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PROBLEMS  OF PROOF  IN CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR  CASES
MARTH:A  A. FIELD f
On September 28,  1971, Congress extended the draft for two years 1
and  made  a  number  of changes  in the  Military  Selective  Service  Act
of  1967.2  Although provisions relating specifically to  conscientious  ob-
jectors were largely unaltered,3 procedural rights granted all registrants
will  have an  effect  on the problems  of proof  and  factfinding  that have
long  vexed  the  determination  of  conscientious  objector  claims.  The
most important of these  procedural  reforms  is  a requirement  that
[i]n the event of a decision adverse to the claim of a registrant,
the local or appeal board making such  decision shall,  upon re-
quest,  furnish to  such  registrant  a brief written  statement  of
the reasons  for  its  decision.'
j Assistant  Professor  of Law,  University  of  Pennsylvania.  A.B.  1965,  Radcliffe;
J.D.  1968,  University  of  Chicago.  Member,  District  of  Columbia  Bar.
IAct  of  Sept.  28,  1971,  Pub.  L. No.  92-129,  tit. I,  § 101 (a) (35),  85  Stat.  353,
amending  Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967  §17(c),  50  U.S.C.  App.  §467(c)
(1970)  (codified  at  50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §467(c)  (Supp.  1972)).  The  amendments
also  changed  the name  of  the  1967  Act  to  the  Military  Selective  Service  Act.  50
U.S.C.A.  App.  §451(a)  (Supp.  1972),  amending Military  Selective  Service  Act  of
1967 § 1(a),  50 U.S.C. App.  §451(a)  (1970).
2 Act  of  Sept.  28,  1971,  Pub.  L.  No.  92-129,  tit.  I,  § 101(a),  85  Stat.  348-55,
amending  Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967  §§ 1-23,  50  U.S.C.  App.  §§ 451-73
(1970)  (codified  at  50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §§451-73  (Supp.  1972)).  The  Act  also
amended  other  aspects  of  federal  law  related  to the  military.
3 The  only statutory  change  relating  specifically  to  conscientious  objectors  trans-
fers responsibility  for administering  the civilian  work program  from  local draft boards
to  the  National  Headquarters  of  the  Selective  Service  System.  50  U.S.C.A.  App.
§456(j)  (Supp.  1972),  amending  Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967  §6(j),  50
U.S.C.  App.  §456(j)  (1970).  A  recent  regulation  requires,  however,  that  the  State
Director,  "under  the  supervision of"  the National  Director  administer  the  alternative
service  program.  32  C.F.R.  § 1660.1 (a)  (1972).  The  duties  of  the  State  Director
with  respect  to  the  alternative  service  program  are  more  specifically  enumerated  at
id. §§ 1660.1(b)  -(c).  These  provisions are  set forth  in note  10 infra.
The  Military  Selective  Service  Act  grants  plenary  rulemaking  power  to  the
President,  50  U.S.C. App.  § 460(b) (1)  (1970),  and  allows  the  President  to  delegate
and  provide  for  the  subdelegation  of  his  authority.  Id.  §460(c).  The  Act  also
creates  the  Selective  Service  System  and  provides  that  it  shall  be  headed  by  a
Director.  Id. §  460 (a) (1).  By  regulation,  the  President  has  granted  the  Director
power
[t]o  prescribe  such rules  and  regulations  as  he shall  deem  necessary  for
the  administration  of the  Selective  Service  System,  the  conduct of  its officers
and  employees,  the  distribution  and  performance  of  its  business,  and  the
custody,  use,  and  preservation  of its  records,  papers,  and  property.
32  C.F.R.  §1604.1(a)  (1972).  By  executive  order,  the  President  has  granted  the
Director  authority  to  make draft  regulations.  Exec.  Order  No.  11,623,  § 1, 3  C.F.R.
211  (1972).  The  President  retained  authority to issue  rules  himself.  Id. § 3.
4Military  Selective  Service  Act  §22(b)(4),  50  U.S.C.A.  A'. §471a(b)(4)
(Supp.  1972),  amending 50  U.S.C.  App.  § 451(a)  (1970).
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This Article will examine the statutory  and procedural  framework
within  which a  claim  of conscientious  objection  must  be asserted  and
will consider various obstacles to reliable factfinding.  It will then focus
on the newly-adopted  requirement  that draft boards reveal  their  bases
of  decision  and  will  evaluate  the  impact  of  that  requirement  on  the
operation  of  the  system.  Finally,  it will  suggest  a  new  approach  to
dealing  with  conscientious  objector  claims.
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  JUDICIAL  PROCEDURE
A.  Selective Service Procedures
Section  6(j)  of  the  Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967  ex-
empts from combatant service any person  "who,  by reason of religious
training and  belief,  is  conscientiously  opposed  to  participation  in  war
in  any form."  '  Church training  or membership  is not  required;  the
Supreme  Court  has  held  that a  person's  objection  is  sufficiently  "re-
ligious"  if it  "stem[s]  from the registrant's  moral,  ethical,  or religious
beliefs  about  what  is  right  and  wrong  and  . . . these  beliefs  [are]
held with the strength of traditional religious  convictions."  6 Total op-
550 U.S.C.  App.  §456(j)  (1970),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.  § 456(j)  (Supp.
1972).  The section  provides:
Nothing  contained  in  this  title  . . shall  be  construed  to  require  any
person  to  be  subject  to  combatant  training  and  service  in  the  armed  forces
of  the  United  States  who,  by reason  of  religious  training  and  belief,  is  con-
scientiously  opposed  to  participation  in  war  in  any  form.  As  used  in  this
subsection,  the term "religious  training and belief"  does  not include  essentially
political,  sociological,  or  philosophical  views,  or  a  merely  personal  moral
code.  Any  person  claiming  exemption  from  combatant  training  and  service
because  of such  conscientious  objections  whose  claim  is  sustained by  the  local
board  shall, if  he is inducted  into  the  armed  forces  under  this title  . . . be
assigned  to  noncombatant  service  as defined  by the  President,  or  shall,  if he
is  found  to  be  conscientiously  opposed  to  participation  in  such  noncombatant
service,  in  lieu  of  such  induction,  be  ordered  by  his  local  board,  subject  to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, to perform  for a period equal
to  the  period  prescribed  in section  4(b)  [24 months]  such  civilian work  con-
tributing  to  the  maintenance  of the national  health,  safety, or  interest  . . .
and any  such  person  who  knowingly fails  or neglects  to  obey  any  such  order
from  his local  board  shall  be  deemed,  for  the  purposes  of  section  12  of  this
title  . . . to  have  knowingly  failed or  neglected  to  perform  a  duty  required
of  him under  this  title  ....
6 Welsh  v.  United  States,  398  U.S.  333,  340  (1970)  (opinion  of  Black,  j.).
The  Court  so held  despite  the  statutory  provision  limiting the  meaning  of  "religious
training and belief."  See note  5 supra.  It held  also that the only persons excluded are
"those  whose  beliefs  are  not  deeply  held  and  those  whose  objection  to  war  does  not
rest  at  all  upon  moral,  ethical,  or  religious  principle  but  instead  rests  solely  upon
considerations  of  policy,  pragmatism,  or  expediency."  Id. at 342-43.  The  statutory
construction  that  led  to  this  result  will  be  explored  more  extensively.  See  text
accompanying  notes  112-33  infra.
Although  Mr. Justice Black's  opinion  announcing  the judgment  of the  Court was
joined  by  only three other  Justices,  the test it adopts  for  conscientious  objection  was
concurred  in  by  a majority  of  the  Court.  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  did  not  accept  the
conclusion  that  the  test adopted  could  be  arrived  at  as  a  matter  of  statutory  con-
struction, but  he considered  the  statute unconstitutional  and  adopted  the  same  test  as
Mr. Justice  Black  "not as a reflection  of congressional  statutory  intent but  as  patch-
work  of judicial  making  that  cures  the  defect  of under-inclusion  in  §6(j)  ...  "
398  U.S.  at 366-67  (concurring  opinion).
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position to the use of force in any and all circumstances  is not necessary;
one's  objection need  only  extend  to  "war  in any  form."  7
A  person  meeting  this  test  for  conscientious  objection  may  be
classified  I-A-0  8  and,  if  inducted,  he will  be assigned  to  service  that
does not require  killing or bearing  arms.  Typically,  I-A-O's  serve as
medics,  though  they  may  work  in  other  noncombatant  jobs  as,  for
example,  cooks  or truck  drivers.'  If,  however,  a man's  conscientious
objection extends  also to noncombatant  service he will be  classified  I-0
and  exempted  from  all  military  service."  Instead  of  military  service,
the  1-0  registrant  who  would  otherwise  be  inducted  is  required  to
perform  "such  civilian  work  contributing  to  the  maintenance  of  the
national health, safety, or interest as the  [National]  Director may deem
appropriate  . . . ...  "  The  registrant  performing  alternate  civilian
7  Gillette  v.  United  States,  401  U.S.  437,  447-48  (1971)  (emphasis  added);
Sicurella  v.  United  States,  348  U.S.  385,  389-90  (1955);  see  United  States  v.
Haughton,  413  F.2d  736,  740-42  (9th  Cir.  1969)  ; United  States  v.  Carroll,  398  F.2d
651,  655  (3d  Cir.  1968).  In  practice,  however,  a  registrant  who  does  claim  total
nonviolence  may  have  less- difficulty  getting  his  claim  sustained.  Reisner,  Selective
Service  Appeal  Boards  and  the  Conscientio s  Objector Claimant:  Congressional
Standards and Administrative Behavior, 1971  Wis.  L. REv.  521,  537.
8 By  regulation,  each  registrant is  classified  in  one  of  several  enumerated  classes.
32  C.F.R.  §§ 1622.1-.2  (1972).  Classification  I-A-O  includes
every registrant  who would have  been classified  in Class  I-A but  for the  fact
that he has  been  found,  by reason of religious,  ethical, or  moral  belief,  to  be
conscientiously  opposed  to participation  in  combatant  training  and  service  in
the  armed  forces.
37 Fed. Reg. 5121  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at 32  C.F.R.  § 1622.11).
9 An executive order  defines  noncombatant  training as "any  training  which  is  not
concerned  with  the  study,  use,  or  handling  of  arms  or  weapons"  and  noncombatant
service  as:
(a)  service in any unit  . . .which  is unarmed  at all  times;  (b)  service  in
the  medical  department  of any  of the  armed  forces,  wherever  performed;  or
(c)  any other assignment  the  primary  function  of which  does  not require  the
use  of arms in  combat;  provided  that  such  other  assignment  is  acceptable  to
the  individual  concerned  and  does  not  require  him  to  bear  arms  or  to  be
trained  in  their use.
Exec.  Order  No.  10,028,  14  Fed.  Reg.  211  (1949),  50 U.S.C.  Apr.  §456  (1970).
10 37  Fed.  Reg. 5121  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32 C.F.R.  § 1622.14).
1150 U.S.C.A.  App.  §456(j)  (Supp.  1972),  amending  50  U.S.C.  APP.  §456(j)
(1970).  New  regulations,  in  addition  to generally subdelegating  the  National  Direc-
tor's  authority  to  administer  the  civilian  work  program  to  the  State  Director,  see
note 3  supra, provide  that "[tihe  State director  of the  State  in  which  a  registrant  is
registered  will  have  primary  responsibility  for  the initial  placement  of the  registrant
in alternate  service."  32  C.F.R.  § 1660.1 (b)  (1972).
The  registrant  is  able  to  play  an  active  role  in  selecting  his  job  assignment.
He may  submit  proposed  jobs  to  the  State  Director.  If a  proposed  job  is  approved,
a  work  order  is  issued.  37  Fed.  Reg.  5127  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.
§§ 1660.3,  .7(b)).  If  the  job  is  not  approved,  the  registrant  may  seek  review  of
that  decision.  32  C.F.R. § 1660.7(e)  (1972).  The  1-0  registrant  may  accept  a  job
anticipating  that  it  will  be  approved  as  alternate  service.  If he  is  correct,  he  will
receive  credit for the  time he has worked  (but  only time after  he was  classified  1-0)
prior  to  approval.  Id. § 1660.7(d).  Only  if  a registrant  has  (a)  taken  a  job  that
is  subsequently  disapproved;  or  (b)  not  submitted  any  approved  jobs  to  the  State
Director  within  60  days  from  the  time  he  was  classified  1-0  will  he be  ordered  to
take  a  specific  alternate  service  job.  Id.  §§ 1660.7(c),  (e).
Government  jobs  and  jobs  with  charitable  or  nonprofit  organizations  that  are
primarily  for the  benefit  of the  public, id.  § 1660.5,  are  among  those  that  qualify  for
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service  is paid  by the  employer  at the  going  rate for his  job.'  The
period of this service is two years 's-the equivalent  of the active  duty
period  of the inducted  soldier,  combatant  or noncombatant. 4
A man must register  for the draft at age  18.15  Each registrant  is
assigned  to  a  local  draft  board,  the  board  of  his  permanent  place  of
residence.'"  Registrants  are to  be  classified  as  soon  as possible  after
they  first  register.'7   Early  classification  is  facilitated  by  the  recent
creation  of the I-H  holding category,  a preliminary  classification of  all
registrants  who  are  "not currently  subject to processing  for  induction
.. ..,,1  By executive order, a random selection  sequence determines
the order of  draft eligibility.'"  Those  registrants  whose lottery num-
bers  are  sufficiently  high  may  remain  indefinitely  in  class  I-H;  those
fulfilling  the  alternate  service  requirement.  In  determining  whether  a particular  job
is acceptable  for  alternate  service  five  factors  are  to  be  considered:
(1)  National Health, Safety  or Interest.  The  job  must  fulfill  specifications
of the  law and  regulations.
(2)  Noninterference with the competitive labor market.  The registrant cannot
be  assigned  to  a  job  for  which there  are more numerous  qualified  appli-
cants  not in  Class  1-0  than  spaces  available.  This  restriction  does  not
prohibit the approval  of special programs  such as Peace  Corps or VISTA
for alternate  service  by  registrants  in  Class  1-0.
(3)  Compensation.  The compensation  will provide a standard of living to the
registrant  reasonably  comparable  to the  standard  of living the  same  man
would have enjoyed  had he gone into  the  service.
(4)  Skill  and  talent  utilization.  A  registrant  may  utilize  his  special  skills.
(5)  Job location.  A  registrant  will  work  outside  his  community  of  residence.
Subparagraphs  (3),  (4),  and  (5)  of  this  paragraph  are  waiverable  by
the  State  director  when  such  action  is  determined  to  be  in  the  national  interest
and would  speed  the  placement  of registrants  in alternate  service.
Id.  § 1660.6  (as  amended  by 37  Fed.  Reg. 5127  (1972)).  Many  of  the  same  criteria
had  been  developed  earlier.  See  Local  Board  Mem.  No. 64,  Sms..  SERv.  L.  REP.  2183
(1962,  amended  1968)  (rescinded,  5  Sm..  Smv.  L.  REP.  8  (1972))  ;  Local  Board  Mem.
No. 98,  Smr.  Smv.  L.  REP.  2200:7  (1969)  (rescinded,  5  SEL.  Smv.  L.  REP.  8  (1972)).
12 32 C.F.R.  § 1660.6(3)  (1972),  quoted in  note  11  supra, suggests,  however,  that
jobs  in which  the registrant  is  well  compensated  should  not  be  approved.  The  pro-
vision  is  waivable,  however.  Moreover,  there  is  probably  not  a  great  difference
between  the  serviceman's  standard  of  living  and  that  obtainable  via most  alternate
service  jobs when  the market values  of room and board  are added to the serviceman's
wages.
13  32 C.F.R.  § 1660.7(d)  (1972).
'4Military  Selective  Service  Act  §4(b),  50  U.S.C.  App.  §454(b)  (1970),  as
amended, 50 U.S.C.A.  App.  §454(b)  (Supp.  1972).  Inductees,  however,  are  subject
in  addition  to  a  reserve  commitment  not  applicable  to  alternate  service  workers.
Id.  §4(d),  50 U.S.C. Ap,.  §454(d)  (1970),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §454(d)
(Supp.  1972).  Proposals  to  add  a  similar  burden  to  conscientious  objectors  were
dropped  from the  1971  amendments.  See H.R.  REP.  No. 433,  92d  Cong.,  1st Sess.  21
(1971).
'5  Military  Selective  Service  Act  § 3,  50  U.S.C.  APP.  § 453  (1970),  as amended,
50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §453  (Supp.  1972).
1632  C.F.R.  § 1613.12  (1972).  There  are  more  than  4,000  such  boards  in  the
country.  CENTRAL  COmmITTEE  FOR  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJEcTORS,  HANDBOOK  FOR COX-
SCIENTIOUS  OBJECTORS  10  (1968).
1732  C.F.R.  §1623.1  (1972).
'1 Id.  § 1622.18.
'9  Proclamation  No.  3945,  34  Fed.  Reg.  19,017  (1969),  50  U.S.C.  App.  § 455
(1970);  Exec.  Order  No.  11,497,  32 C.F.R.  § 1631.1  (1972).
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with  lower  numbers  will  be  reclassified  out  of  the  I-H  category-as
I-A  unless  they  are eligible for  another  class.2°
The proper  classification of a man whose  lottery number  is below
the I-H cutoff  is  determined from information  he provides  in the Reg-
istration  Questionnaire  (Form  100)  21  which  he receives  when he reg-
isters.22   The form calls  for general information  about the registrant-
such  as  his  occupation  and  marital  status-which  is  relevant  to  pos-
sible  deferments  or exemptions.23  It includes a question on the subject
of  conscientious  objection:  "Do  you  claim  to  be  a conscientious  ob-
jector  based  on  moral,  ethical  or religious  beliefs  which  prevent  your
participation  in combatant  and/or  noncombatant  military  service ?"  24
A  registrant  who  answers  affirmatively  is  furnished  Form  150  and
instructed  to submit  it to  his board.25
On Form  150  the registrant  must indicate  whether  his  conscien-
tious objection extends to noncombatant  service  and,  if so,  the reasons
why.2 6   He must also describe his belief;  why it is sufficiently religious,
moral,  or ethical;  how and  from what sources  he  acquired  it; and  the
ways  in which  he  has  manifested  it.
27   In  addition  to  Form  150,  the
registrant may  present  all  relevant  written  information  regarding  his
conscientious  objection,  and  he  may  submit  references  in  support  of
his  claim.
2
1
The registrant  who  receives  Form  150  in response  to a  conscien-
tious objector  claim  on his  Registration  Questionnaire  must  return  it
20 Selective Service Registrants  Processing Manual § 622.18  in  SEL.  SERV.  L.  REP.
2622:1  (1972).
2137  Fed.  Reg.  5121  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1621.9).  See
Selective  Service Registrants Processing Manual § 613  in  SEL.  Smv.  L.  REP.  2613:1
(1972).  For  a  discussion  of  the  Manual, which  sets  out  a  new  procedure,  see
5  SEL.  SERV.  L.  REtP.  3  (1972).  The  Registration  Questionnaire  was  formerly  called
the  Classification  Questionnaire  [Form  100].  32  C.F.R.  § 1621.9  (1971).
22 Selective Service Registrants Processing Manual § 613.4 in  SEL.  Smv. L.  REP.
2613:1  (1972).
23 For  a  copy  of Form  100,  see  SEL.  SEav.  L.  REP'.  2156:3  (1972).  Under  the
old  system,  shortly after  a  man  registered,  his  local  board  sent him  this  form.  The
order  in  which  the  forms  were  sent  was  determined  chronologically  by  birth  date.
32  C.F.R.  § 1621.9  (1971).
24 SEL.  SERv.  L.  REP.  2156:3  (1972).  Form  100  was in need  of updating because
it  failed  to  inform  the  registrant  that  moral  or  ethical  beliefs  may  entitle  him  to
conscientious  objector  status.  See United  States  v. VanCleve,  4  SEL.  SERV.  L.  REP.
3494  (D.  MINN.,  Aug.  30,  1971).  The  new  form  bears  a  revision  date  of  Nov.  5,
1971.  SEL.  Smv. L.  REP.  2156:3  (1972).
2532  C.F.R. § 1621.11  (1972).
26 Form  150,  37 Fed.  Reg. 487  (1972).
27 Id.
28 See  37 Fed.  Reg. 5121  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1621.12).  The
old  Form  150  provided  space  to  list  references  who  could  provide  the  board  with
further  information  regarding  the  registrant's  conscientious  objection.  Form  150
(superseded),  SEL.  SERV.  L.  REP.  2156:14  (1968).  The submission  of references  has
been  of some  importance  in  having  a  claim  sustained;  see  Reisner,  supra note  7,  at
538, and  registrants would  be well-advised  to  continue  to  list  them  and  submit  letters
from  them.
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within thirty days.29'  But his draft board will not necessarily  consider
the conscientious  objector  claim as soon  as the form is  received.  The
regulations  require  that  a registrant  be given  the lowest  classification
to which he  is entitled." 0   I-A-available  for induction-is the highest
classification.  I-A-0  and  I-0  are  the  next  highest,  in  that  order."'
If, therefore,  the registrant's questionnaire establishes grounds for some
lower classification-such as a student deferment, a hardship deferment,
or  a  sole  surviving  son  exemption-his  conscientious  objector  claim
will not be considered;  it will be held in abeyance  until such time as it
becomes  relevant  to his status. 3
A  man  who  has not  made  a  conscientious  objector  claim  at  the
time of registration may still do  so at any time prior to the mailing of
his induction  notice by writing to his local board  and requesting  Form
150.33  If at the time he files the form his status is I-A, and if his  sub-
mission makes  out a prima facie  case for conscientious  objector status,
the  board  is  obliged  4  to  reopen  his  classification  to  pass  on the  new
claim.
35
It  is  advantageous  to file  a conscientious  objector  claim  as  soon
as possible,  for a board is  more likely to trust the sincerity  of a  claim
that is promptly  made.3 0   A claim  made shortly before  induction  may
29 SEL.  SERv.  L. REP.  2156:14.1  (1968).
30 32  C.F.R.  § 1623.2  (1972).
31Id.
32 Draft boards  do not  uniformly follow  this rule,  however.  Some  seem  to  pass
on  conscientious  objector  claims  as  soon  as  received.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.
Owen,  415  F.2d 383  (8th  Cir. 1969).
33 See  32  C.F.R.  § 1621.11  (1972)  ; 37 Fed.  Reg. 5123  (1972)  (to  be codified  at
32  C.F.R. § 1625.2)  ; notes  304-06  infra & accompanying  text.
34  Mulloy v. United  States,  398  U.S.  410  (1970).  See  37  Fed.  Reg. 5123  (1972)
(to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1625.2).  It  is  of  moment  to  the  registrant  whether
the board  denies  his  claim  after  reopening  or  whether  it refuses  to  reopen.  If  the
board reopens and then denies the claim,  the registrant has  the same  rights  of personal
appearance  and appeal  as  after  the initial  classification.  32  C.F.R.  § 1625.11  (1972).
If  the  board  refuses  to  reopen,  however,  no  appeal  is  possible  and  the  registrant  is
subject  to  immediate  induction.
A  rule that a board  could  reopen  or not,  in its  discretion,  would  permit  a board
to deny  appeal  rights  of  all  but  its  initial  classifications.  The  difficulty  with  a rule
allowing  a  registrant  to  force  a board  to reopen  simply  by  submitting  information,
whether  or  not  that  information  proves  true,  is  that  on  its  face  it  empowers  a
registrant, who cannot be drafted while appeals  are pending, 37 Fed. Reg. 5124  (1972)
(to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  §§ 1626.6  (appeal  to  appeal  board),  1627.7  (1972)
(appeal  to  Presidential  Board)  (formerly  32  C.F.R.  §§ 1626.41,  1627.8  (1971)),  to
delay  his  induction  indefinitely.  The  Supreme  Court  was  satisfied  that  the  board's
power  not to  reopen where  claims are  "plainly  incredible,"  coupled  with  the statutory
criminal  penalties  for  registrants  who  make  false  statements  to  their  board,  were
sufficient  to  protect  against  this  tactic.  Mulloy  v. United  States,  398  U.S.  410,  418
n.7  (1970).
35 If, however, the registrant  holds  a  lower  classification  when  he files  the  form,
the  question  of  his  conscientious  objection  should  be  held  in  abeyance.  See  text
accompanying notes 29-32 supra & note  32.
30  Common sense indicates  that this would  be true, and  empirical  studies  of draft
board  operations  show  that the  factor  may  be  critical.  See  Reisner,  supra note  7,
at  536;  Rabin,  Do  You  Believe  in  a Supreme Being-The  Administration of  the
Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967  Wis. L.  REv.  642,  680.
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well  seem  a  calculated  evasion."  A board  is  not  entitled  to  deny  a
claim,  however,  simply  because  it  is  filed  late,38  so  long  as  it  is  filed
prior to the mailing  of an induction  order.39
The  registrant  can have  all  information  relevant  to  his  classifica-
tion placed  in his Selective  Service  file by sending  it in writing  to the
board.40  When his  conscientious  objector  claim  becomes  relevant  to
his classification,  the local board  considers  whether  to grant  the claim
"on the basis  of the official  forms  of the Selective  Service  System and
such other written information as may be contained in  [the registrant's]
file  . ... "  41  The  file  will  include  the  registrant's  classification
questionnaire,  his  Form  150,  his  correspondence  with  his  board,  and
any material he has submitted  to aid the board  in arriving at a proper
classification.  It  may also  include  unsolicited  information  from  third
parties 42  and  information gathered  by the board.  The board  can  sup-
plement  an inadequate  file by  requesting a  registrant  to provide  added
information,4"  by  requesting  other  governmental  agencies  to  provide
information,44  or by issuing subpoenas  directing "any person" to testify
37 See United  States  ex  rel. Hemes  v.  McNulty,  432  F.2d  1182,  1187  (7th  Cir.
1970)  (dictum);  United  States  v.  Pritchard,  413  F.2d  663,  666  (4th  Cir.),  cert.
denied, 396  U.S.  995  (1969)  ; Bishop  v. United  States, 412  F.2d  1064,  1068  (9th  Cir.
1969)  ;  United  States  v. Henderson,  411  F.2d  224,  227  (5th  Cir.  1969),  cert. denied,
399  U.S. 916  (1970).  Heroes, Pritchard,  and Henderson are  of questionable  validity.
In these  cases,  the  courts  were  apparently  willing  to  allow  the registrants'  sincerity
to be thrown into  question by the fact that the  registrants had  waited until their  other
deferment  possibilities  were exhausted  before  seeking  I-0 status.  Other  cases  have
rejected  this conclusion  on  the ground that  32  C.F.R.  § 1623.2  (1972)  precludes  con-
sideration  of a 1-0  claim  if another  deferment  is available.  United  States  v.  Ruther-
ford,  437  F.2d  182,  184-86  (8th  Cir.  1971);  United  States  v.  Lemmens,  430  F.2d
619,  624  (7th  Cir.  1970);  United  States  v.  Bornemann,  424  F.2d  1343,  1347-48  (2d
Cir.  1970).  See  United  States  v.  Broyles,  423  F.2d  1299,  1305-06  (4th  Cir.  1970)
(en  banc)  (discussing  possible  reasons  why,  in  light  of  § 1623.2,  those  with  other
deferments  may  not  choose  to  claim  1-0  status);  United  States  v.  Wingerter,  423
F.2d  1015,  1019  (5th  Cir.  1970).
38 Clay v. United States,  403 U.S.  698,  702-03  (1971).  See United  States  ex rel.
Hemes  v.  McNulty, 432  F.2d  1182,  1187-88  (7th  Cir.  1970)  (dictum)  ;  United  States
v. Broyles,  423  F.2d  1299,  1305  (4th  Cir. 1970)  (en  banc) ; cf. United  States  ex rel.
Lehman  v.  Laird,  430  F.2d  96, 99  (4th  Cir.  1970)  (delay  until  Vietnam  service  was
imminent was  not,  standing alone,  a  reason  for  denial  of  1-0  claim)  ;  Capobianco  v.
Laird,  424  F.2d  1304  (2d  Cir.  1970),  vacated and  remanded, 402  U.S.  969  (1971)
(remanded  for reconsideration in light of Ehlert v. United  States, 402 U.S. 99  (1971))
(fact  that  claim  was  made  after  induction  notice  was  received  was  not,  standing
alone,  sufficient  to  deny  reopening  of registrant's  classification).
39 Ehlert  v. United  States,  402 U.S.  99  (1971)  ; 32  C.F.R. § 1625.2  (1972).  See
notes  304-06  infra & accompanying  text.
40See  37  Fed.  Reg.  5121  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  §§  1621.12,
1622.1(a));  32  C.F.R. § 1625.1 (a)  (1972).
4132 C.F.R. § 1623.1(b)  (1972).
42See  37  Fed.  Reg.  5121  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  §§ 1621.12,
1622.1 (a)).
4332 C.F.R.  § 1621.13  (1972).
44 Id. § 1621.14.  The local board can itself request information  from  local agencies.
It  must  request  the  State  Director  to  obtain  information  from  state  or  national
welfare  or  governmental  agencies.  Id.
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before  it and to produce relevant  documents.45   Information within the
personal  knowledge  of  any  board  member  may  also  be  considered.46
In all cases,  however,  information  the board  receives  must  be  reduced
to writing  and placed  in the  file  for it to be  legitimately  considered.
47
Its inclusion  in the file is deemed to give the registrant notice that it is
before  the  board.
48
While the board has power  to seek out for  itself information  per-
taining to  the proper  classification  of a registrant,  the regulations  im-
pose  on it no duty to do so.  Since under the regulations the registrant
bears  the burden of convincing the board that he is entitled  to  a classi-
fication  lower  than I-A,49 the  board  has little  incentive  to  supplement
an  inadequate  file;  if  information  in  the  file  is  insufficient  to  show
whether or not the registrant  is  entitled to  a deferment  or exemption,
the registrant has not made his case, and the board may properly  deny
his  claim." 0
A registrant dissatisfied  with the board's classification has a right
either  to  appeal  immediately 1  or  to  appear  personally  before  the
board.52  The Selective  Service  System depicts the personal appearance
451d. § 1621.15.
46 Id.  § 1623.1 (b).
47 Id.
48 Id. § 1641.5  (1972).  The  registrant  is  not  informed  when  the  local  board
receives information,  whether  favorable or not.  But he  does have the right to inspect
his file at any time,  id. §§ 1606.32(a)  (1),  1670.8(a)  (1),  which is  deemed  to give  him
notice.  See, e.g.,  United States  v. Mendoza,  295  F. Supp.  673,  680  (E.D.N.Y.  1969).
One  recent  case  suggests,  however,  that  the registrant  is not  deemed  to  have  notice
of  adverse  information  when  he  is  "justifiably  unaware"  of its  insertion  in  his  file.
United  States  v.  Fisher,  442 F.2d  109,  115-16  (7tlh  Cir.  1971)  (registrant  incorrectly
informed  by board  employee  that  nothing had  been  added  to  his  file).  Similarly,  in
United  States v. Owen, 415  F.2d  383,  388  (8th  Cir.  1969),  the court  said:
While  we may charge  literate registrants with  knowledge of information with
which  they are  directly confronted,  such  as that  contained  on  registration  or
classification  cards,  we  may  not  expect  a  working  knowledge  of  selective
service regulations  or inquiry  at the  office of the  local board  to guard against
information  received from an outside  source.
The court  held that the registrant  before  it had been
denied a basic  procedural right when he was classified  by the  local board  and
the  appeal  board  without  first  being  apprised  of adverse  information  in his
file  and  being  given  an  opportunity  to  rebut it.
Id. at 389.
49 See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10  (1972)  ("In  Class I-A  shall be placed  every registrant
who  has  failed  to  establish  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  local  board,  subject  to  appeal
hereinafter  provided,  that he is eligible  for classification  in  another  class.").  See also
id. § 1623.2;  37 Fed. Reg.  5121  (1972)  (to be codified at 32  C.F.R.  § 1622.1).
50 Similarly, the regulations  provide that  "the  board  shall proceed with the regis-
trant's  classification  whenever  he fails  to  provide  the board  in a  timely  manner  with
any  information  concerning  his  status  which  he is  requested  or  required  to  furnish."
32 C.F.R. § 1623.1(b)  (1972).  The old regulations  specifically  provided for  classifica-
tion  whenever  Form  100 was  not returned  in time.  32  C.F.R.  § 1623.1(b)  (1971).
5137 Fed.  Reg.  5123  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at 32  C.F.R.  § 1626.1).  No  appeal
is allowed  from the  initial  I-H classification.  Id.
52 Id. 5122  (to  be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(a)).  The new  regulations  allow
conscientious  objector  claimants  to make  a  personal  appearance  before  classification
instead  of  following  classification,  at their  option.  Id. (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.
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as  an opportunity for the registrant to  "discuss  his  case with his local
board  members  as  he  would  with  his neighbors."  "  The  regulations
provide:
At any  such  appearance,  the registrant  may present  evi-
dence,  including witnesses, may discuss his classification, may
point out the class or classes  in which he thinks he should have
been  placed,  and may  direct  attention  to  any  information  in
his file which he believes the local board has overlooked  or to
which he believes it has not given sufficient weight.  The reg-
istrant  may  present  such  further  information  as  he  believes
will assist the local board in determining his proper classifica-
tion.  Such  information  shall be  in writing,  or  if oral,  shall
be  summarized  in  writing  by  the  registrant  and,  in  either
event, shall be placed  in the registrant's file. 4
The personal  appearance  is  closed  to  the public,55  and  procedural
protections  are  far more  limited than  is  customary  in proceedings  in-
volving  critical  administrative  determinations." 5  The  aim  of  such  a
procedure, according to General  Hershey, is to keep the System "simple
enough so that the average citizen  can  see  how it works."  "  Prior to
the  1971 amendments,  it was discretionary with the local board whether
to  allow  "person [s]  to  appear  before  it with  or on  behalf  of a  regis-
trant,"  58  and the registrant  was typically  the only  witness  at the per-
sonal appearance.  The amendments provide that "[s] ubject to reason-
able limitations  on the number of witnesses  and  the total time allotted
to  each  registrant,  each  registrant  shall  have the right  to  present wit-
§ 1624.1(b));  see  50  U.S.C.A.  Asp.  §  471a (b)  (1)  (Supp.  1972).  The  1971  amend-
ments  provided,  for  the first  time,  that  a quorum  of  the board-that  is,  a  majority
of  the  board's  members-must  attend  the  personal  appearance.  50  U.S.C.A.  App.
§ 471a(b)  (3)  (Supp.  1972),  amending 50  U.S.C. App.  § 471a(b)  (1970).  Previously
the  presence  of one  board member  was  sufficient.  See  32  C.F.R.  § 1624.2  (1971).
53 SELECTIVE  SERVICE SYSTEM,  THE  CLASSIFICATION  PROCESS  158  (Special  Mono-
graph  No.  5,  1950).
5437  Fed.  Reg.  5122  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  §1624.4(b)).  The
right  to  present  evidence  and  witnesses  was  not  included  under  the  old  regulations.
32 C.F.R.  § 1624.2(b)  (1971).
55  For  a  discussion  of  the rationale  and  the  regulatory  basis  for  this  practice,
see  Reisner,  The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Review, 35  U. CaI.  L. REV.  686, 697-98  (1968).
56 Although the  1971  amendments  provided  that Selective  Service  System  regula-
tions must be  prepublished,  they continued the System's  exemption  from  the operation
of  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act.  Military  Selective  Service  Act  § 13(b),  50
U.S.C.A.  App.  §463(b)  (Supp.  1972),  amending  50  U.S.C.  App.  §463(b)  (1970).
That  exemption  may  originally  have  been  unthinkingly  granted  to  the  System.  See
Note,  The Selective Service, 76 YALE  L.J.  160,  183  n.133  (1966).
57Hearings on S.  4164 Before  the  Senate Military Affairs  Comm.,  76th  Cong.,
3d  Sess.  384  (1940).
5832  C.F.R.  § 1624.1(b)  (1971);  see  Uffelman  v.  United  States,  230  F.2d  297,
303  (9th  Cir.  1956)  (upholding  local  board's  refusal  to  allow  registrant  to  present
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nesses  on his  behalf  before  the  local  board."  9 The  amendments  do
not, however,  change the provision of the regulations  denying the  reg-
istrant representation  by legal counsel,"0  although the Senate version  of
the bill would have  granted  "the right to be  accompanied  and  advised
by private  counsel." 6-
The  regulations  do not provide for the personal  appearance  to  be
transcribed.  Even when the board  clerk keeps minutes of the meetings,
they are not generally made a matter  of public record.  If a  registrant
asks the board to allow him to bring  his own  stenographer,  the board
may  acquiesce  or not, in  its discretion. 2  But  a  registrant  does  have
the  right,  after  the  hearing  has  been  concluded,  to  prepare  his  own
summary  of what transpired and to submit it for inclusion in the file.63
The board, of course, may also place  a summary  in the  file.  After  the
personal appearance,  the board  again decides  on the registrant's  classi-
fication and informs him of its decision."  The registrant who has had
a personal  appearance  and  wishes  to  contest  his  classification  further
has a  right to appeal. 5
There  are ninety-four  appeal  boards 6  and  a  Presidential  Appeal
Board,  formally  named  the  National  Selective  Service  Appeal  Board.
While every registrant may appeal  to his appeal  board, there  is a right
to seek further review  before  the Presidential  board only  if the appeal
59 Military  Selective  Service  Act  §22(b)(2),  50  U.S.C.A.  APP.  §471a(b)  (2)
(Supp.  1972),  amending 50  U.S.C.  APP.  §471  (1970).  A  registrant  who  "does  not
speak  English  adequately"  has  a right  to appear  with an  interpreter.  37  Fed. Reg.
5122  (1972)  (to be codified at 32  C.F.R.  § 1624.4(d)).
6037  Fed.  Reg.  5122  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1624.4(e)).  In
United  States  v.  Weller,  309  F. Supp.  50  (N.D.  Cal.  1969),  the  registrant  argued
that  the  regulation  denying  him  the right  to  have  his  retained  attorney  accompany
him  at the  personal  appearance  was not  authorized  by the  Selective  Service Act  and,
if  authorized,  was  unconstitutional.  The  Court  found  for  the  registrant,  seemingly
on  both grounds.  309 F. Supp.  at 56.  The government  appealed  the  decision to  the
Supreme  Court of  the United  States, but that  Court  concluded,  after  argument,  that
it lacked  jurisdiction.  It  remanded  the  case  to  the United  States  Court  of  Appeals
for  the Ninth Circuit.  401  U.S.  254  (1971).
6 1 See H.R.  REP.  No.  433,  92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  29  (1971).
62 See  O'Brien  v.  Resor,  423  F.2d  594,  598  (4th  Cir.  1970);  United  States  v.
Tittlerud, 2  SEL.  SERv.  L. REP.  3283  (D.  Minn.  1969).  The  board  may  not  allow
the registrant  to tape  record  his  personal  appearance.  Letter  to  all  State  Directors
(00-43)  from  Daniel  J.  Cronin,  Assistant  Deputy  Director,  Operations,  Oct.  26,
1971,  SEL.  SERv.  L. REP.  2200:89.
63 37  Fed.  Reg. 5122  (1972)  (to be codified  at 32  C.F.R.  § 1624.4(b)).
64 Id.  (to be  codified  at 32  C.F.R.  § 1624.6).  A  majority  of the  local  board  is
the necessary  quorum  when voting  on  a  classification.  32  C.F.R.  § 1604.56  (1972).
The  National  Director  prescribes  the  number  of  members  of  the  local  board.  Id.
§ 1604.52.  A  3-  to  5-member  board  is  typical.  Until  the recent  regulations,  a  local
board had  to consist of at least  3 members.  32  C.F.R.  §  1604.52(a)  (1971).
6537  Fed.  Reg.  5123  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1626.1).  The  regis-
trant  who decides  not  to exercise  his right  to  a  personal  appearance  may  also contest
the action of  his local board before an appeal  board.  Id.  (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
§§ 1626.1,  2).  See note 181  infra.
66See  32  C.F.R.  § 1604.21  (1972);  CENTRAL CoMMTTEE  For  CONscIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS,  HANDBOOK  FOR CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTORS  10  (1970).
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board  is divided. 7  The registrant  is not the only person who  can ap-
peal.  The State  and  National Directors  of the  Selective  Service  may
appeal at any time.
68
The new  regulations provide that when the National  or  State Di-
rector decides to appeal, he "shall place in the registrant's  file a written
statement  of his  reasons  for taking  such  appeal."  6"  When  the regis-
trant  appeals,  he  "may attach  to his  appeal a statement  specifying  the
reasons he  believes  the  classification  inappropriate,  directing  attention
to any information in his file which he believes received  inadequate  con-
sideration,  and setting out more fully any information  which  was  sub-
mitted."  70  Prior to the amendments,  the appeal  board was to  classify
the registrant  anew solely on the basis of the evidence  contained  in his
file. 7'  The  1971  statutory  amendments,  however,  created for the first
time the right to a personal appearance  before  both the appeal  board 7?
and the Presidential  board.73   Both appellate  bodies may now consider
information presented by the registrant during his personal appearance. 7 4
A quorum of the appeal board must attend the appearance, 7  but there is
no right to present witnesses at that stage.76
When a registrant  has  exhausted  his appeals within the  Selective
Service  System,  he  can pursue  the  issue  of  classification  further  only
by presenting  enough  new  information  to  require a  reopening.
77
B.  Avenues of Judicial Review
A  registrant  whose  conscientious  objector  claim  has  been  finally
denied within the Selective  Service  System has several  alternatives  open
to him.  He may refuse to submit to  induction  and defend  an ensuing
67 37  Fed.  Reg. 5124  (1972)  (to be  codified  at 32  C.F.R.  § 1627.1 (b)).
68 Id.  5123  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1626.1).  Before  the  new  regulations,
the  government  appeal  agent,  whose  general  duty  was  to  advise  and  aid  both  regis-
trants  and  local  board  members  as  to  applicable  law,  had  a  right  to  appeal  local
board  decisions.  32  C.F.R.  § 1626.2(a)  (1971).  The  appeal  agent's  duties  were
described  in  id. § 1604.71.  The  new  regulations  abolish  the  position  of  government
appeal agent.  36  Fed.  Reg.  23,375  (1971).
6937 Fed. Reg. 5123  (1972)  (to be  codified  at  32 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (a)).
70 Id.  (to  be  codified  at 32  C.F.R. § 1626.3 (e)).
7132  C.F.R.  §  1626.24  (1972).
72 Military  Selective  Service  Act,  §22(b)  (1),  50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §471a(b)  (1),
amending 50  U.S.C.  Ap.  § 471  (1970)  ; 37  Fed.  Reg.  5123  (1972)  (to  be codified  at
32 C.F.R.  § 1626.3 (c)).
73 Military  Selective  Service  Act,  §22(b)  (1),  50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §471a(b)  (1)
(Supp.  1972),  amending 50  U.S.C.  App.  §471  (1970).  37  Fed.  Reg.  5124  (1972)
(to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1627.3(d)).  The  statute  allows  an  appearance  before
"any appeal  board  of the  Selective  Service  System."  In  view  of  the  regulation,  it is
a moot issue whether  this  includes  the  National Board.
7437  Fed.  Reg.  5124  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  §§16 26.4(g)(3),
1627.4(g)  (3)).
75 Id.  (to  be  codified  at 32  C.F.R. § 1626.4(e)).
76Id.  (to  be  codified at  32  C.F.R. § 1626.4(d)).
77 See note  34 supra.
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criminal  prosecution on the ground that he was  erroneously  classified.7"
If he loses he will be subject to a maximum  penalty of five years'  im-
prisonment and a $10,000  fine.79  The registrant may, instead, give up
the battle, accept his  classification,  and  enter  the military.  Finally, he
may  accept  induction but petition for habeas  corpus  immediately  upon
entering  the military."  The ground  for relief  will be that  his induc-
tion was  illegal  because  it resulted from  misclassification.  The  regis-
trant will be assigned to duties  involving minimal  conflict  with his  as-
serted beliefs  while the petition is pending."1  If he loses,  however, he
will be  in the military and  subject to  court-martial  for  refusal to  obey
orders."2
78 Estep v. United  States,  327  U.S. 114  (1946).
'19 Military  Service  Act  §12(a),  50  U.S.C.  App.  §462(a)  (1970),  as amended,
50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §462(a)  (Supp.  1972).  Although  the  statute sets  that  maximum
sentence,  another  section  provides,  "[N]otwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  law,
any  registrant  who  has  failed  or  refused  to  report  for  induction  shall  continue  to
remain  liable for induction  and when available  shall be  imnmediately  inducted  . ..  ."
Id. §4(a)  50  U.S.C. App.  §454(a)  (1970),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §454(a)
(Supp.  192).  Pursuant  to  the statute,  an  executive  order  directs  that  those  failing
or  refusing  to  report for  induction  be  inducted  as  soon  as  available.  Exec.  Order
No.  11,360,  32  Fed.  Reg.  9787,  9789  (1967)  (codified  at  32  C.F.R.  §1631.7(c)
(1972)).  If this order were complied  with,  a man who  had  served a prison  sentence
or  paid  a  fine  for  refusing to  submit  to induction  would  be  ordered  again  to  submit
and  if he  refused  be subject  repeatedly  to  the maximum  sentence.  See  McGraw  v.
United  States,  156  F.2d  539  (1st  Cir.  1946).  That  result,  coupled  with  restraints
placed  on  the  Department  of  Justice's  power  to  decline  to  prosecute,  see  Military
Selective  Service  Act  §12(c),  50  U.S.C.  App.  §462(c)  (1970),  as  amended,  50
U.S.C.A.  App.  §462(c)  (Supp.  1972),  appears  to  have  been  the  purpose  of  section
4(a),  which  was  added  to the  statute in 1967.  See H.R.  RFP.  No. 267,  90th  Cong.,
1st  Sess.  43  (1967)  (sectional  analysis  of Military  Selective  Service  Act  § 1 (a)  (b),
50  U.S.C.  App.  §454(a)  (1970),  as  amended,  50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §454(a)  (Supp.
1972)).
80 See  Eagles  v. United  States  ex rel. Samuels,  329  U.S. 304  (1946).
SDep't  of  Defense  Directive  No.  1300.6,  §VII(c),  SEx.  SERv.  L.  REP.  2330
(Aug.  20,  1971).
82The  efficacy  of  relief by  habeas  has  sometimes  been  questioned.  In  Estep  v.
United  States, 327  U.S.  114  (1946),  which  involved  the  issue  whether  habeas  was
the  sole  avenue  to judicial  review  of a  misclassification  or  whether  misclassification
could serve as  a defense  to  a  criminal  prosecution  for  refusal  to  submit  to  induction
as well,  Mr. Justice  Murphy, in  a concurring  opinion,  said that the  habeas  remedy
may  be  quite  illusory  in many  instances.  It  requires  one  first  to  enter  the
armed  forces and  drop  every  vestige  of civil rights.  Military  orders  become
the law  of life  and violations are met with  summary court-martial  procedure.
No more drastic condition  precedent  to judicial  review  has  ever been  framed.
Many  persons  with  religious  or  conscientious  scruples  are  unable  to  meet
such a condition.  But  even if a person  is inducted  and a quest is  made for a
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  the outlook  is  often  bleak.  The  proceeding  must  be
brought  in  the  jurisdiction  in  which  the  person  is  then  detained  by  the
military, which may be thousands of miles  removed from his home, his friends,
his  counsel,  his  local  board  and  the  witnesses  who  can  testify  in  his  behalf.
Should he overcome  all  these obstacles  and possess  enough  money to  proceed
further,  he  still  faces  the  possibility  of  being  shifted  by  the  military  at  a
moment's  notice  into another  jurisdiction,  thus  making  the  proceeding  moot.
There  is  little assurance,  moreover, that the  military will  treat his  efforts  to
obtain  the writ  with  sympathetic  understanding.  These  practical  difficulties
may thus destroy whatever efficacy  the  remedy might otherwise  have and cast
considerable  doubt  on  the  assumption  that  habeas  corpus  proceedings  neces-
sarily guarantee  due process  of law to inductees.
Id. at 129-30.
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Although  the  law  makes  these  alternatives 3  available  to  regis-
trants  who  have exhausted  their  remedies within the  Selective  Service
System,"4 there is some  question whether it is factually consistent with
his  claim  for  a  conscientious  objector  whose  sincere  claim  has  erro-
neously been rejected within the Selective  Service  System to accept in-
duction.  Does the fact that a man enters the military itself demonstrate
that he  does  not entertain  scruples of  sufficient  depth  and  sincerity  to
entitle  him to  conscientious  objector  status?  Is it  disqualifying  even
when the purpose  of entering is to seek  relief by habeas  corpus?
At first  blush it would  appear  that  the man  who  objects  only to
combatant  service  could  in good  conscience  enter the  military to chal-
lenge  his  classification,  but  that  accepting  induction  would  belie  the
Mr.  Justice  Douglas,  dissenting  in  Ehlert  v. United  States,  402  U.S.  99,  108
(1971),  claimed that in-service  remedies  are inadequate  because of military intolerance
towards  conscientious  objectors.  He  documented  this  with  tales  of  atrocities  the
military  has  committed  on  conscientious  objectors  from  World War  I  up  until  the
present.  He also  claimed  that military factfinders  do not  have  the  sensitivity  to  the
rights  involved  to be  entrusted  with the administrative  determination  whether  a man
is  a  conscientious  objector,  and  that it  will be more  difficult  for  a man to  prove  his
conscientious  objection once in the  military where he is  away from  friends  who could
provide  evidence  for  him.  The  Court,  by  contrast,  thought  in-service  procedures
adequate  and  military  tribunals  as  sensitive  to  conscientious  objectors'  rights  as  are
draft  boards.  402  U.S. at  104  n.8.
83 There  is  a  final  method  whereby  a  classification  may  be  reviewed  judicially
and  that  is  by  preinduction  suit  by  the  registrant  for  declaratory  and/or  injunctive
relief.  It  is  obviously  preferable  to  many registrants  who  can afford  to  bring  such
suits to  determine  their  status before making  the decision whether  to submit  to  induc-
tion.  Preinduction  suits  do,  however,  contravene  a  basic  policy  against  allowing
"litigious  interruptions"  to  the  induction  procedure,  Falbo v.  United  States,  320  U.S.
549,  554  (1944),  and  they are  not  generally  allowed.  See Military  Selective  Service
Act  § 10(b) (3),  50  U.S.C. App.  § 460(b)  (3)  (1970),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.
§ 460(b)  (3)  (Supp.  1972).  While  the  precise  limits  on  which  cases  will  permit  of
preinduction  relief  have  not  yet  been  drawn,  see  Fein  v.  Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd.
No.  7, 40  U.S.L.W.  4280  (U.S.  Mar. 21,  1972)  ;  Breen v.  Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd.
No.  16,  396 U.S.  460  (1970)  ; Boyd  v. Clark, 393  U.S. 316  (1968)  ;  Clark v.  Gabriel,
393  U.S.  256  (1968);  Oestereich  v.  Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd.  No.  11,  393  U.S.  233
(1968);  Wolff  v.  Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd.  No.  16,  372  F.2d  817  (2d  Cir.  1967),
that  form  of  relief  will  not  be  available  to  the  bulk  of  conscientious  objectors,  if,
indeed, it is  available to any of them.  See  Clark v. Gabriel,  393  U.S. 256  (1968).
84 As a general  rule, a man can  receive judicial  review  of the correctness  of his
classification,  either by way of habeas  corpus  or as a defense  to a criminal  prosecution,
only if he  has exhausted  his  remedies  within  the  Selective  Service  System.  Military
Selective  Service Act  § 10(b)  (3),  50  U.S.C.  App.  § 460(b)  (3)  (1970),  as  amended,
50  U.S.C.A.  App.  § 460(b) (3)  (Supp.  1972).  Edwards  v. United  States,  395  F.2d
453  (9th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 393  U.S.  845  (1968);  DuVernay  v.  United  States,  394
F.2d 979  (5th  Cir.  1968),  aff'd per curiam by  an equally divided court, 394 U.S.  309
(1969)  ; cf.  Clark v. Gabriel,  393  U.S. 256  (1968)  ;  Falbo v. United  States, 320  U.S.
549  (1944).  The  exhaustion  principle  is  not  limited  to  presently  available  adminis-
trative remedies;  cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391  (1963)  ; if a registrant fails to pursue
his  appeals  he  is permanently  precluded  from  judicial  review;  cf.  Johnson  v. Zerbst,
304  U.S.  458,  464  (1938)  ("A  waiver  [of  a  constitutional  right]  is  ordinarily  an
intentional  relinquishment  or  abandonment  of  a known  right  or  privilege.").
The  general  rule  does,  however,  have  exceptions;  see  McKart  v. United  States,
395  U.S.  185  (1969);  cf.  Breen  v. Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd.  No.  16,  396  U.S.  460
(1970)  ; Oestereich  v. Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd.  No.  11,  393 U.S.  233  (1968),  which,
despite  recent  Supreme  Court  pronouncements,  are  of  uncertain  scope.  Compare
McKart  v.  United  States,  supra, with DuVernay  v.  United  States,  supra.
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claim  of  the  registrant  who  seeks  total  exemption.5  This  depends,
however,  on the basis for the I-0 claimant's objection to noncombatant
service.  If he says it conflicts  with his  conscience  to wear  a  military
uniform  or to be  any part of  an organization that participates  in war,
the  sincerity of his  claim  is at least  somewhat  called  into  question by
his entry into the military to contest his classification.  A more limited
objection to noncombatant  service-that  the registrant  cannot, because
of his beliefs, personally  contribute  to the war  effort,  as he would,  for
example,  by helping cure injured persons  who would  eventually return
to  combat-is  not,  however,  necessarily  inconsistent  with  acceptance
of a brief period  of service in the military.
It  may be  objected,  however,  that the  only rational  reason  for  a
registrant  (whether he claims I-0 or I-A-0 status)  to choose habeas as
a means of contesting his  classification  instead of defending  a  criminal
prosecution is to give himself the opportunity to avoid a prison sentence
and  become  a  cooperating  member  of  the  military  in  case he fails  in
his  conscientious  objector  claim.  A  willingness  to  cooperate,  even
though induced by the threat of imprisonment for noncooperation,  may
conceivably  be  inconsistent  with a valid  conscientious  objector  claim.
If it is, any conscientious  objector  claimant, I-A-0  or 1-0,  who enters
the military to contest his classification thereby reveals  that he does not
qualify as  a conscientious  objector,  unless  a  reason  other  than  ability
to avoid a prison sentence  can explain his choice of the habeas  route. 8 6
Under  two hypotheses  it might  be  rational  for the  registrant  to
contest his  classification by habeas  even  if he planned  to  refuse  to  co-
operate  in  the  event  his  petition  failed.  It  might  be  rational  if  the
registrant were  more likely  to  prevail  in  a habeas  proceeding  than  in
defending  a criminal  prosecution  on  the ground  of  misclassification  . 7
85  This  is  so because  the registrant  seeking  alternate  service  must  claim  that it
violates  his  convictions  to  serve  in  any  military  capacity.
86 The  analysis  is  complicated  somewhat  by  the fact  that  even  persons  who  do
defend  a criminal  prosecution  rather than  seek  habeas  may  be  given the  opportunity
to  avoid  imprisonment  and  cooperate  with  the  military  after  they  are  convicted  by
being paroled  into the armed forces.  See  32 C.F.R. §§ 1643.1-.13  (1972),  as amended,
37  Fed.  Reg.  5125  (1972).  A registrant  does  not,  however,  have  a  right  to parole
into  the  military,  and  such  parole  is  not  uniformly  offered  a  convicted  registrant.
(If the government  did afford  it uniformly  it would  allow  a  criminal  prosecution  to
serve  the  function  of  a preinduction  suit-allowing  the  registrant  judicial  review  of
his classification before his ultimate decision whether  to submit-whenever  a registrant
was  willing  to have  a conviction  on his  record.  This  result  should be  unacceptable
to  the  government  for  the  same  reasons  that it  strongly  opposes  the  general  avail-
ability  of  the  preinduction  remedy.  See  cases  cited  note  83  supra.)  A  man  who
decides  to  defend  a  criminal  prosecution  rather  than  enter  the  military  and  seek
habeas  must  therefore be  willing to serve  a  prison sentence,  for  he may  or may  not
have a later  opportunity to  enter  the military.  A man  who  follows  the habeas  route,
by  contrast,  will  assuredly  be  given  the  opportunity  to  cooperate  with  the military
if  his petition  fails.
87 It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  man  defending  a  criminal  prosecution  is
advantaged.  If he  is  indigent,  he  will  be  provided  with  counsel.  Moreover,  the
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It also  might be  sensible for a  registrant whose  beliefs  permitted  him
to  choose the habeas route if, in the event of losing, he would be better
treated by the system of military justice than by the civil courts.  Neither
of these  hypotheses,  however,  has  any  substantial  foundation  in  com-
mon  experience.
Another  possible reason for  entering  the military to  contest one's
classification might be to obtain more information  on what the military
is like in order to decide  whether to cooperate  if one's  claim  is denied.
This  justification  will not  be  sufficient,  however,  if unconditional  op-
position to  service is considered the sine qua non of entitlement to con-
scientious objector status. 5
Whether  a  person  who  accepts  induction  can  qualify  as  a  con-
scientious  objector  depends  ultimately upon  the scope  of  the  conscien-
tious objector exemption.  Congress  could have exempted  conscientious
objectors  simply because  there is a group of persons  who will not serve
even  under  the  threat  of  imprisonment.  Under  that  view  Congress'
aim would be to force persons to serve as fully as the threat of imprison-
ment could induce them to serve. 9  Rather than imprison persons when
the threat of imprisonment would not be effective, however, there would
be  an  alternative  form  of  service,  also  beneficial  to  the  nation,  which
they would, at least under compulsion,  perform.  If this theory under-
lies  the  conscientious  objector  provisions,  a person  who  would  make
the choice of entering the military rather than going to prison would not,
by definition, be entitled to conscientious  objector status;  and no  claim-
ant to either I-0 or I-A-O status who was in fact entitled to that status
could  enter the military--even  if he filed for habeas  immediately upon
enteringf 0
government  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  case  against  him  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt,  whereas  in  habeas  the registrant  bears  the  burden  of  proof.  For  other  dis-
advantages of habeas, see note  82 supra.
88  Concerning  the  difficult question  of the  degree  of  certainty  of  opposition  that
is  necessary  in  order  to  qualify  as  a conscientious  objector, see  Mansfield,  Conscien-
tiou  Objection-1964 Term, 1965  RELIGIoN  &  PuB.  OaER  3,  19.
89 Under  this  view  of the  exemption,  the  System  discovers  that it  is  in  error  in
denying  a man's claim  on grounds  of  lack  of sincerity  or lack  of depth  any  time  the
man  goes  to  prison  rather  than  accepting  induction.  The  System  cannot,  however,
correct  the  error.  Objectors'  willingness  to  go  to  prison  will prove  that they  qualify
only as  long as prison sentences  are  actually  carried  out.
90 Cf.  Mr.  Justice  Black's  approach  in  Welsh  v.  United  States,  398  U.S.  333
(1970):
Both  [Seeger  and  Welsh]  strongly  believed  that  killing  in  war  was  wrong,
unethical,  and  immoral,  and  their  consciences  forbade  them  to  take  part  in
such  an  evil  practice.  Their  objection  to  participating  in  war  in any  form
could not  be  said  to  come  from  a "still,  small  voice  of conscience";  rather,
for  them that  voice  was  so loud  and  insistent  that both  men  preferred  to go
to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces.  There was  never any question
about  the  sincerity  and  depth  of  Seeger's  convictions  as  a  conscientious
objector,  and  the  same  is true  of Welsh.
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A different  interpretation  of Congress'  underlying  purpose  in en-
acting  the conscientious  objector  provisions  is possible,  however:  that
Congress decided that even those persons whom threat of imprisonment
might  induce  to  serve  should  not  be  coerced  to  do  so  if  the  service
would  violate  their  deeply-held  conscientious  scruples  and  if they  can
be used in some  capacity  more in keeping  with their  beliefs.  On  this
theory of  the conscientious  objector  provisions,  a man  does  not show
himself disqualified by entering the military rather than going to prison.
The United  States Court of Appeals for the District  of Columbia Cir-
cuit seems to have taken this view.  In the recent case of Gruca v. Sec-
retary of  the Army,91 it rejected  the  Government's  contention  that  a
sincere conscientious  objector  could  not allow himself to  submit to  in-
duction  into  the Army.  The court thought  that  "a  registrant  should
have  the  right to  attempt to  prove  the  sincerity  of  his  claim  without
risking the obloquy of a prison term if he is  unsuccessful."  92
It is unnecessary  to resolve the question of congressional  purpose,
however, for even if the exemption  extends  only to persons who prefer
imprisonment  to  the  objectionable  service,  reasons  of  policy  dictate
against  ruling the traditional  remedy  of  habeas  corpus  unavailable  to
the claimant who  has entered the military.93  If one were  to accept the
view  that  the  conscientious  objector  claimant  who  accepts  induction
thereby undermines his claim,  a man who has been unsuccessful  within
the  Selective  Service  System  and  is  unwilling  to  abandon  his  claim
would  have  to  refuse  induction.  If the  courts  then  uphold  his  clas-
sification,  he would  be in prison and not in the military.  It  is  surely
more consonant with the ultimate aim of the Selective  Service statute-
the mobilization  of armed forces-to  encourage  the  registrant to  seek
review by habeas.  If he does that and loses his claim, the likelihood  of
his serving in the military is maximized.9"
Id. at 337.  To  use  the fact that  an  objector  went  to  jail  rather  than  entering  the
military to show his  sincerity,  or  as one  factor tending  to show  sincerity,  is  distinct,
however,  from  using  failure  to  go  to  prison  as  either  conclusive  of  insincerity  or
as  one factor  tending  towards  a  finding  of  insincerity.
91436  F.2d  239  (D.C.  Cir.  1970),  cert. denied, 401  U.S.  978  (1971).
92 Id. at 243.
93 Another  reason for holding habeas  available  to  a conscientious  objector  is  that
the only inquiry open to a court hearing  the  habeas  petition  of a  serviceman  claiming
that his  draft board  misclassified  him  is  whether  his  Selective  Service  file  shows  a
basis  in fact  for  the  classification  his  draft  board  gave him.  See text  accompanying
notes  96-97  infra.  A  court  giving weight  to  the petitioner's  entry  into  the  military,
occurring  subsequent  to  the  Selective  Service  System's  classification,  would  violate
that standard.
94 This analysis  would  be undercut  only if the  unsuccessful  conscientious  objector
claimant  who  does  accept  induction  were  more  troublesome  than  beneficial  to  the
military.
It  is true, of course,  that fewer  persons  will abandon  their  claims  under a system
where  they  can  be  raised  without  risking  imprisonment  than  if  the  only  avenue  of
review  in  conscientious  objector  cases  were  defense  of  a  criminal  proscution.  The
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C.  The Basis-in-Fact  Test
Whether the registrant who  refuses to accept his  Selective  Service
classification  challenges  it in  a criminal  proceeding  or  by habeas  after
induction,  he faces  a standard of judicial review  that is the "narrowest
known to the law."  5  The evidence  a court may consider  in reviewing
the  correctness  of  a  registrant's  classification  is  limited  to  evidence
appearing  in  his  Selective  Service  file. 6  Section  10(b)  (3)  of  the
Military  Selective  Service  Act  provides  that  a  court  may  overturn  a
decision  of  the  Selective  Service  System  only  if there  is  "no  basis  in
fact"  for the classification. 7   The  statute,  however,  only  represents  a
codification  of a standard the Supreme Court had earlier enunciated.
The  Supreme  Court first  formulated  the  "basis-in-fact"  standard
for Selective  Service  cases  in Estep v.  United States."'  The  issue  in
Estep  was  whether  a  registrant  who  had  refused  to  submit  to  in-
duction  could  defend  his  criminal  prosecution  on  the  ground  that he
should  not  have  been  classified  I-A,  or  whether  the  only  method  of
review  was postinduction  habeas.  The  lower  court had  held  that the
provision  of the Selective Training  and  Service  Act of  1940  that "the
decisions  of  . . . local  boards  shall be final  except where  an appeal  is
authorized in  accordance  with  such rules  and regulations  as  the Presi-
dent may prescribe"  precluded  judicial  review  except by habeas.  The
Supreme Court ruled against the Government on this point, holding that
a registrant could  obtain review  in a criminal proceeding.  The finality
provision, it said, did not empower the boards to act beyond the powers
the Act and  regulations  conferred  upon  them.  A registrant  could  ac-
cordingly defend a charge of refusing to submit to induction by showing
that  the  board's  classification  was  "lawless  and  beyond  its  jurisdic-
tion."  "  Rather than leave the finality provision without any meaning,
number  of persons  in  the  military  could  conceivably  increase  under  a system  where
habeas  was  not  available  to  conscientious  objector  claimants.  This  could  happen  if
there  were a larger  number  of persons  who  abandoned  claims  that  would  ultimately
have  been  sustained  than  the  number  of  persons  with  losing  claims  who  refused
induction.  Even  if  that  occurred,  however,  the  added  military  personnel  would,  by
hypothesis, be  people  who  had  a statutory  right  not  to  be there.
Provisions  for parole  into the military for persons  convicted  of refusing  induction
do  not  undercut  this  analysis.  Such  parole  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  made  uniformly
available  to  convicted  registrants.  See  note  86  supra.  Even  when  a  man  is  given
the  chance  to  enter  the  armed  forces  after  conviction,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose
that he  is  less  likely  to enter  the  service  as  a  parolee  after  conviction  for  refusing
induction  than  he  would  be  to  complete  military  service  if  he  accepted  induction
initially, petitioned  for  habeas  and his  petition  was  denied.
95 Blalock  v.  United  States,  247  F.2d  615,  619  (4th  Cir.  1957).  The  same
standard  of review  prevails  in  preinduction  suits, see  cases  cited  note  83  supra.
906 Cox v. United  States,  332 U.S.  442  (1947).
97Military  Selective  Service  Act  §10(b)(3),  50  U.S.C.  Ap1,.  §460(b)(3)
(1970),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.  § 460(b) (3)  (Supp.  1972).
98327  U.S.  114  (1946).  The  Court  had  earlier  formulated  the  standard  in
deportation  cases.  See cases  cited  id. at  123  n.14.
99 Id. at  121.
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however,  the  Court derived from  it the  "no  basis-in-fact"  standard  of
judicial  review: 100
The provision making the decisions  of the local boards "final"
means  to us  that  Congress  chose  not to  give  administrative
action under this Act the customary  scope  of judicial  review
which  obtains under  other statutes.  It means that the courts
are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classi-
fication made by the local boards was justified.  The decisions
of the  local boards  made in  conformity  with the  regulations
are final  even though they may be  erroneous.  The  question
of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no
basis  in  fact  for  the  classification  which  it  gave  the
registrant."'°
In theory,  the basis-in-fact  test seems  to mean  that  any evidence
supporting the board's  decision  requires a court  to affirm  regardless  of
countervailing  evidence in the record." 0 2  It is unclear whether the test
is actually deemed to carry that meaning or, if not so  extreme, how far
it is from that formulation.  What is certain  is that the test is intended
to provide for narrower judicial review than  the "substantial  evidence
test" applied to decisions  of most administrative  agencies.,0 3   As many
courts  apply them, however, the two tests may differ little. 04
100 The  deportation  cases,  where  the  Court  had  earlier  derived  a  basis-in-fact
standard  of  review,  see note  98 supra, also involved  a  statute  that  characterized  the
administrative  action  as  "final."  See  Bridges  v.  Wixon,  326  U.S.  135,  167  (1945)
(Stone,  C.J.,  dissenting).
3.01327  U.S.  at  122-23.
102 See  Bridges  v. Wixon,  326  U.S.  135,  167  (1945)  (Stone,  C.J.,  dissenting)
(deportation  proceeding)  ; accord, 4 K. DAvis,  ADMINISmATiVE  LAW  TREATIsE  §  29.07,
at  150  (1958).  But see the opinion  for the  Court  in Bridges overturning  an  admin-
istrative  decision  that was  supported  only  by  "flimsy"  evidence.  326  U.S.  at  156.
See  also text accompanying  note  174 infra.
103 The issue under that test is  whether  there is  "substantial  evidence"  to support
the  agency's  decision.  Section  10(e)  of  the Administrative  Procedure  Act  provides
that  a  reviewing  court  should  set  aside  an  agency's  determination  only  if  it  is
"unsupported  by  substantial  evidence"  and  that  "[i]n  making  the  foregoing  deter-
minations,  the  court  shall  review  the  whole  record  or  those  parts  of  it  cited  by  a
party  . . . ."  Administrative  Procedure  Act  §10(e),  5  U.S.C.  §706  (1970).  See
Universal  Camera  Corp.  v. NLRB,  340  U.S.  474  (1951),  for  the  Supreme  Court's
construction  of  the  substantial  evidence  test.  See  also  Jaffe,  Judicial Review:
"Substantial Evidence on the  Whole Record", 64  HARv.  L. Rlv.  1233  (1951).
1 04 See  4 K.  DAvis,  supra note  102,  §29.07.  at 150-52;  M. FoRxoscH,  TAxisE
oN  A miis'rvn  LAw  §  338,  at  727  n.19  (1956)  ; Hansen,  The Basis-in-Fact Test
in  Judicial Review  of  Selective  Service  Classifications: A  Critical Analysis,  37
BRooiYN  L.  REv.  453,  471-81  (1971);  Comment,  The  Selective  Service  System:
An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54  CALIW.  L. IZEv.  2123,  2140  (1966)  ;  Comment,
Fairness  and Due Process Under the  Selective  Service System,  114  U.  PA.  L.  Rxv.
1014,  1023  (1966)  (suggesting a "minimum  test  of legality"  is used)  ; Note, Selective
Service  and Judicial Review, 32  VA.  L. REv.  618,  625-26  (1946).
Since  the Supreme  Court has never  clarified  the  precise  meaning  of  the basis-in-
fact test, lower courts  differ considerably  in the way they  apply it.  For  cases  inter-
preting  the test  as  allowing  only  very  narrow  review,  see,  e.g.,  Speer  v.  Hedrick,
419  F.2d  804  (9th  Cir.  1969)  (per  curiam);  United  States  v.  Pritchard,  413  F.2d
663  (4th  Cir.),  cert.  denied, 396  U.S.  995  (1969);  United  States  v.  Henderson,
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The basis-in-fact  standard  applies,  however,  only  to factual  ques-
tions.  This  is clear  from Estep's pronouncement  that a board's juris-
diction is limited by the statute and the regulations, that only its actions
within its jurisdiction  are final,  and that a  registrant  can always  chal-
lenge  a board's  action  on the ground  that it is lawless  and  outside the
board's  jurisdiction.' 0 5  Since  Estep, moreover,  the  Court  has  over-
turned classifications  without deference  to the Selective  Service  System
when  a  board  has  made  a  legal  error,  either  by  denying  procedural
rights to  a  registrant  in the course  of classifying  him, or  by misinter-
preting  the  legal  requirements  for  a  classification.' °  Inasmuch  as
Selective  Service  proceedings  are  conducted  on  a  relatively  informal
basis  and  board  members  are  chosen  as  community  representatives
rather than experts,  it is not surprising that courts  have undertaken to
decide  questions  of law  de novo.07
Although  courts  decide  purely  legal  issues  independently  of  the
System, a registrant cannot prevail by showing a legal error  on the part
of  the  board  unless  that  error  has  prejudiced  him.08  This  doctrine
poses a potentially bigger hurdle for the registrant  than the  "harmless
error"  standard  as  typically  applied.  First,  some  courts  require  the
registrant to show that the error was prejudicial,0 9 rather  than placing
411  F.2d 224  (5th  Cir.  1969),  cert. denied, 399  U.S. 916  (1970).  For  cases  applying
it more  as  the  equivalent  of  a  substantial  evidence  test,  see,  e.g.,  Annett  v.  United
States,  205  F.2d  689  (10th  Cir.  1953);  Rautenstrauch  v.  Secretary  of  Defense,  313
F. Supp.  170  (W.D.  Tex.  1970).
105327  U.S. at  120-21.
1o6 See Sicurella  v.  United  States,  348  U.S.  385  (1955)  (legal  interpretation);
Simmons  v.  United  States,  348  U.S.  397  (1955)  (procedural  rights);  Gonzales  v.
United States,  348  U.S. 407  (1955)  (procedural  rights).  Justice  Minton  would have
applied  the basis-in-fact  test  to  legal  as  well  as  factual  questions.  He  dissented  in
all  three  cases  on  the  ground  that  although  the  boards  involved  may  have  acted
mistakenly,  their  judgment  was  not  so unreasonable  as  to  be  arbitrary  or  capricious.
348  U.S.  at  396, 406,  418.
107 Cf.  Oestereich v.  Selective  Serv.  Local  Bd. No.  11,  393 U.S.  233, 242  (1968)
(Harlan, 3.,  concurring  in the result) ; McKart  v. United States,  395  U.S.  185,  197-99
(1969).
105 See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Lawson,  337  F2d  800  (3d  Cir.  1964);  Pate  v.
United  States,  243  F.2d  99,  104  (5th  Cir.  1957).  Compare Briggs  v.  United  States,
397  F.2d  370  (9th  Cir.  1968)  (denial  of  physical  inspection  held  prejudicial),  with
Edwards  v.  United  States,  395  F.2d  453,  455-57  (9th  Cir.)  (no  prejudice  found),
cert. denied, 393 U.S.  845  (1968),  and United  States ex rel. Lipsitz v.  Perez, 372  F.2d
468, 470  (4th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 389  U.S. 838  (1967)  (registrant  suffered  no  "actual"
prejudice),  and United  States  v. Bobzien,  306  F. Supp.  1272  (C.D.  Cal.  1969)  (no
prejudice  found).  Of course,  when  the  error  goes  to  the  board's  jurisdiction  in  the
strict  sense,  cf.  Estep  v.  United  States,  327  U.S.  114  (1946),  prejudice  need  not  be
shown;  e.g., Adolfson  v. Commanding  Officer,  3  SEL.  SExv.  L.  REP.  3311  (N.D.  Cal.
1970)  (no  need  to  show  prejudice  when  board  issued  induction  order  to  registrant
not in  its  jurisdiction).
109 See, e.g., Adolfson  v.  Commanding  Officer,  3  SEL.  SERv.  L. REP.  3311  (N.D.
Cal.  1970)  (registrant  must  show prejudice  from  omission or  violation  of procedural
requisites)  (dictum).  The  same  practice  prevails  in  criminal  cases  that  are  not  of
constitutional  dimensions;  see,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Lipscomb,  435  F.2d  795,  803
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on the government the burden of proving the error harmless."'  Second,
some courts  hold that classification  by the appeal  board is  independent
of the local  board so  that errors  limited  to the  local  board are  per  se
harmless."'
II. THE UNRELIABILITY  OF  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR
DETERMINATIONS
One firm conclusion  can be drawn from  experience  with  the con-
scientious  objector  provisions:  the  results  have  been  unreliable.  In
part,  this is  attributable  to  the difficulties  encountered  in giving  clear
definition to the substantive standard.  More serious are the seemingly
intractable problems involved in attempting to apply the standard within
the framework  of  the Selective  Service  System.
A.  The Standard
For a time, the standard itself was a matter of considerable dispute.
The  1948 version of the Selective Training and Service  Act," 2 like the
current statute, said that a person  "who,  by reason of religious  training
and  belief,  is  conscientiously  opposed  to participation  in  war  in  any
form"  would  be  considered  a  conscientious  objector." 3  It  went  on,
however, to define  religious training and belief:
Religious  training  and  belief  in  this  connection  means  an
individual's  belief in a relation to a  Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation,  but
11 0  The  Supreme  Court has held that in  criminal  cases  involving  federal  consti-
tutional error, the  beneficiary  of the  error must  show it harmless beyond  a reasonable
doubt.  Chapman v.  California,  386  U.S.  18,  23-24, 26  (1967).  In  civil  cases  also,
the prevailing  rule  is  that the  beneficiary  of an  error bears  the burden  of  proving  it
harmless.  See  F.  J~mns,  CivIL PRocFDuRE  § 11.3,  at  531  (1965).
"'1 See  Clay  v. United  States,  397  F.2d 901,  912-13  (5th  Cir.  1968),  vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub norn. Giordano  v. United  States, 394 U.S. 310  (1969)  ;
Storey  v. United  States,  370  F.2d  255,  258-59  (9th  Cir.  1966)  ;  DeRemer  v. United
States,  340  F.2d  712,  719  (8th  Cir.  1965)  (at  least where  claim  was  of local  board
prejudice).  Courts  differ,  however,  on  which  errors  are  limited  to  the  local  board
and which also infect the  appeal board process.  At least one court makes an exception
to the  inference  of appeal board  correction  when the  local  board's  action  "was  either
so  arbitrary  or  erroneous  as  to  taint  the  entire  procedure."  United  States  ex  rel.
Khamis  v. Resor,  3  SEL.  SEav.  L. Rm,.  3295,  3296  (N.D.  Ill.  1970).  Some  courts
adopt a test of whether the registrant's  claim  is the type  likely to  have been  corrected
by  the  appeal  board.  United  States  v.  Atherton,  430  F.2d  741  (9th  Cir.  1970)
(distinguishing  between  claims  of  local  board  prejudice  and  claims  where  appeal
board  is  likely  to be  influenced  by  local  board);  see  Caverly  v.  United  States,  429
F2d  92  (8th  Cir.  1970).  When  the  appeal  board  gives  valid  reasons  for its  clas-
sification,  appeal board  correction  of local board  errors is usually  inferred;  cf. United
States  v. Carroll,  398  F.2d  651,  654  n.5  (3d  Cir.  1968);  United  States  v.  Shevenell,
310  F. Supp.  1069  (D.  Me.  1970).
112 This  was  the  popular  title  of  the  1948  draft  law.  Act  of  June  24,  1948,
ch.  625,  62  Stat. 604.
"13  Selective  Service  Act  of  1948  § 6(j),  62  Stat.  612,  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.
App.  §456(j)  (Supp.  1972).
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does  not  include  essentially  political,  sociological,  or  philo-
sophical views  or a merely personal  moral  code." 4
One point of confusion was whether the exemption  was limited to those
with  theistic religious  beliefs." 5  This was part of  the larger  problem
of distinguishing  between  "religious"  beliefs  and  "essentially  political,
sociological,  or  philosophical  views,  or  a  merely  personal  moral
code."  "'
In  United States v.  Seeger "'7  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the
"Supreme  Being"  language  of  the statutory  standard  did  not  require
that  a  man  believe  in  a traditional  God  to  qualify  as  a  conscientious
objector.  Instead,  the Court  said that Congress,  "in keeping  with  its
long-established  policy  of  not  picking  and  choosing  among  religious
beliefs,"  11  had  allowed  for  the  exemption  of  "all  sincere  religious
beliefs  which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which
all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent."  "'
The  Court  went on  to clarify  the line  of  demarcation  between  beliefs
considered  "religious"  under  the  statute  and  those  not  deemed  re-
ligious.  Seeger, together with the more recent  case of Welsh v. United
States,2 '  indicates that the primary test of whether  a belief is religious
within the meaning  of the statute is a functional  one;  the role  that the
belief plays  in the life of the possessor is the central element  in deciding
whether  a  registrant's  belief  is  religious  "in  his  own  scheme  of
things."  121  The  test  the factfinder  must  apply  is  "whether  a  given
belief that is  sincere  and  meaningful  occupies  a place  in the life  of  its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief  in God of one who
clearly  qualifies  for the  exemption."  12  If  it does,  the  source  of his
114 Selective  Service  Act  of  1948  § 6(j),  62  Stat.  613,  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.
App.  §456(j)  (Supp.  1972).
15 Compare United  States  v. Seeger,  380  U.S.  163,  173-180  (1965),  with Welsh
v.  United States,  398  U.S.  333, 348-50  (1970)  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring in  the result).
116 These  problems  existed  also  under  the  1940  provision,  which  was  simply:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be  construed to require  any person  to be  subject
to  combatant  training  and  service  in the  land  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States
who,  by  reason  of  religious  training  and  belief,  is  conscientiously  opposed  to  par-
ticipation  in war  in any  form."  Selective  Training  and  Service  Act  of  1940  § 5(g),
54  Stat.  889.  Compare United  States  ex  rel. Reel  v.  Badt,  141  F.2d  845  (2d  Cir.
1944),  and United States  v.  Kauten,  133  F.2d  703  (2d  Cir.  1943),  and  United  States
ex  rel. Phillips  v.  Downer,  135  F.2d  521  (2d  Cir.  1943),  with  Berman  v.  United
States,  156  F.2d  377  (9th  Cir.  1946)  (en  banc).
"17380  U.S.  163  (1965).
"Isd, at  175.
"9  Id. at  176.
120398  U.S.  333  (1970).
121 380  U.S.  at  184-85.
122 Id. at  166.  See  id. at  184;  Welsh  v.  United  States,  398  U.S.  at 339-40.
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belief-whether  it is  internally  derived  or  externally  compelled 12
3 -- is
immaterial.12 4   Nor need it derive  from the teachings  of  any religious
group,  as opposed to  the registrant's  own reading  or contemplation.' 25
There is, however, a substantive  as well as a functional  dimension
to  the test whether  a  belief qualifies.  A  purely  pragmatic  belief-for
example, a belief that the registrant should avoid endangering his life-
cannot qualify  even if it occupies  a central  place in the registrant's  life
and  scheme  of  values.  Similarly,  a  belief  that  war  is  unwise  as  a
matter of policy  will not suffice.  The objection  must be conscientious.
Although  it may  be  "founded  to  a substantial  extent  upon  considera-
tions  of public  policy,"  it may  not rest  "solely  upon  considerations  of
policy,  pragmatism,  or  expediency."  126  It  must  have  some  "moral,
ethical, or religious"  content in order to qualify.
127
Welsh and Seeger were concerned with the 1948 statute.  Congress
amended  the  statute  in  1967,  excluding  the  clause  defining  religious
training  and  belief as "an  individual's  belief  in  relation  to a  Supreme
Being  involving duties  superior  to  those  arising  from  any human  re-
lation."  128  Congress'  purpose  in making this change  is quite  unclear.
While the  amendment  would  seem  most  plausibly to  show  acceptance
of the Seeger holding that theistic belief is not required, the legislative
history  indicates  that  some  members  of  Congress  believed  they  could
avoid  that  holding  by  abandoning  the  Supreme  Being  language.'29
Apparently they were influenced by language  in Seeger suggesting  that
Congress' use of the term "Supreme  Being,"  rather than "God,"  showed
the exemption embraced a wide spectrum of religious belief.'80
123 The Government  in  Welsh  conceded  that the registrant's  belief was  held with
the  strength  of  traditional  religious  convictions  but  claimed  that,  even  after  Seeger,
conscientious  objector  status  could  be  denied  to  one  whose  beliefs  had  no  religious
basis.  398  U.S.  at 337-38.  The  Court  held,  however,  that  Welsh's  beliefs  qualified
him for  conscientious  objector status.
124 United  States  v. Seeger,  380 U.S.  163,  186  (1965).
125 The Court in Welsh  said that the  "sincere  and meaningful  beliefs that prompt
the registrant's  objection to all  wars need  not  be  confined  in either  source  or  content
to traditional  or  parochial  concepts  of religion."  398  U.S.  at 339;  see  380  U.S.  at
184-85.  Neither  Seeger nor  Welsh belonged  to a religious  group  or  adhered  to  the
teaching of any organized  religion when they applied  for  conscientious  objector  status,
yet both  their  claims were  upheld  by  the Supreme  Court.
126 398  U.S.  at 342-43.  See 380  U.S.  at  173  (those  objecting  "on  the  basis  of
essentially political,  sociological or  economic  considerations"  excluded).
127 398 U.S.  at 342.  See id. at 339-40.
12
8  See note  5  supra.  Although  the  Supreme  Court  decided  Welsh  subsequent
to the amendment,  it was the  1948  version  of the  Act that the Court was interpreting;
Welsh  had been  convicted  of  refusing  to  submit  to  induction  in  1966,  prior  to  the
amendment.
129 See H.R.  REP.  No. 267, 90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 31  (1967);  H.R.  REP.  No.  346,
90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  15-16  (1967);  113  CONG.  REc.  15,428-29  (1967)  (remarks  of
Senator  Edward  Kennedy).  But see id.  14,098,  14,119-20  (remarks  of  Congressmen
Edwards  and Kastenmeier)  ; id. 15,428  (remarks  of  Senator  Russell).
130 See 380 U.S.  at  174-76.
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It does not seem likely, however, that the statute will be read more
narrowly without the Supreme Being language than it was with it.  The
issue for the  Court in Seeger was whether the reference  to a  Supreme
Being narrowed the meaning  of  "religious  training  and belief"  or left
it unaltered.  The Court decided that the Supreme Being language  did
not change the preexisting test of "religious training and belief"; it did
not decide  that the  Supreme Being language  enlarged  the definition  of
religion or that the definition would be any narrower  in its  absence.'31
It seems then that the Welsh-Seeger test of who  is sufficiently  re-
ligious remains  viable.'32  Accordingly,  a draft board's  duty in passing
on  a  conscientious  objector  claim  is  to  decide  whether  a  registrant's
objection  is sincere,  whether it is based on religious  training and belief
within the meaning  of  Welsh and Seeger, and whether  it runs to par-
ticipation in all wars.' 3 3
B. Application of the Standard
Even  if  the  standard  is  properly  understood,  there  remains  for
those who find the facts the elusive task of probing the registrant's state
of mind.  Part  of the problem  may lie  in the nature of  the factfinder.
Board members are not sympathetic to conscientious  objector  claims.'3 4
13  See id. at 165,  173,  176.
_1
3 2 As  indicated,  note  6  supra, the  test  stated in  Mr.  Justice  Black's  opinion  in
Welsh was  adopted  by  the  Court,  although  there  is  no  opinion  for  the  Court.  Mr.
Justice  Harlan,  who  had  joined  the  Court's  opinion in  Seeger, had  second  thoughts
about  that  opinion  as a matter  of  statutory construction,  as  well  as  disagreeing  with
the  statutory  construction  in  Welsh.  398  U.S.  at  344  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring  in
the result).  He  thought  that  Congress  had  intended  to  exempt  only  persons  with
theistic religious beliefs.  It did not intend to exempt  adherents  of nontheistic  religions,
id.  at  348-50,  nor  did  it  intend  to  exempt  those  whose  beliefs  were  not  acquired
through  "religion"  in  the  conventional  sense,  id. at  351-54.  Justice  Harlan  thought,
however,  that  the  statutory  provision  as  properly  construed  violated  the  religion
clauses  of  the  first  amendment,  id. at  356-61.  He  believed  that  when  a  statutory
provision  is  unconstitutional  because  of  underinclusion,  nullification  of  the  provision
is  not  the  only  possible remedy.  The  Court  may instead, if it deems  it more appro-
priate, extend  the statute's  coverage  to include  more persons.  Id. at 361-67.  But see
id. at  367-69  (White,  J.,  dissenting).  It  was  on  this  reasoning  that  Justice  Harlan
"adopt[ed]  the  test  announced  by  MR.  JUSTIcE  BLAcK,  not  as  a matter  of statutory
construction,  but  as  the  touchstone  for  salvaging  a  congressional  policy  of  long
standing that would otherwise have to be nullified."  Id. at 345  (Harlan, J., concurring
in the  result).
133 There are  difficulties  also  in  deciding  whether  a particular  registrant's  objec-
tion runs  to  all wars.  See note 302  infra.
134 J.  D~vis  &  K.  DOLBEARE,  LITTLE  GROUPS  OF  NEIGiBORS  92,  table  4.2,  108
(1968)  ; Rabin, A Strange Brand of Selectivity: Administrative Law Perspectives on
the Processing of  Registrants in  the  Selective  Service  System,  17  U.C.L.A.L.  Rxv.
1005,  1019  (1970).  Only  5%  of  the  board  members  polled  in  a  Wisconsin  study
thought  it was  very  important  to  defer  conscientious  objectors  and  55%  said  that
conscientious  objectors  should not  be  deferred  at  all.  Davis  & Dolbeare,  A  Social
Profile  of  Local Draft  Board Members:  The  Case  of  Wisconsin,  in  SEcrvE
SEaVICE  AND  AmERCAN  Sociy  53,  73-74  (R.  Little  ed.  1969)  [hereinafter  cited  as
A  Social Profile].  See  G. WAMSLEY,  Sar-cniv  SERvIcE  & A  CHANGING  AMFMaCA
146  (1969)  (suggesting  local  board  hostility  to  "unconventional"  claimants).
Board  members  also  have  peculiarly  middle  class  values.  The  predominant
middle  class  composition, see note 229  infra & accompanying  text,  of the  local  boards
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Many  are  veterans  35  and  they  frequently  belong  to  veterans'
organizations.
136   All are persons whose sense  of duty has led them to
volunteer their  time  137  to the operation  of the system  of military con-
scription, 3 '  while  the conscientious  objector's  claim  for  exemption  is
based  on a rejection  of the military  system itself.  Prior to  the recent
statutory amendments  not only  did the  typical  board  have  a bias,  but
it also was an interested party.  The board's basic responsibility was to
fill a monthly quota of men available for service;  189  when it allowed  a
man to avoid military service,  it had to find another to replace him.  A
I-A-O  classification leading  to noncombatant  service did  count toward
can  be  explained  partly  by  the  fact  that  voluntary  and  uncompensated  service  on
the  draft  board  is  the  sort  of  civic  duty  which  members  of  the  middle  class  are
accustomed  to  performing.  Board  members  are  frequent  holders  of  other  civicly
oriented  nonpartisan  offices.  A  1966  study  of  local  board  members  in  Wisconsin
revealed,  for  example,  that  26%  of  the  members  had  held  a  position  on  their  local
school boards.  J.  DAVIS  & K.  DOLBEARE,  supra at 65-71;  Wamsley,  Decision-Making
it  Local Boards: A  Case Study,  in  SEcTrM  SRvicE  AND AMERICAN  SoclEry  83,
93-94  (R.  Little ed.  1969)  [hereinafter  cited  as  Decision-Making].
135 A 1966 study reported that almost two-thirds  of board members  were veterans.
J. DAVIS  & K.  DoLBEaRE,  supra note  134,  at 57.  NATIONAL  ADVISORY  CommissioN
ON  SEIEcTIVE  SERVICE,  IN  Puasurr OF EQuITY:  WHO  SERVES  WHEN  NOT ALL  SERVE?
19  (1967)  [hereinafter  cited  as  MARSHALL COMMISsioN  REPORT];  G.  WAmsLEY,
smpra note  134,  at 94.  Davis  & Dolbeare  put  together  statistics  to  conclude  that  the
average  board  in  1966  had  three  veterans,  one  of  whom  was a  veteran  of  World
War  I.  J. DAVIS  & K. DoLBEARE,  supra at 57.
At least in several  instances  during  World War  II  the  selection  of veterans  for
service  on  the  local  boards  was  a deliberate  statewide  policy.  A  State  Director  of
Selective  Service  of a midwestern  state  explained  his  preference  for  veterans  in  the
following  manner:
. . if  a  majority  of  the  local  board  members  were  veterans,  because  of
their previous  service  and  activities  in  various  veterans'  organizations,  they
would  have  an understanding  of service  to the nation  and  a patriotic  desire
to do  the best  possible  for  their  country.
In  the appointment  of members  of  local boards,  lists were  obtained  from
the various veterans'  organizations,  principally the American Legion,  Veterans
of Foreign  Wars, and  the United  Spanish  War  Veterans,  as well  as recom-
mendations  from  civic  groups  such  as  Kiwanis,  Rotary,  Lions,  Chamber  of
Commerce,  and various  labor groups, both  CIO  and A.  F.  of L.  From these
lists  men  were  selected  and  appointed  as  members  of  the  individual  local
boards,  and  boards  of appeal  throughout  the  state.
SELECTI'VE  SERVICE  SYSTEM,  ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION  OF THE  SYSTEM  191
(Special  Monograph  No.  3,  1951).  For  a  discussion  of  the  reliance  placed  on
veterans'  organizations  in the initial  selection  of board  members  after  passage  of the
1940 draft  law,  see  G.  WAmsLEY,  supra at 128.
136 46%  of Wisconsin's  local  board members  belong  to veterans'  organizations  as
compared  to  6%  for the United  States  adult  population.  J.  DAVIS  & K.  DoLBEARE,
supra note  134,  at  68,  table  3.5.  The  comparatively  high  proportion  of  members
belonging  to such  organizations  indicates  a continuing  military  connection  and  a  high
regard for conventional  patriotism  on their part.
137 Board  members  are  not  compensated  for  their  services.  32  C.F.R.  § 1603.3
(1972).
138 Rabin,  supra note  134,  at  1019.  But see  Evening  Bulletin  (Philadelphia),
Feb.  3,  1972,  at 48,  col.  1,  reporting  the  request  of  the  Pennsylvania  State  Director
to remove  from a local  draft board  a 21-year-old  member  who  had  joined  "to  make
sure  the  views  of  people  of  [his]  age  [were]  present  in  the  board  meetings"  and
who  followed  a policy  of granting  deferments  upon  request  because  he  was  "against
making  people  go  to war  if they  don't  want  to."
139  32  C.F.R.  § 1631.6(a)  (1972).894  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
fulfillment  of  the  quota,  but  a  I-0  classification  did  not.1 40  Section
5(d)  of the new  statute,  when read  in conjunction  with  an  executive
order issued in July  1971,1"  alters this situation by establishing  a uni-
form  national  call.  Men  holding  lottery  numbers  up  to  a  specified
ceiling, periodically announced  by the Director of Selective  Service, are
vulnerable  to being  called,  regardless  of how  many  registrants  falling
within this category a particular  board might  have.
If  draft  boards  were  purely  neutral  factfinders,  however,  they
would still have difficulty passing reliable judgments upon conscientious
objector  claims.  The  boards,  as  earlier  observed,  are  "not  composed
of experts,  real  or purported,  but  of citizens  of the neighborhood."  142
They  may  not understand  the  applicable  legal  rules  and  may  be  con-
founded  by the  lengthy  and  sophisticated  statements  some  registrants
submit  to  explain  their  beliefs,  particularly  registrants  without  tradi-
tional  religious affiliations. 4'
Problems more basic than the nature  of the boards  are that often
there  is  little  evidence  available  to  substantiate  or  disprove  the  reg-
istrant's  asserted  belief,  and  that  even  when  there  is  evidence  to  be
found,  there is little likelihood that current  factfinding  procedures  will
bring  it to  light.  In the past, a local board  typically utilized  only the
following  sources  of  information  when  it  passed  on  the  merits  of  a
conscientious  objector  application  in the first  instance:  the registrant's
statements  made  in his  Form  150,  his  other  correspondence  with  the
board,  and statements  submitted  by third persons whom  the registrant
had requested  to support his claim.  Under the recent amendments  the
same should be true  except for those registrants  who request that their
personal meeting  with the board ...  be held before  the initial classifica-
tion instead of after it.145
1
40Id.
'4'  Exec.  Order  No. 11,606,  3 C.F.R.  179  (1972).
142 Ex parte Stanziale,  138  F.2d  312,  314  (3d  Cir.),  cert. denied, 320  U.S.  797
(1943).
143 Board members  do not develop  skills because  of the  occasional  nature of their
job and  the  small  percentage  of  conscientious  objector  cases.  See  Rabin,  supra note
134,  at  1018;  Rabin,  supra note  36,  at  650.  Board  members  are  often  unaware  of
existing regulations,  J. DAvis  & K.  DOLBEARE,  supra note 134,  at  80,  and  controlling
precedents.  Rabin,  supra note 36, at  670.  The  System's  tardiness  in  revising  Form
150  following  the Seeger decision served  to  exacerbate  these  difficulties.  Hearings on
Selective Service  & Military  Compensation Before  the  Senate  Comm.  on  Armed
Services,  92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  417  (1971)  (statement  of  Mr.  Neier,  Executive
Director, ACLU).
144 For a  discussion  of the  relevance  to this  problem  of  the  personal  appearance
before the  board,  see  text accompanying  notes  180-94  infra.
145 Under  the  new  regulations,  registrants  who  claim  conscientious  objector
status  have  a  right  to  meet  personally  with  the  board  either  before  or  after  the
board's initial  classification.  37  Fed.  Reg. 5122  (1972)  (to be  codified  at 32  C.F.R.
§ 1624.1).  Other  registrants'  right  to  a  personal  appearance  comes  into  play  only
after  the  board  has  initially  denied  their  requested  deferment  or  exemption.  Id.
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Prior to the  1967 amendment of the draft law, it was not critical
that  frequently  the  only  evidence  considered  by  the  board  was  that
submitted  by  the  registrant.  Special  procedures  were  available  at  a
subsequent  stage to fill  the gap.  When a  registrant  appealed  a denial
of a conscientious  objector  claim,  the appeal  board, on  the basis  of his
file,  would make a determination  whether the  local board's  action  was
correct.  If the appeal  board  also  ruled against the registrant,  the case
was  referred to the Department of Justice  for investigation  and recom-
mendation.'46  The  Department  of  Justice  procedure  started  with  an
FBI  investigation,  which  ordinarily  consisted  of  interviews  with  a
wide range of persons who had had contact with the registrant."7  After
the investigation was completed, the registrant, provided with a written
summary of the evidence in the FBI report,4 8 appeared before a hearing
officer,'49  where  he  could  contest  the  information  in  the  report  and
produce  witnesses  to  support  his  claim.' 50  The  registrant  could  be
represented  by counsel  at this hearing.'r'
The  hearing  officer  was  generally  a  private  attorney  who  had
volunteered  to  perform  this  function  without  compensation. 52  After
the hearing, he reported his findings and conclusions to the Department,
recommending  for  or against  a  grant of  conscientious  objector status.
Despite  these  provisions  a board  may  always  request  a  registrant  to  appear  before
it in the  exercise  of its investigative  powers.  32 C.F.R.  § 1621.15  (1972)  (providing
subpoena  powers).  But  such  an  interview  on  the  initiative  of  the  board  will  not
displace  the  registrant's  right to have  a personal  appearance  at his  request.
Prior  to  the  recent  regulations,  conscientious  objectors,  like  other  registrants,
had  a  right to  a  personal  appearance  on  their  request  only  after  they  were  initially
classified.  32  C.F.R.  §1624.1(a)  (1972).  The  period  from  mid-1968  to  mid-1970
is  an exception,  however.  During  that  time  local  boards  were  instructed  to  hold  a
preclassification  interview,  apart from  any  request  on  the  part of  a  registrant,  with
registrants  claiming  to  be conscientious  objectors  to  whom  boards  felt they could  not
grant  conscientious  objector  status.  Local  Board  Mem.  No.  41,  SE..  SERv.  L.  REP.
2174  (as  amended,  1968)  (rescinded,  1970).  That  interview  did  not take  the  place
of  the  post-classification  personal  appearance.  Id.
146 The  1940  statute  first  provided  for  the  Department  of  Justice  procedure.  It
directed  that  the  Department  should,  after  "appropriate  inquiry,"  hold  a  hearing
"with  respect  to  the  character  and  good  faith  of  the  objections  of  the  person  con-
cerned."  Selective  Training  and  Service  Act  of  1940,  ch.  720,  § 5(g),  54  Stat.  889.
The  provision  was  in  effect  until  1967.  Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-40,  § 1  (7),  81  Stat.  104.
147 Reisner,  supra note 55, at  687  n.5;  Smith & Bell,  The  Conscientious Objector
Program-A Search for Sincerity, 19 U.  Prr. L. REv.  695,  701  (1958).
148 See  Simmons  v. United  States,  348  U.S.  397  (1955);  Smith  &  Bell,  supra
note 147, at 701-02;  cf. United States  v. Nugent, 346  U.S.  1  (1953).
149 Selective  Training and  Service  Act  of  1940,  ch.  720,  § 5(g),  54  Stat.  889.
150 Smith  & Bell, supra note  147, at  702.
'51  Office  of  the  Attorney  General,  Mem.  No.  41  (revised),  § 104.1  (Apr.  2,
1956).  The  attorney  could  not,  however,  "object  to  any  question  or  make  any
argument concerning  any  phase  of the  proceeding,"  id. § 104.5,  which  was  meant  to
be conducted  in an  "informal, non-technical  and  flexible  manner,"  id.  § 104.1.
152 Reisner,  supra note  55,  at  688;  White,  Processing Conscientious Objector
Claims: A  Constitutional Inquiry, 56  CAW.  L.  REv.  652,  654  (1968).896  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vo1.120:870
The hearing  officer's  recommendation  did not bind the  Department.1
5 3
Nor  did  the  Department's  subsequent  recommendation  and  advisory
opinion-based  on  the  registrant's  Selective  Service  file,  the  FBI  in-
vestigation,  and  the  hearing  officer's  report '54-bind  the  appeal
board,'55 which again passed on the registrant's classification. 5"  It has
been  estimated,  however,  that  the  board  did  follow  the  Department's
recommendation  in ninety to ninety-five  percent of the cases. 57   More-
over, the Department's  recommendation  was favorable to the registrant
in more than seventy percent of all cases. 5 8
In  1967,  Congress  abolished  the  Department  of  Justice  pro-
cedure.' 59  With  larger  draft  calls,  and  the  consequent  increase  in
appeals  from unfavorable  classifications,  the Department was unable to
keep  abreast  of  the  cases,  and  Congress  became  concerned  that  the
procedure provided an attractive delaying tactic that could be used even
by those with no hope of receiving  conscientious objector status. 6 0
During  the  period  when  this  procedure  existed,  it  appears  that
many  local  boards  routinely  denied  all  but  the  most  clear-cut  con-
scientious  objector  claims  because  they  considered  the  evidence  they
had  inadequate  for  making  reliable  determinations.' 6'  As  observed
above, only a denial would lead to departmental investigation and recom-
mendation.  Similarly,  the  appeal  board  was  likely  to  deny  a  claim
initially  in order to  elicit more  evidence. 6'  With  the abolition  of the
procedure, however, the only evidence available at any stage with which
to  judge  the  validity  of  a  registrant's  claim  is  typically  the  evidence
153 Rabin,  supra note  36,  at  680,  reports  that  the  Chief  of  the  Conscientious
Objector  Section  of the  Department  has  estimated  that the  Department  followed  the
hearing  officer's  recommendation  in  approximately  75%  of  the  cases.
154 Smith & Bell, supra note  147, at  702.
155 Exec. Order No.  10,714,  § 1626.25,  22 Fed. Reg. 4273, 4275  (1957)  (rescinded,
Exec. Order  No.  11,360,  32  Fed.  Reg. 9787,  9792  (1967)).
156 Selective  Service  Act  of  1948,  ch.  625,  § 6(j),  62  Stat.  613,  as  amended,
50  U.S.C.A.  APP.  §456(j)  (Supp.  1972);  Exec.  Order  No.  10,714,  §1626.25(e),
22  Fed.  Reg.  4273,  4275  (1957)  (rescinded,  Exec.  Order  No.  11,360,  32  Fed.  Reg.
9787,  9792  (1967)).
157 Smith  & Bell,  mtpra note  147,  at  702  (90-95%)  ;  Gonzales  v.  United  States,
364  U.S. 59,  72  (1960)  (over  90%).
158 Estimate of the  Conscientious  Objector  Section  of the  Department  of Justice,
reported  in  Reisner,  supra note  55,  at  687.  Smith  & Bell,  supra note  147,  at  702,
reports  that  in  80%o  of  the  cases  approval  of  the  claim  was  recommended.  The
disparity  may  be  due  to  a  lower  percentage  of  favorable  recommendations  during
the  final  years  of  the  Department  procedure,  when  many  more  registrants  were
drafted and challenges  to local board classifications  markedly  increased.  See  Reisner,
supra at  688.
15950 t.S.C. App.  §456(j)  (1964),  as amended by  Pub.  L.  No.  90-40,  §1(7),
81  Stat.  104  (1967).
16
0 See  CIVILIAN  ADVISORY PANEL  ON  MILITARY MANPOWER  PROCUREMENT, 
9 0TH
CONG.,  1ST  SEss.,  REPORT TO  THE  HousE  Comm.  ON  ARmED SERVICES  (Comm.  Print
1967);  H.R.  REP.  No. 267,  90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  31  (1967);  H.R.  REP.  No.  346,
90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  15  (1967).
161 See  Rabin,  supra note  36,  at 668-70.
162See id. 674; Smith  & Bell, supra note  147,  at 700.PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR  CASES
before the local board; no  evidence will be gathered  later to correct an
erroneous  decision  at the  initial  level,16  and  local  boards  themselves
have no  more evidence  than  that which they  often  deemed  inadequate
in the past.
164
Although boards have power to conduct their own investigations," 6 5
they  rarely  do  so.' G G  Long  accustomed  to  relying  solely  on  evidence
163  Since the  1971  amendments  there is  one exception:  Appeal  boards  now  grant
personal  appearances,  37  Fed.  Reg.  5123  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.
§ 1626.3(a)),  which  could  produce  additional  evidence.  That  personal  appearance  is
likely  to be duplicative  of  the  personal  appearance  before  the  local  board,  however,
and  all evidence  before either board  in the usual  case  still  comes  from  the  registrant
and sources  that he provides.  Systematic investigation  on the  part of the  government
is  utterly lacking.
164The  unofficial  transcript  of  the  personal  appearance  in  the  case  of  O'Brien
v. Resor,  423  F.2d  594,  598-99  (4th  Cir.  1970),  suggests  that  some  local  boards  may
have continued  to defer to the appellate  procedure  after  the reason  for such  deference
disappeared.  O'Brien's  second  personal  appearance  was  on  November  14,  1967;  the
amended  Act was  approved  on  June  13,  of that year,  and  the Department  of Justice
procedures  were  therefore  not  utilized  in his  case.  The  transcript  reads  (emphasis
in original)  :
Mr.  Ballard:  Is there  something  you wanted  to add  to  your case?
Me:  No.  I only  wanted to discuss  my classification  of  I-A  so  that  I might
answer  any  of  your  questions  and  doubts.
Mr. Ballard:  We  don't  actually  have  any  questions.  We  studied  your  file
and feel  we can't classify you I-0.
Me:  Could you  tell me  why you made  this  decision.  Is  it because  you  doubt
some  of  my answers  or  convictions?
Mr.  Ballard:  We don't actually doubt your beliefs-it's just that  you never
applied before.
Me:  I  realize I  never  applied  before  but  according  to the  regulations  there
isn't really any  time stipulated for  an individual to register  as  a  conscientious
objector.  According  to  the  Supreme  Court,  it's  simply  whether  or  not  an
individual  is sincere  and  lives  according  to  his beliefs  in  a  Supreme  Being.
Mr.  Ballard:  Well,  there are  many  regulations  concerning  this  and  it's  just
a  hair-line  border  between  them.  We just  don't  feel  we  can  give  you  the
classification.
Me: If  you've  read  my material,  you've seen  I  have  lived according  to  my
convictions  over  the years.  There  are letters  from  friends  who  have  known
me  over  the  past  four  years, my  roommate,  professors,  a minister,  and  my
brothers,  who  I'm very  close  to  and  who  know  my  feelings.  All  of  these
people have written because they feel I am sincere in my beliefs.
Mr.  Ballard:  Yes, we  have  read  the letters  and  we  believe you  are sincere.
All  of us  as Christians  don't  believe  in  killing and  when  the  time  comes  we
must  think about it.
Me: Then  it's just that I applied late.
Mr.  Ballard:  No, not  really, it's just that you should appeal to the Board of
Appeals.
Older Man:  Yes,  I  think it would  be  better for  you  if you  appeal  it.  The
board seems  to have more time  for things like  this.  They  have the  time  to
read your material  and won't make any hasty decisions.  Yes,  I think it's best
to appeal  it.
Me:  But  if you  gentlemen  feel  I'm  sincere  why  can't  you  classify  me  as  a
conscientious  objector?
Mr.  Ballard:  We  certainly feel yoz're sincere.  You  certainly wouldn't  drive
all the way from  Baltimore  on  just a hunch.  Why it's  not just  the  expense
there's a lot of time  involved.
1
65 See text accompanying  notes  43-45 supra.
166 Reisner,  supra note  55,  at  710.
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submitted to them, their failure to change their  approach  since  1967  is
not surprising.  The nonprofessional,  volunteer  nature  of draft boards
also makes  it difficult for  them to change their  ways.  Board  members
are unpaid . 67 and typically  spend  only one  or two evenings a month at
the job. 6'  To have added the responsibility for investigating  claims to
the  heavy  caseload  the  Vietnam  conflict  has  entailed  would  have  in-
volved  a commitment  of time that  draft boards  are unwilling  to  give.
For  boards  to rest their  decisions  solely  on  registrants'  evidence
creates  a  troublesome  situation.  At  least  those  registrants  whose
biographical data presented in their Form  100  do not belie their claims,
and  who  have been advised  by  counsel from  the time they  first regis-
tered for the draft should, under that procedure, receive  classification as
conscientious  objectors, whether or not their claims  are genuine.  Even
registrants  who  seek  conscientious  objector  status  after  their  initial
registration  should,  with  competent  advice,  be  able  to  present  papers
showing a prima facie case and nothing that casts doubt upon the claim.
If then the registrant's  evidence  alone  can induce  or compel  the board
to grant a  claim, claims  can easily  be fabricated,  and a man's  chances
of  success  within  the  Selective  Service  System  will  depend  less  on
whether  he is a sincere conscientious  objector than on the care he takes
in supplying  data to his board.
Boards  may respond  by denying  claims  because  they  distrust the
registrant,  even though no evidence  supporting  disbelief  appears  in the
record.  They  may suspect  that evidence  supporting  the  claim  is fab-
ricated or that full investigation  might produce  contradictory  evidence,
and  they  may  justify  denying  a  claim  on  simple  disbelief  since  the
registrant  bears  the  burden  of  proving  that  he  is  entitled  to  the  ex-
emption.  One can have little confidence  in a selection  of which  claims
to  disbelieve,  however,  when nothing  in the file  provides  grounds  for
doubting  sincerity;  it  seems  inevitable  that  genuine  claims  would  be
denied along with false ones, and that some false claims would continue
to be granted.'69  To  empower  boards  to  deny claims  on  the basis  of
167 32 C.F.R.  § 1603.3  (1972).
168 Rabin,  supra note  36,  at 649-50.
169 Professor  Ralph  Reisner  conducted  a  study  of  the  bases  for  classification
decisions  when  the  Department  of justice  procedure  was  in effect,  see Reisner,  supra
note  55,  at  710  n.139, and concluded  that  the ultimate  decision  as  to sincerity  at that
time  rarely  rested  on the  applicant's  own  statements  or  such  an  elusive  factor  as  his
demeanor  during  his brief  personal  appearance before  the  local  board  or  the hearing
officer.  Instead a registrant's  inability  to explain  evidence  that  was  revealed  by  the
FBI  investigation  and  was  contradictory  to  his  claim  was,  according  to  Professor
Reisner,  the  most  frequent  reason  for  ultimate  denial  on  the  ground  of  insincerity.
Id. 710.
Under  current  procedures  the  registrant  will  not  often  be  confronted  with  the
problem  of having to  explain  adverse  information,  because  typically no  adverse  infor-
mation  will  be  produced.  But those  registrants  for  whom,  if  an  investigation  werePROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR  CASES
mere  disbelief  would,  moreover,  make  their  discretion  in granting  or
rejecting claims unlimited and utterly unreviewable, a result particularly
troublesome  when the board's  impartiality  is  questionable. 70
In a somewhat different context,  the Supreme Court has held that
a board is not free to reject a registrant's  claim when nothing in his file
supports  the  rejection.  In Dickinson v.  United States,"'  the  Court
reversed  the  conviction  of  a  man  who  had  been  denied  a  ministerial
exemption  by  the  Selective  Service  System.  The  board's  apparent
ground was disbelief of Dickinson's evidence, but there was  nothing  in
his  file  impeaching  or  contradicting  his  claim.  The  Court  held  that
"when  the  uncontroverted  evidence  supporting  a  registrant's  claim
places him prima facie within the statutory  exemption,  dismissal  of the
claim solely on the basis  of suspicion  and  speculation  is  both contrary
to the spirit of the Act and foreign to  our concepts of justice."  172  Its
ruling, it said, was consistent with the basis-in-fact test for "if the facts
are  disputed  the  board bears  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  resolving
the conflict-the  courts will not interfere." "'  Under  the basis-in-fact
test "the task of the courts  . . . is to search the record for some affirma-
tive  evidence  to  support  the  board's  overt  or  implicit  finding  that  a
registrant has  not painted a complete  or accurate  picture of his  activi-
ties."  174  If, however,  there  is  no  proof  "incompatible  with  the  reg-
istrant's  proof  of  exemption,"  boards  must  utilize  their  investigatory
powers  to  produce  conflicting  evidence  before  they  can  be  upheld  in
denying the claim."'5
conducted,  no  adverse  information  would  be uncovered,  or  those  who  would  be  able
to  explain  away  any  negative  findings,  suffer  from the  cloud  of suspicion  that hangs
over  all  claims  because  they  are  not  checked  out.
A  later  study  by  the  same  author  compares  present  appeal  board  determinations
with  pre-1967  ones.  Professor  Reisner  concludes  that  "the  critical  difference  . . .
lies  in the  greater  use  by  appeal  boards  of  a  small  number  of  absolute  criteria  by
which eligibility  is judged.  The decisions  rendered  by  the Justice  Department appear
to have been predicated  on a less absolute, more individual appraisal  of the  applicant's
beliefs."  Reisner,  supra note  7,  at  541.
170 See notes  134-41  supra & accompanying text.
171346 U.S. 389  (1953).
172 Id. at 397.
1"3Id. at 396.
174Id.
.75 Id. at 396-97.
The  dissenters  in Dickinson claimed  that  the  Court  had  abandoned  the  basis-in-
fact test by  "examin[ing]  and weigh[ing]  . . . purely factual  determinations,"  id. at
400  (Jackson,  J., dissenting)  :
It will not do for  the  Court  . . . to say  on  the  one  hand  that the board's
action  is  not  subject  to  "the  customary  scope  of  judicial  review"  and  that
"the  courts  are not  to  weigh  the  evidence,"  and  then  on  the other  to  strike
down  a classification  because  no  affirmative  evidence  supporting  the board's
conclusion  appears  in  the record.  Under  today's  decision, it  is  not  sufficient
that  the  board  disbelieve  the  registrant.  The  board  must  find  and  record
affirmative  evidence  that  he  has misrepresented  his  case--evidence  which  is
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The rule of Dickinson  applies somewhat differently to conscientious
objector cases.  Two years after Dickinson, the registrant in Witmer v.
United States  176  argued to the Supreme Court that the Selective Service
System  erred in denying his conscientious  objector  claim when he had
made  a  prima  facie  case  of  conscientious  objector  status  and  his  file
contained no  evidence  incompatible  with  the  claim.  The  Court  ruled
that  a  board  could  legitimately  deny  the  claim  without  any  evidence
positively  inconsistent  with  conscientious  objector  status.  It  distin-
guished the ministerial  exemption at issue in Dickinson on the ground
then put to the test  of substantiality  by the courts.  In short, the  board  must
build  a record.
Id. at  399.
Professor  Kenneth  Culp Davis  also  has  claimed  that the  Court's  refusal to  allow
the board to  find  against the party having  the burden  of  proof on  the  ground  that  it
disbelieves  his  evidence  is  inconsistent with  the basis-in-fact  test that  the  Court  said
it espoused.  4 K. DAvis,. supra note  102,  §  29.07,  at  150.
An  analogous  issue  in  a  civil  trial  is  whether  a  judge  should  be  permitted  to
direct a verdict for the party having the burden  of proof.  Courts  disagree  on whether
it  is  ever  permissible  to  direct  a  verdict  when  a  plaintiff  offers  evidence  that,  if
believed,  would  entitle  him  to  a  verdict,  and  the  defendant  offers  no  contradictory
evidence.  Some  say  that  a  verdict  cannot  be  directed  for  the  plaintiff  because  the
jury must pass  upon whether  he is  to be believed  and what  inferences  to  draw  from
his  testimony.  See,  e.g.,  Alexander  v.  Tingle,  181  Md.  464,  30  A.2d  737  (1943);
Woodin v.  Durfee,  46  Mich.  424,  9  N.W.  457  (1881).  Others  hold  that  the judge
may  direct  a  verdict for the  party  bearing the burden  of  proof.  He  should do  so  in
those  cases  where  the proponent  has  made  a  prima  facie  case  and  there  is  nothing
in  the  evidence  that  provides  the  factfinder  with a  reasonable  basis  for  disbelieving
the  proponent's  evidence.  He  may  direct  a  verdict  even  if  persons  supplying  the
evidence  have  an  interest  in  the  outcome,  for  the  fact  that  they  are  interested  does
not  by  itself  provide  a basis  for  discrediting  their  testimony:
A jury  has  no greater  or better  right to act  arbitrarily  or  unreasonably
in  forming a  judgment or  opinion  as to  whether  or  not  a witness  speaks  the
truth  than  it has  to  act  unreasonably  in  arriving  at  any  other  opinion  or
conclusion.
And  there  is  no  general  rule  "that  the  mere  fact  that a  witness  is  interested  in  the
matter  in  controversy,  in and  of itself, without  regard  to  other  circumstances  of  the
case, makes it  reasonable to disbelieve  . . . his testimony  . . . ."  Jerke  v. Delmont
State  Bank,  54  S.D.  446,  459-61,  223  N.W.  585,  590-91  (1929),  quoted  in  IX
J.  WIGM ORE,  EVIDENcE  §2495,  at  309  (3d  ed.  1940).  See  also  Ferdinand  v. Agri-
cultural  Ins.  Co.,  22  N.J. 482,  126  A.2d  323  (1956).
Wigmore  considers  the  latter  approach  the  better  rule,  IX  J.  WIGMoRE,  szupra
§  2495,  at  306,  and  both  he and  James  report it  as  the  prevailing  view.  F. JAMES,
supra note  110,  §7.11,  at  279;  IX  J.  WIGMOR,  supra §2495,  at  305.  It  is  the
counterpart  of the  Dickinson rule  in  draft  board  cases  except  that  under  Dickinson
it is  not a rule  of  reason,  based  on  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the particular
case,  that determines  whether  the  factfinder  can  disbelieve  the registrant  because  of
his interest  in the outcome;  instead  there is a per se  rule  that a  board cannot discredit
the  registrant  unless  it  finds  something  else  in  the  evidence  to  cast  doubt  on  his
veracity.  This difference  may  be explained  in  part because  in draft  board procedures
the  board  occupies  the  roles  both  of  factfinder  and  judge;  no  case  can  be  kept  from
disposition  by  the factfinder  in the  absence  of a per  se  rule, for,  at this  stage of the
proceedings,  there  is  no  separate  third  body  to  determine  how  a  rule  of  reason
applies  to  the particular  case.  Moreover, that boards  are likely  to  have to  participate
in  gathering  facts  adverse  to  the  registrant,  if  any  are  to  be  gathered,  presents  a
special  danger,  without  a  counterpart  in  civil  cases:  that  the  factgathering  process
will  be  short-circuited  if  the  factfinder  is  permitted  to  rule  against  the  registrant
because  of  a  disbelief  that  lacks  a  basis  in  any  evidence  that  has  been  gathered.
Under  the quota system  the danger  was  accentuated  because  the boards,  unlike juries,
had  an interest  in  the  outcome.
176 348 U.S.  375  (1955).
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that good faith was  irrelevant to  that exemption,  which required  only
a showing of totally  objective facts-that the registrant's regular voca-
tion was preaching and teaching religion.  Conscientious  objector cases,
by  contrast,  always  involve  the  subjective  issue  of  the  registrant's
sincerity.1
77
Witmer added, however, that Selective  Service authorities may not
rule  against a registrant  "solely  on the basis of  suspicion and  specula-
tion" in conscientious objector cases any more than in others.  A denial
based  on insincerity  can be sustained  only  if there is  something in the
registrant's file that casts doubt on the registrant's veracity.'  Witmer's
conviction  was  in fact sustained  on  the ground  that his  statements  to
the board  justified  an  inference  of insincerity.1 9
As noted  above,  in many  cases  local  boards  meet  with  the  reg-
istrant himself.  As a result of the 1971  amendments,  the same is now
likely to  be true of appeal  boards  as well.'80  While a  registrant  is  in
full control of the evidence he presents to his board  in writing, and can
draft  it  so  that  it  clearly  supports  his position,  he  obviously  cannot
predict, much less control, the board's assessment  of his demeanor  at a
personal appearance.  If the board is  entitled to reject a claim because
it concludes from its observations  of the registrant that he is not telling
the  truth,  the  registrant  cannot  be  assured  of  success  by  the  simple
expedient of filing a paper claim which is  free of inconsistency.'"'
While there  is an absence  of square holdings on the subject, there
are suggestions  in the case law that a board may properly disbelieve  a
registrant  because of his demeanor  and reject his claim for that reason
alone.  In Witmer, for example,  the Court noted that  "Witmer  stated
his beliefs with apparent sincerity" '82  and that there was "no indication
anywhere in the record that his demeanor  appeared shifty or evasive or
'77 Id. at 381.  Cf. Dickinson v. United  States,  346 U.S.  at  393  n.5.
178 348  U.S.  at 381-82.
179 Prior  to  claiming  conscientious  objector  status  Witmer  had  claimed  exemp-
tions as  a farmer  and  as  a minister,  both  of  which  claims  had  been  frivolous;  he
had  made  inconsistent  statements  about  whether  his  beliefs  permitted  him  to  con-
tribute to  the war  effort  in  any  capacity;  and  he  had  not  adduced  any  evidence  of
a  prior  expression  of  his  conscientious  opposition  to  participation  in  war.  Id. at
382-83.
3
80  See 50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §471a(b) (1)  (Supp.  1972).
181 A registrant  might  benefit,  if  this  is  the  rule,  by  avoiding  an  appearance
before  the  board.  Bypassing  a  personal  appearance  before  the  local  board  by
immediate  appeal  is not  considered  a failure  to  exhaust  administrative  remedies  that
bars later judicial  review.  (This,  at least,  is the  position of commentators,  3.  GRF-
FrrHs,  THE  DRAn LAW  41  (2d  ed.  1968);  SF.  SERv.  L.  REP.  PRAcTICE  MANUAL
12411  (1968),  but  there is no definitive  judicial  decision on  the issue.)  A board  can
deprive  a  registrant  of  this  stratagem  by  requiring  him  to  appear  before  it,  see
McGee  v.  United  States,  402  U.S.  479  (1971);  note  145  supra, but  it  may  be
doubted  whether  the  overburdened  boards  will  be  that  farsighted  in  very  many
instances.
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that his appearance was one of unreliability  ....  1  83  For this reason,
it explained,  it was necessary, in order to sustain the conviction, to find
inferences of insincerity in the written statements Witmer had presented
to the board.
This  language  implies,  however,  that the  mere fact  that the  reg-
istrant met personally with the board would not suffice as a basis in fact
for  an  unfavorable  classification.  When nothing  in the  record  is  un-
favorable to a registrant, an adverse classification  will not be  sustained
simply because,  in its meeting with the registrant, the board might have
discredited  his claim because  of his demeanor.  Such a  finding on the
part of the board  will not be presumed unless the board records  its un-
favorable  impressions  in the registrant's  file.  A contrary  rule  would
undermine Dickinson's holding-that disbelief should not be inferred in
the absence  of evidence  to  support  the inference-in  all  cases  where  a
registrant appeared before  his board.  Witmer permits that result only
where the board makes  an adverse  notation concerning  the registrant's
demeanor.'
Allowing  a board to  reject a claim  by making an  adverse  finding
concerning the registrant's demeanor  does provide a means of rejecting
claims that are perfect on paper  but may in fact be insincere.  Yet there
is little basis  for  confidence  that the  claims  the board  rejects  on  the
basis of demeanor  will be those that in fact are insincerely made.  The
typical hearing before  the draft board  does not provide  a reliable basis
for separating the genuine claims from the contrived  ones.  Protections
which are deemed to enhance the reliability  of the factfinding process  in
judicial  proceedings  are  absent:  for  example,  a  public  forum,'  the
right to confront  and cross-examine  adverse witnesses, 8"  and  the right
to  counsel. 87  Inarticulate  or poorly-educated  registrants  may be  par-
ticularly prejudiced. 8  Prior to the 1971  amendments,  the typical per-
183 Id.
184 Other  cases  indicating  that  a  board  may  deny  on  the  basis  of  demeanor
evidence  are:  United States  v.  Washington,  392  F.2d  37,  39  (6th  Cir.  1968)  ; United
States  v.  Corliss,  280  F.2d  808,  814-16  (2d  Cir.  1960)  (conviction  affirmed  on  basis
of  demeanor  notation  in  record) ;  Parr  v. United  States,  272  F.2d  416,  419  (9th  Cir.
1959)  (conviction  reversed  in absence  of demeanor  notation);  Pitts  v. United  States,
217  F.2d  590  (9th  Cir.  1954)  (same);  Campbell  v.  United  States,  221  F.2d  454,
457-58  (4th  Cir.  1955).  But  cf. Batterton  v. United  States,  260  F.2d  233,  236-37
(8th  Cir.  1958).
185 See  lit re  Oliver,  333  U.S.  257,  266-72  (1948);  People  v. Jelke,  308  N.Y.
56,  61-62,  65,  123  N.E.2d  769,  771-73  (1954).
186 See  Pointer  v.  Texas,  380  U.S.  400,  404-06  (1965);  Greene  v.  McElroy,
360  U.S.  474,  496-97  (1959);  1  K.  DAvis,  sapra note  102,  §7.05;  V  3.  WIGMoRE,
supra note 175,  § 1367.
187 See,  e.g.,  Gideon v.  Wainwright,  372 U.S.  335  (1963).
188 The lack of procedural  safeguards  before  the local  board may be  more critical
now  than  it  was  prior  to  1967.  Previously  the  registrant  who  was  unsuccessful
before  his  local  board had  an opportunity  later  for  a  hearing  at which  he  could  be
represented  by  counsel,  was  furnished  a  resumi  of  evidence  that  the  FBI  had
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sonal  appearance  before  a  local  draft  board  lasted  for  only  about  ten
minutes.5 9   The  regulations now suggest  fifteen minutes  as normal,
190
but that period is to include the three witnesses the registrant now may
present.  Nervousness  caused by the seriousness  of the occasion,  rather
than the lack of a genuine  claim, could well  explain any evasiveness  on
the part of the registrant that occurs,  and such a short interview  cannot
usually provide a reliable basis for distinguishing one from the other.19
The lack of time allowed for the personal appearance  is probably due, in
large part, to the volunteer  nature  of draft boards. 9'  Time pressures
may also prevent board members  from making a thorough study of the
registrant's  file.  A board  unfamiliar  with  a  registrant's  claim  cannot
maximize  the  utility  of  its  hearing  with  the  registrant  to  clarify  or
expose  the weak points  in his  case.  A generalized  interview  of  such
short duration is not an adequate means  of testing  sincerity.
Despite these  shortcomings  in present  practice, there are probably
some  occasions  when a  board  could  reasonably  reject  a  claim  because
the personal  appearance  persuaded  it that  the  claimant  should  not  be
believed.  Because  in the bulk of cases the personal appearance  does  not
provide  a firm  basis  for  determining  the  claimant's  veracity,  it  may
nonetheless  be unwise to allow a board to deny a claim on this ground
alone, rather  than force  it to unearth  available  evidence  supporting  or
discrediting the claim  it suspects. 19 3  Empowering  a board to reject  a
claim  on  demeanor  alone  would  create  considerable  danger  that  de-
meanor  would  be  cited  as the  dispositive  ground  in  cases  where  that
ruling was inappropriate.  By citing a "shifty demeanor"  or an "appear-
ance  of unreliability"  on the part of the registrant,  a board could avoid
the burden of checking out a claim, yet render an unreviewable  decision.
To  be sure, there is  now a  right  of personal  appearance  at the  appeal
board and the Presidential board level.  Their determinations,  however,
if  based  on  demeanor, will  not be  reviewable  in court  as  long as  the
registrant's  appearance  cannot be preserved  in the record or recaptured
on  appeal.  A registrant  seeking to  challenge  a classification  in court
gathered,  and  was  given  an  opportunity  to  rebut  adverse  evidence  by his  own  testi-
mony, through  witnesses, or  by written evidence.  See text accompanying notes  147-50
supra.
189 Interview  with  Selective  Service  officials at  National  Headquarters,  in  Wash-
ington,  D.C.,  Aug. 1971.  This  estimate  coincides  with that which  others  have made.
See, e.g., Reisner,  supra note  55,  at 698  (10  minutes)  ; Rabin,  supra note  36,  at  650
(10-15  minutes),  662  (10-20  minutes).
19037  Fed.  Reg. 5122  (1972)  (to  be  codified  at 32  C.F.R.  § 1624.4(c)).
191 Decision-Making, supra note  134,  at  95,  reports  that  things  like  dress  and
posture become important  in deciding  whether  to grant  claims.  See id. 97-98.
192 See text  accompanying notes  167-68  supra.
193 Cf. Dyer v.  MacDougall,  201  F.2d  265, 269  (2d  Cir.  1952)  (L.  Hand, 3.).
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will  therefore  be  effectively  barred  from  judicial  review  if  a  finding
based solely on demeanor  is legally  sufficient.
Even  a  rule that  a  board  cannot  reject  a  claim  on  the  basis  of
demeanor  alone  if it has failed  to  conduct  an investigation  to produce
all  available  evidence  would  be  insufficient  to  solve  the  dilemma.  A
board  that  has  investigated  thoroughly  might  correctly  disbelieve  a
claim even though no evidence  (other than the registrant's  appearance)
supports  disbelief.  As will be more  fully explored, 9'  the  quantum  of
evidence an investigation produces cannot be dispositive.  That there is
little  evidence  to prove the  registrant's  belief may  not provide  a basis
for disbelieving him; a failure to make external manifestations  of one's
belief is not inconsistent with strong opposition to participation in war.
Nor is it conclusive that an investigation yields  evidence supporting the
registrant.  He is in full control of whatever  evidence  does or  does not
exist  on  the  subject  of whether  he  entertains  a  particular  belief.  A
registrant whose activities  support a conscientious  objector claim  could
have engaged  in those activities  simply to  add to the persuasiveness  of
his  case before the draft board.  If third  parties  attest to the sincerity
of his claim,  they  may themselves  be  insincere,  or the  registrant may
have persuaded  them of the validity of his  claim  simply to improve his
chances  of success.
Because  the  subject  of inquiry  is  so  elusive,  the  rule must  either
allow  the  clever  registrant  to  fabricate  a  foolproof  conscientious  ob-
jector claim  (by not allowing the board to rest on demeanor),  or permit
the draft board  to deny conscientious  objector  claims at will in its un-
reviewable discretion.  If we could trust to  an adversary  system  to see
that  evidence on both sides  of a controversy were  produced,  and if we
trusted  the  factfinder  on  the  subject  of  the  dispute,  we  could  have
greater  confidence  in a rule permitting  denial  of  a claim  on the  basis
of demeanor  alone.
III.  THE  "REASONS"  REQUIREMENT
Prior to the 1971 amendments,  the Universal Selective  Service and
Military Training Act  did not require boards to disclose their grounds
of decision.  Although  the Administrative  Procedure Act required ad-
ministrative  agencies to give reasons  for their decisions, 95 the Selective
Service  System has consistently been exempted  from the APA.'96
194 See text  accompanying  notes  258-63  infra.
195Section  8(b),  5  U.S.C.  §557(c)  (1970).  See  also  id.  §§4(b),  6(d),  5
U.S.C.  §§555(e),  558(c)  (1970);  MODEL  STATE  ADmINISTRATIVE  PROCEDURE  AcT
§ 11.  Many states,  however,  do not require  findings in cases  tried  by judges  without
juries,  and  prior  to  1930  federal  equity  courts  were  not  required  to  make  findings.
2 K.  DAvIs, supra note  102,  § 16.03.  Moreover,  under  Rule  52  of the  Federal  Rules
of Civil  Procedure,  findings are  not necessary  in  decisions  in  some  cases.  Id.
196 See note  56  supra.
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Before  1967, however,  boards'  failure to  explain  their  decisions
was not of great importance in conscientious objector cases,  because the
Department  of  Justice,  when  it  made  recommendations  to the  appeal
boards for disposition  of conscientious  objector  cases, gave reasons  for
its recommendations.  Courts presumed that the Department's  reasons
were  shared by the  appeal board whenever  the board  followed  the re-
sult the Department  recommended  but  did not  specify reasons  for the
classification.  In Sicurell  v. United States,"7 for example, the Depart-
ment based  its recommendation  of rejection  on  reasoning that the  Su-
preme  Court  later  held  legally  erroneous.  The  appeal  board  denied
Sicurella's  claim without explanation.  The  Supreme Court  ruled  that
the "error of law by the Department, to which the Appeal Board might
naturally look  for guidance  on such  questions,  must vitiate  the  entire
proceedings at least where it is not clear that the Board relied  on some
legitimate ground." 1'  Similarly,  when the Department recommended
denial  of  an exemption  on alternative  grounds,  one  of which  was  in-
valid,  and  the appeal  board  followed  the recommendation  without  in-
dicating on which ground it relied, the classification would be reversed
because  it might  have  rested  on  the  erroneous  ground. 9 9  Thus,  the
courts  were left without  reasoning  to  explain the  administrative  deci-
sion  only  in  cases  where  the  appeal  board,  without  explanation,  re-
jected  a  recommendation  that an  exemption  be granted. 0  Since the
.197348 U.S. 385  (1955).
.19
8 Id.  at 392.
199 United  States  v. Jakobson,  325  F.2d 409,  416-17  (2d  Cir.  1963),  aff'd  sub
nom. United  States  v. Seeger,  380  U.S.  163  (1965)  ;  Clay v.  United  States,  403  U.S.
698  (1971)  (per  curiam)  ; Ypparila v. United  States,  219 F.2d  465  (10th  Cir.  1954)  ;
Shepherd v.  United States, 217 F.2d 492  (9th  Cir. 1954)  ; United  States  v. Englander,
271  F. Supp.  182  (S.D.N.Y.  1967)  (mem.);  United  States  v. Erikson,  149  F. Supp.
576, 579  (S.D.N.Y.  1957).  This  approach  clearly makes  sense  in a  case  where  the
record  provides  simply  a basis on  which  the board might  legitimately have  found  the
registrant disqualified.  In such a situation it is  possible that the Justice  Department's
error led  to misclassification because  the board decided  solely on an  erroneous  ground
and did not make the  finding on which it could have  legitimately  denied the  exemption
sought.  In a case where  the  file  shows positively that  the registrant  was  disqualified,
however, one might quarrel  with  the rule requiring  reversal  because of faulty reason-
ing.  If,  for  example,  the  Department  recommended  against  a  registrant  on  all
statutory grounds and was in error in its advice that the registrant  was not sufficiently
religious  and  was  insincere,  cf.  Clay v.  United  States, supra, but  the registrant's  file
showed  clearly  that  his  opposition  extended  only  to  particular  wars,  the  doctrine
would seem  to require  that,  in the  absence  of appeal  board  reasons  for  denial  of the
exemption,  its I-A  classification of the  registrant be  held  erroneous.  While it is true
that the appeal  board might have rejected  the registrant's  claim  on erroneous  reason-
ing, the fact remains  that he is not  entitled  to that  classification  and  that the  record
reveals that, at  least  in result,  the  appeal  board's  decision was  the  only  correct  one.
For a  court  so  to  decide,  however,  might  be  deemed  an  usurption  of  the  board's
function  of classifying  the registrant  in the  first instance.  Cf. SEC v. Chenery  Corp.,
318  U.S.  80, 88  (1943).
200  Of course,  the  reasoning  available  to  courts  for  review  might  not  in  some
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Department's  recommendations  were usually followed, those cases were
uncommon.
After abolition of the Department's  investigatory procedure,  how-
ever,  registrants'  files  in most  cases  did not  show the ground  of deci-
sion.  The anomalous  situation  resulting from  courts'  attempts  to re-
view decisions  whose rationale they  could not understand fully explains
Congress'  recent  action.
A.  The Need for a Reasons Requirement
As noted above,201 the ultimate issue the Court faced  in Dickinson
v.  United States 2 .2  was whether a  draft board  can  find against a reg-
istrant because  it disbelieves  him when no evidence  supporting  its dis-
belief  appears in the record.  In fact, it was not clear  that the board  in
that  case  had  disbelieved  Dickinson.  The  file  failed  to  explain  the
board's  rejection  of his  claim. 2"3  Moreover,  it affirmatively  appeared
that there had been  an issue  whether Dickinson's  ministerial  activities
should be considered  his vocation when they were not compensated and
he supported  himself  by  working  as  a  radio  repairman  for  five hours
a week.  The Court held,  however, that, under  the statute, a man  who
regularly  devotes  150  hours  each  month,  as Dickinson  did, to  preach-
ing and  teaching his faith  qualifies as  a minister although  secular  em-
ployment is his sole  source of support.  This conclusion left no evidence
in the record  supporting  any legitimate  ground  for  rejection  of Dick-
inson's claim.  There then remained for the Court the question whether
the board's  determination might have rested  on a basis not reflected  in
the record: that the board did not believe  Dickinson's factual assertions
were truthful.
To have sustained Dickinson's conviction on the ground that, even
though  the  file  contained  no  evidence  of  insincerity,  the  board  might
have  disbelieved  the registrant's  claim would  have made wholly unre-
viewable  every  case  where the board  took the precaution  of stating no
reasons for denying a claim.  If courts were to presume that the board's
disallowance  of a claim was based upon  disbelief  of the  claimant's evi-
dence, there would always be a "basis in fact."  204  A board would then
201 See text  accompanying  notes  171-75  supra.
202346 U.S. 389  (1953).
203 Since  Dickinson was  not  a  conscientious  objector  case,  there  had  been  no
departmental  investigation.
204 Even  after  Dickinson a  board's  action  would  have  to be  sustained  whenever
the registrant's  file  indicated a basis  in  fact for  the result  reached.  If  Dickinson had
been  decided  otherwise,  however,  the  decision  would  have  to be  sustained  also  when
the  file  did  not  show a  basis  in  fact,  for  it  could  always  be  presumed  that  a board
disallowed  a  claim  because  it  disbelieved  the  evidence.
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be  subject to  reversal  only  when  it had  committed  a prejudicial  pro-
cedural error or had indicated gratuitously a reason for its decision that
was legally  indefensible.
While  the Dickinson Court refused  to adopt that presumption,  it
did not affirmatively require boards to disclose their reasons.  The con-
sequence of the  Court's approach  is that  if a  record  shows a basis  for
rejecting  a  claim  on any  ground  the  administrative  adjudication  will
be upheld  without regard  to the actual  reason  for  the  board's  denial.
In Dickinson the  Court surmounted  the  problem  presented  by its  ig-
norance  of the board's  reasoning by finding that  each possible ground
would  have  been  erroneous.  Suppose,  however,  that  there  had  been
some  evidence  in Dickinson's  file  contradicting  his  statement that  he
regularly spent 150 hours a month as a minister.  Whether  or not that
evidence had in fact  influenced the board's  decision, it would have pro-
vided  a  basis  in  the  record  for  the  board  to  disbelieve  Dickinson's
evidence.  That  this basis  existed  would  have insulated  his  case from
further review, although in fact the board had discounted the contradic-
tory evidence and believed  Dickinson's claim that he worked  150 hours
monthly as  a minister, and  had denied the  exemption  only because  of
an error of law-a belief that Dickinson  disqualified himself by  spend-
ing  five  hours  a  week  as  a  radio  repairman.  Only  if the  board  had
stated the  reasons for  its decision  would  its error  in denying  Dickin-
son's claim  have come to light.
To  cite  a more  current example, there might be a basis  in a reg-
istrant's file for believing his conscientious  objection relates  only to the
war  in Vietnam, though other  evidence-perhaps  even the bulk of the
record-suggests  his objection  is to  war in general.  The draft board
has  ruled  against  him without  disclosing  its reason.  Without a  rea-
sons  requirement,  a  court  must  sustain  the  classification  even  if  the
board has  in fact  decided that the  registrant's  opposition  does  extend
to participation in all wars.  The board may have thought a registrant
must belong to  a peace church  to be  exempted.  Or, acting  arbitrarily
and  in contravention  of Dickinson, it may simply have  disbelieved  the
registrant  though  there  was  no  basis  for disbelief  in  the  record.  In
neither case would the registrant be able to show that his classification
was illegal;  there would be a basis in the record for a decision that the
draft board did not make-a  decision that  the registrant  is a  selective
conscientious  objector.
Without a reasons requirement, the rules that a board lacks power
to resolve  issues  of fact  against  a  registrant unless  there  is  some  evi-
dence  unfavorable  to  him  on that  issue and that  courts  will not defer
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to board  decisions on questions of law  were, then, of no practical  effect
whenever there was  a basis  in fact  for ruling against the registrant  on
any  ground.  A  registrant  could  lose  an  exemption  whenever  there
was  some  evidence  from which  a factfinder  could  decide  against him,
whether  or not the factfinder  did decide against him on the point.  He
could  be  convicted  though no  factfinder-either  court  or  draft  board
-had  ever  thought that the facts on which his conviction was premised
were true.
Such a  result would be possible  in any system  where a  court did
not know  the  basis  for  decisions  it  reviewed  and  where  the  scope  of
review  was  less  than  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  In any such
case  the court might affirm  a conviction  on  a hypothesis  supported  by
the  requisite  amount  of  evidence,  when  neither  court  nor board  had
considered  that  hypothesis  truthful.  The  extreme  narrowness  of the
basis-in-fact  standard  of review  accentuates  the problem  by making  it
more likely that a registrant will be  convicted  on the basis of findings
that have never  been made.  Under  that  standard, a  court must defer
to the  board's  classification  even  if the  evidence  unfavorable  to the
registrant on  a crucial  issue  is  very weak.  Yet the very weakness  of
that evidence makes it likely that the board ruled in favor  of the regis-
trant  on the  issue and  denied his  claim  for  exemption  on  some  other
ground.  Moreover, the smaller the amount of evidence needed to satisfy
the reviewing  standard, the more likely it is to be present in the bulk of
the cases.  With a basis-in-fact test that was strictly followed and with-
out  a requirement  that  boards  give  reasons,  the  only  cases  where  a
registrant  could  expect  to  correct  an  erroneous  classification  in  court
would be those where all of the evidence  on all of the issues unambig-
uously favored  him. 2"5
The  deference  to  board  decisions  that  absence  of  reasons  made
necessary  did  not  comport  with  what Estep 206  had  indicated  was  the
205 The basis-in-fact  test, when  not  coupled  with a  requirement that  boards  give
reasons,  thus  became  equivalent  to  a rule  that  boards'  decisions  would  be  sustained
whenever  there  was  any  conceivable  legitimate  basis  for  their  ultimate  result.  The
rule  amounted  to  a  presumption  that  the board  correctly  understood  applicable  law.
It  did not  result  from  a conscious  policy  that  all  board  decisions  should  stand  that
could  have  been  reached  legitimately  whether  or  not  they  were  so  reached,  cf.
McGowan  v.  Maryland,  366  U.S.  420,  426  (1961)  ("A  statutory  discrimination  will
not  be  set  aside  if  any  state  of  facts  reasonably  may  be  conceived  to  justify  it."),
but  was a rule  of necessity-necessitated  by  ignorance  of the board's  actual  grounds.
This  was  apparent  since  whenever  the  reason  or  reasons  for  the  board's  decision
appeared,  courts  did require  a  basis  in  the  evidence  for  the reason  or  reasons  given;
it  was  not deemed  sufficient  that the  classification  might be  proper  on other  grounds.
Indeed,  the  presumption  of  correctness  was  sufficiently  weak  that a  board  would  be
reversed  when  the record  suggested  it misunderstood  an element of the  applicable  law
but  did  not  show  whether  the  error  affected  the  classification  it  gave.  See  text
accompanying  notes  195-200 supra.
206 Estep v. United  States,  327  U.S.  114  (1946).
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purpose  of  limited  review  of  Selective  Service  determinations.  The
basis-in-fact  test  was  designed  to  allow  boards  rather  than  courts  to
resolve  conflicts  in the  evidence;  it contemplated  deference  to  factual
decisions that boards  had actually  made.  If boards  act in  accordance
with the law, those  decisions  will not be unfavorable  to the  registrant
simply  because  there is a  basis  in fact for finding  against  him.  The
basis-in-fact  standard  is  a  standard  of  review.  Boards,  by  contrast,
have the duty to  decide  on the  basis  of all the  evidence  whether they
consider  the  registrant  entitled to  the  claimed  exemption;  their  func-
tion is to rule in accordance with the preponderance  of the evidence.2"7
The policy  is for courts to  defer to  findings that boards  have  actually
made in conformance to this standard, not to deny an exemption  simply
because there  is a basis for ruling against a registrant on some ground
when no factfinder has actually so ruled.
In sum, the failure of boards to state their reasons often precluded
significant judicial review.  By the same token, the system was vulner-
able to the charge that it contravened Estep's mandate that only  classi-
fications  "made  in  conformity with the regulations"  are final  and that
courts  will not sustain  classifications  resulting  from lawless  board ac-
tion. o 8
207 When the evidence  is in equilibrium, however, the registrant's  burden of proof
causes  him to lose.
208 327 U.S.  114,  122  (1946).  The absence  of reasons might have been  attackable
on  constitutional  grounds  as  well.  That  would  depend  upon  whether  it is  constitu-
tionally  required that draft  boards'  decisions  be judicially  reviewable.  Estep did  not
resolve the  question, though it did say that to assume  nonreviewability  of a classifica-
tion in  a criminal  prosecution  would  be to  "infer that  Congress  departed  . . . far
from  the traditional  concepts  of a  fair trial  . . . ."  Id.  See  also  Wechsler,  The
Courts and the  Constitution, 65  CoLUm.  L. REv.  1001,  1004-07  (1965)  ;  H.M.  HART
& H.  WECHSLER,  THE  FEDERAL CoURTS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEm  317-25,  328-40
(1953).  Despite  Justice  Brandeis'  comment  that  "[t]he  supremacy  of  law  demands
that  there shall  be opportunity  to have  some  court  decide  whether  an erroneous  rule
of law  was applied;  and whether the proceeding  in which  facts  were  adjudicated was
conducted  regularly,"  St. Joseph  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  United  States,  298  U.S.  38,  84
(1936)  (Brandeis,  J.,  concurring),  the  Supreme  Court  has  not  clearly  held  judicial
review, even  of constitutional  rulings by administrative  agencies,  to be constitutionally
required,  let  alone review of legal  rulings having  less  than  constitutional  implications.
See generally 4 K.  DAVIS,  supra note  102,  §§28.18-.19.  But  cf. Crowell  v. Benson,
285  U.S.  22  (1932);  Ng  Fung  Ho  v.  White,  259  U.S.  276  (1922);  Ohio  Valley
Water  Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,  253  U.S.  287  (1920).  The  present  status  of those
cases  is  analyzed  in  4  K.  DAvis,  supra §§29.08-.09.  The  Court's  enthusiasm  for
avoiding  resolution  of  the  constitutional  issue  by  finding  that  even  statutes  which
apparently  preclude  review  in fact  allow it, as the  Court  did in Estep, may  serve  as
some  indication that lack  of review  is constitutionally  suspect.  See also, e.g., Harmon
v.  Brucker,  355  U.S.  579  (1958)  (per  curiam) ;  Pennsylvania  R.th  v.  Rychlik,  352
U.S.  480  (1957)  ;  Shaughnessy  v.  Pedreiro,  349  U.S.  48,  51-52  (1955)  ;  Heikkila  v.
Barber,  345  U.S.  229,  232-33  (1953);  Elgin,  J. & E.  Ry.  v. Burley,  325  U.S.  711
(1945),  aff'd  on rehearing,  327  U.S.  661  (1946);  Kessler  v.  Strecker,  307  U.S.  22,
34  (1939);  United  States  v.  Williams,  278  U.S.  255  (1929).  And  even  if  judicial
review  is  not  generally  required  by  the  Constitution,  there  may  be  special  factors  in
Selective  Service  cases  that  make  it  constitutionally  necessary.  Even  a  court  that
deems  the  informality  of  Selective  Service  proceedings,  the  lack  of  procedural  safe-
guards,  and the  possible partiality  of the factfinder  in themselves  to be constitutionally
acceptable,  might  come  to a  different  conclusion  if  Selective  Service  decisions  were
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B.  The  Analogy  to Juries
Juries  commonly fail to "disclose  their predicates  of decision.2 0 9   It
may  be  argued  that  whatever  reasons  support  that  practice 2 1 0  apply
equally to draft boards.  Draft boards  and juries do have certain  sim-
ilarities.  Both  are  factfinding  bodies  composed  of  laymen  without
legal skills, drawn from the community  of the persons whom their de-
cisions  affect.  Differences  between  draft boards  and  juries neverthe-
less  justify  imposing  different  rules  as  to  the  degree  and  manner  in
which they  must  account  for  their  decisions.  The  salient  differences
are in their functions, their constitutional status, and their composition.
1.  Functions
While juries hear  evidence  in the presence of a judge, no judicial
officer  is present  at the proceedings  that  result in  draft boards'  initial
classifications.  This difference  makes draft boards'  factual  determina-
tions  less  subject  to  judicial  supervision  than  are those  of juries.  A
judge observes all evidence  the jury does, contemporaneously  with the
jury, and can rule upon whether  a jury can rationally arrive at a par-
ticular  verdict.21'  A  draft  board,  by  contrast,  judges  alone  whether
there  is sufficient  evidence to  support  its decision.
at no stage  subjected  to judicial scrutiny.  Moreover,  the consequences  of an erroneous
Selective  Service  classification  are  momentous.  Even apart  from the  criminal liability
of  a  person  who  fails  to  comply  with  a  Selective  Service  order,  a  person  who  does
comply must spend  two  years  as a soldier, possibly  in a  combat  zone.  (Cf.  Yakus v.
United  States,  321  U.S.  414  (1944),  allowing  limitations  on  judicial  review  where
criminal  prosecution  for  noncompliance  also  was  possible but  where  compliance  cost
only  money.)  And  conscientious  objectors  whose  conscientiously-held  beliefs  prevent
them from  entering  the military  are forced  to serve  the prison  term.  That  sensitive
constitutional  issues  are involved  in  the  area  of  conscientious  objection,  whether  or
not  a  conscientious  objector  exemption  is  constitutionally  required,  see notes  289-91
infra, may  also  make  it  more  important  for  judicial  review  to  be  available  than  in
cases  where  the issues  are freer  from  constitutional  implications.  Cf.  Ng  Fung  Ho
v. White,  259  U.S.  276  (1922)  (requiring  judicial  determination  of  citizenship  under
the  fifth  amendment  though  generally  the  finality  clause  of  the  deportation  statute
was  deemed  to  permit  only more  limited  review).
209 While  special  verdicts  and  interrogatories  to  the jury  to be  answered  along
with  the  general  verdict  are  available  devices  for  obtaining  jury  findings,  they  are
not normally  required  in  civil cases,  F. JAMES,  supra note  110,  § 7.15,  at  295  (1965),
and  are  virtually  never  employed  in  criminal  cases,  see  G.  CLEMENrTsoN,  SPECIAl.
VEmICTS  AND  SPECIAL  FINDINGs  BY  JuRms  49  (1905)  (only  general  verdict  proper
in criminal  case) ; United States  v. Spock, 416 F.2d  165,  180  (1st Cir.  1969)  (terming
use of special  interrogatories  in  that  criminal  prosecution  "without  precedent").
210 The  reason  commonly  suggested,  both by  adherents  and critics  of  the current
system,  is that juries  are less  controlled,  by the  judge and  by the  law, when  findings
are not  required.  See, e.g., United  States  v. Spock,  416  F.2d  165,  180-83  (1st Cir.
1969)  ;  G.  CLEMENTSON,  supra note  209,  at  49;  F. JAMES,  sUpra note  110,  § 7.15,  at
293-99  (1965).
211 See  generally  F.  JAMES,  supra note  110,  §§ 7.13,  .16,  .20.  A  judge  also
exercises  some  control over  what  evidence  comes  before  the  jury, id. §  7.12,  and  can
guard against  the  jury  being  influenced  by  improper  considerations.  See  generally
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The  board's  decision,  like  a  jury's,  is  of  course  subject  to later
judicial review.  At that stage a judge can decide whether the decision
is sustainable.  Under  prevailing law,  it will be  if it has  any basis  in
the evidence.  A judge cannot, however,  review  after the fact with the
same  assurance  as  one  supervising  the  factfinder  contemporaneously,
for  he  cannot  observe  certain  evidence,  notably  the  demeanor  of  the
witnesses, which  may have  affected the factfinder's  decision.
While draft boards, like juries, make factual findings, they also per-
form the  role that trial judges fulfill  in judicial  proceedings:  they  de-
cide the applicable law.  When  one body decides  both the law and  the
facts in a case and that body is excused  from stating its grounds of de-
cision, the law as well as the facts are shielded  from effective review."'
In jury  trials  deference  is  paid  juries'  findings,  which  they  need not
explain, but the law  of the case remains wholly  reviewable.  That law
is ascertained  by examining the court's rulings, the charge, and the in-
structions to the jury." 3  Since  in draft board proceedings,  no person
who is not on the board articulates  on the record the law to be applied
in the particular  case,  the  only way  to prevent  insulation  of that law
from review is for board members themselves to reveal what they deem
the  law  to  be.  By  doing  so  they  will  make  possible  more  accurate
judicial  review than is possible with juries; in jury cases the reviewing
court knows the law as it was told the factfinder, but it does not know
what  the  factfinder  understood  the law  to be. 4   But if boards  were
not required to give reasons, the reviewer would have substantially less
assurance  what law was  applied than it does with juries. 5
212 When  judges  try cases  without  juries  and  pass  on  both  law  and  facts,  the
same problem  could arise.  The Federal  Rules  avoid the  problem  by  requiring judges
who  try  cases  alone  to  indicate  their  bases  of  decision.  FED.  R.  Civ.  P.  52(a).
Cf. note  195  supra.
2-13 In  Sparf  & Hansen  v.  United  States,  156  U.S.  51  (1895),  it  was  argued
that  juries  should  decide  both  the  law  and  the  facts.  The  Court,  over  a  strong
dissent, rejected  that  contention.  Juries  of  course  retain  the power to disregard  the
law  as  related  to  them  by  the judge,  but  the  currently  prevailing  system  is  not  to
inform  them  of  that  power  but instead  to  stress  their  duty  to follow  the  law.  See
United  States  v.  Moylan,  417  F.2d  1002  (4th  Cir.  1969).  See  also  Van  Dyke,
The Jury as a Political  Institution, CENTER  MAGAZINE,  Mar.  1970,  at  17  (suggesting
that jurors  should be  informed of  their  powers  of  nullification).
214 Even when  the reviewer  knows  what  the factfinder  understood  the  law to  be,
it cannot,  of course,  know  whether  the  factfinder  chose  to  disregard  that  law.
215A  somewhat  analogous  system would  involve  not  instructing  the jury  on  the
law but informing  jurors of the  existence  and availability  of legal  sources  and  telling
them  to  apply  their  conception  of  the  law  to  the  particular  case  without  disclosing
what that conception  is.  See generally Sparf & Hansen  v.  United  States,  156  U.S.
51  (1895),  discussed in note 213  supra.  The analogy  is  not  a  perfect  one,  however,
because  board  members,  though  nonexpert  in  comparison  to  judges,  are  far  more
professional  than  jurors.  Draft  boards  are  continuing  bodies,  and  members  are
expected  to  know  the  law  they  are  to  apply,  though  the  expectation  often  fails  in
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2.  Constitutional  Status
Another  factor  supporting greater  accountability  for  draft boards
than juries  is that the deference paid juries' factual findings is required
by the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution. 1  Under
that amendment,  a jury's findings  cannot be reexamined  except as per-
mitted under  common  law.217   By contrast,  Congress  is not obliged to
protect from review  the factual findings  of draft boards. 21  Moreover,
as will next be discussed, the reasons underlying the constitutional lim-
itation on jury accountability  do not apply to draft boards.
3.  Composition
Nonreviewability of juries'  factual findings  is deemed a protection
to the individuals affected.  Juries are thought to represent the people,
as  opposed  to the government. 19  But  if friendliness  of the factfinder
to the individual as against the system is the rationale for  allowing its
decisions  to  be unreviewable,  it would  be folly  to apply the  same rule
to  draft boards.  As  discussed  previously,  board  members are  excep-
tionally sympathetic  to a system  of conscription,  have an interest stem-
ming  from  their  inquisitorial  function  in  deciding  cases  on  less than
practice.  See text  accompanying  notes  142-43  supra & note  143.  jurors  serve  for  a
much  more  limited  term  and  are  not  required,  or  even  encouraged,  to  have  any
knowledge  of  the  legal  system  other  than  that  imparted  by  the  judge  during  the
course  of  the  trial.
216 U.S.  CoNsT.  amend.  VII.
217
In  Suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value  in  controversy  shall  exceed
twenty dollars, the right  of trial by jury  shall be  preserved,  and no fact  tried
by  jury, shall  be  otherwise  reexamined  in  any  Court  of  the  United  States,
than according  to the  rules of the  common  law.
Id.
218 The  Selective  Service  and  Training  Act,  as  interpreted  in  Estep  v.  United
States,  327  U.S.  114,  120  (1946),  and  the  basis-in-fact  test  there  evolved,  do,
however,  oblige courts to  defer  to  draft boards'  factual  findings.
219 See,  e.g.,  Patton  v. United  States,  281  U.S. 276,  296-97  (1930).  In  Duncan
v.  Louisiana,  391  U.S.  145  (1968),  the  Court  stated:
A right to  jury  trial  is  granted  to  criminal  defendants  in  order  to  prevent
oppression  by  the  Government.  Those  who  wrote  our  constitutions  knew
from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges  brought  to eliminate  enemies  and against  judges too respon-
sive to the  voice of higher authority.  The framers  of the constitutions  strove
to create an independent judiciary but insisted  upon further protection  against
arbitrary  action.  Providing  an  accused  with  the right to be  tried by  a jury
of  his  peers  gave  him  an  inestimable  safeguard  against  the  corrupt  or
overzealous  prosecutor  and  against  the  compliant,  biased,  or  eccentric
judge.
Id. at 155-56  (footnote  omitted).PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR  CASES
adequate facts 220 and, prior to recent amendment,22' also had an interest
stemming  from the quota system in ruling against the registrant.
It may be  argued  that juries  are  trusted not  because they favor
the people but simply because they temper legal technicalities  with com-
mon sense, a characteristic that could, depending  on the  circumstances,
favor  either party to a  dispute. 2  They are under  oath to follow the
law,  but  "jury lawlessness  is  the great  corrective  of law  in its actual
administration."  223  If this is juries'  raison d'&re,  it is  essential  that
they  bring to their decisionmaking  the sense of the community.
If a group of citizens  is representative,  it is understandable that the
community might  be  willing  to  entrust  to  them  the  task  of  decision-
making  on  some matters  of importance  without requiring  them  to ac-
count for their decisions.224  To excuse juries, in theory at least selected
at random  from the whole  community,225 from disclosing  the findings
behind their verdicts  saves time and expense.  It may even permit juries
to render  decisions  more in accordance  with the community's  sense of
justice than any  formulated  standards  would  allow.2 26   The  same  ra-
220At  one  time  juries,  as  draft  boards  still  do,  performed  the  functions  of
witness  and  investigator  as  well  as  factfinder.  As  neighbors  of  the parties  involved,
jurors  were expected  to bring to  the  decisionmaking their  personal  knowledge  of the
case, see J.  THAYER,  A  PRELhimixARY  TREATISE  ON  EVIDENCE  AT  THE  COMMON  LAW
90-91,  94-95,  104  (1898),  and  they  had  the  power  to  inform  themselves  from  other
sources  of  the  facts  of  a  case  so  that  their  decisions  would  be  correct.  See  6
W.  HoLDswoRTH,  A  HISTORY  OF  ENGL SH  LAW  388  (1924);  E.  MORGAN,  SoME
PROBLEMS  OF PROOF  UNDER  THE  ANGLo-AMERICAN  SYSTEM  OF  LITIGATION  17  (1956)  ;
J.  THAYER,  supra at  91-94.  Jurors  have  evolved  to  play  quite  a  different  role.
Indeed,  jurors  now  commonly  must  swear  to  decide  a  case  solely  on  the  evidence
presented  in  the  courtroom  and  they are  often  disqualified  if  they  know  the  parties
to  a  controversy  or  have  knowledge  of  the  case  from  outside  sources.  Because
adverse  parties  separate  from  the  factfinder  have  the  responsibility  of  producing
evidence  on  the  issues,  it is  more likely  that  all  relevant  evidence  will  come  to  light
than  when  one  body  is  both  factfinder  and  investigator  and  can  affect  the  amount
of investigation  it must do  by its  decisions  on  sufficiency  of  evidence.
221 See text accompanying  notes 139-41  supra.
222Justice  Holmes  has  said  that  juries  "will  introduce  into  their  verdict  a
certain amount-a very large amount, so far as I have  observed-of popular  prejudice,
and  thus  keep  the administration  of the  law  in  accord  with  the  wishes  and  feelings
of the  community."  0.  HOLMES,  Law in  Science and Science in Law, in  CoLLEcTED
LrA  PAPERS 237-38  (1920).  See Traynor, Fact Skepticisn and the Judicial Process,
106  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  635,  638  (1958);  Wyzanski,  A  Trial  Judge's Freedom  and
Responsibility, 65  HAav.  L. Rlv.  1281,  1286  (1952).
223 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv.  12,  18  (1910).
224 But  see  E.  Griswold,  1962-1963  Harvard  Law  School  Dean's  Report  5-6,
quoted in H. K_ vEN & H.  ZElSi,  THE  AmmucAN  JURy  5  (1966):
The jury trial at best is  the apotheosis  of the amateur.  Why  should anyone
think that  12  persons  brought  in from  the  street,  selected  in various  ways,
for their lack  of general  ability, should have any  special  capacity  for deciding
controversies  between  persons?
225 Federal Jury  Selection  and  Service Act of  1968,  28 U.S.C.  §§ 1861-71  (1970).
See  Glasser  v. United  States,  315  U.S.  60,  86  (1942);  Brown  v. Allen,  344  U.S.
443,  474  (1953).
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tionale cannot support nondisclosure  by draft boards, 27 when  members
are  appointed, 22 8  not  randomly  selected,  and  when  the  middle  class,
whites,  and  white-collar  workers  are  grossly  overrepresented  at  the
expense  of the laboring and lower  classes 229  and  minority groups. 2 30
C.  Feasibility  of  the Reasons Requirement
Until  shortly  before  Congress  imposed  the  reasons  requirement,
courts generally had not questioned the  absence  of reasons in  Selective
227 But see  General  Hershey's  rationale  for  entrusting  the  drafting  process  to
nonprofessionals,  text accompanying  note 238 infra.
228 The statute  provides  for appointment  by the  President on  the recommendation
of  the  state  governor.  Military  Selective  Service  Act  § 10(b) (3),  50  U.S.C.  APP.
§ 460(b)  (3)  (1970),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  APP.  § 460(b) (3)  (Supp.  1972).  In
practice,  many  board  members  are  selected  by  their  predecessors,  a  practice  that
perpetuates  the nonrepresentative  nature  of the boards.  Davis  and  Dolbeare  reported
in  their  Wisconsin  study  that  39%  of  the  local  board  members  said  that  they  had
been  recruited  by  their  local  board  and  43%  said  the  newest  member  had  been
recruited  by the  local  board.  J. DAvis  & K.  DoLrAFRE,  supra note  134,  at 66.
229 See 3.  DAvis & K. DOLBEARE,  supra note 134, at 58-60  (1966  study-3%  times
as many  proprietors-managers-officials  on  boards  than  in  employed  male  population;
twice  as  many  professionals  and  farmers;  only  :V(  as  many  blue  collar  workers);
MARSHALL  CoMMiss  o  REPORT,  spra note  135,  at  19  (1966  study-70%  in  white-
collar  occupations;  over 20%  of those professional men;  Y2  of remainder  are farmers),
appendix  73-81;  Decision-Making, supra note  134,  at  122-26;  Note,  The  Selective
Service, 76  YALE  L.J.  160,  167  (1966).
230 In  1966  only  1.3%  of  board members  were  black, as  compared  with  11%  in
the  national  male  population.  J.  DAvIs  & K.  DoLBEAR,  supra note  134,  at  57;
Decision-Making, supra note  134,  at  125;  MARsHALL  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra
note  135,  at  19.  Other  minority groups  were  also  underrepresented.  Only  0.8%  of
board  members  were  Puerto  Rican,  0.7%  Spanish  American,  0.2%  Oriental,  and
0.1%  American  Indian.  Id.  The  1971  amendments  may,  however,  be  instrumental
in  reversing  this  trend  of  underrepresentation.  In  them,  Congress  requested  the
President  to  appoint minority  group  members  to  local  boards  in  proportion  to  their
population  in  a  particular  jurisdiction.  Military  Selective  Service  Act  § 10(b) (3),
50 U.S.C.A.  APP.  §460(b)  (3)  (Supp.  1972),  amending 50  U.S.C.  APP.  §460(b) (3)
(1970).  More  important,  Congress  lowered  the  maximum  permissible  term  from
25  to  20  years  and  lowered  the  maximum  age  limit  for  local  board  service  from
75  to  65  years.  Id.  These  age  requirements  should  have  a  significant  impact  on
the  system.  The  Marshall  Commission  found  in  1966  that  20%  of  all  local  board
members  were  over  the  age  of  70.  MARSHALL  COMIMISSIOr  REPORT,  supra at  19.
Davis  and  Dolbeare  concluded  from  the  available  statistics that  the  average  board  in
1966  had  only  one  member  under  50  and  had  at  least  one  over  70.  3.  DAvis  &
K.  DOLBEARE,  supra at  57.  Although  the  average  age  of  local  board  members  may
be  lower  today,  the  new  length  of  service  and  age  limits  should  still  have  a  great
impact.  National  Headquarters  estimated  that  the  1971  amendments  would  require
about  25%  of  all  local  board  members  to  resign.  4  SEt..  SERv.  L.  REP.  44  (1971).
The  resultant  large  number  of  openings  as well  as  the  congressional  request  provide
the  System  with  the  opportunity  to  remedy  minority  underrepresentation.
Prior to the  1967  amendments,  the Marshall  Commission  recommended  that board
members  have a fixed  term  of 5 years.  MARsHALL  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra at 5.
Congress  responded  by  setting  a  fixed  term,  but  made  the  limit  25  years.  Military
Selective  Service  Act  of  1967  §10(b)(3),  50  U.S.C.  APP.  §460(b)(3)  (1970),
as amended,  50  U.S.C.A.  APp.  §460(b)(3)  (Supp.  1972).  Congress  also,  at  the
suggestion  of the Marshall  Commission,  MARSHALL  CoMmIssioN  REPORT,  supra at  5,
made  women  eligible  to  serve  on  boards.  Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967
§10(b)(3),  50  U.S.C.  APp.  §460(b)(3)  (1970),  as  amended,  50  U.S.C.A.  APP.
§460(b)(3)  (Supp.  1972).  Until  1967,  boards  had  been  100%  male.  MARSHALL
COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra at  19.PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR  CASES
Service  cases 231  despite decisions  under  the  Selective  Service  Act  re-
quiring judicial review and precepts as to the essentials  of such review
enumerated  in  other  contexts.  It is  commonplace  that  review  is  not
apt to be meaningful when the reviewer  does not know  the basis  of the
231  Shortly  before  the  congressional  mandate,  however,  most  circuit  courts  of
appeal  anticipated  Congress  by  requiring  that  reasons  be  stated  when  conscientious
objector  claims  were  denied.  See, e.g.,  United  States  v.  Stetter,  445  F.2d  472  (5th
Cir.  1971);  Scott  v.  Commanding  Officer,  431  F.2d  1132  (3d  Cir.  1970);  United
States  v.  Broyles,  423  F.2d  1299  (4th  Cir.  1970)  (en  banc);  United  States  v.
Haughton, 413  F.2d  736  (9th  Cir.  1969).  But  see  Gruca v.  Secretary  of the  Army,
436 F.2d  239, 245  (D.C.  Cir. 1970),  cert. denied, 401  U.S. 978  (1971)  ;  United  States
v.  Curry, 410  F.2d  1297  (1st Cir.  1969).  The  timing  of  the  courts'  interest in  the
issue  is  probably  due  to  abandonment  of  the  Justice  Department's  investigation  of
conscientious  objector claims.  See text  accompanying  notes  159-60  supra.  It  is  true
that claims for  exemptions or  deferments  other  than  as a conscientious  objector  were
unaffected  by  the Justice  Department  procedure,  but  it  was  in conscientious  objector
cases  that  courts  initially  required  reasons,  and  most  court-imposed  reasons  require-
ments  appeared  to  apply only  to  denials  of  conscientious  objector  claims.  See,  e.g.,
United  States  v. Andrews,  446  F.2d  1086  (10th  Cir.  1971)  ; United  States v. Broyles,
supra; United  States  v. Haughton,  supra; Dunlap  v.  Volatile,  4  SasL.  SERV.  L.  REP.
3114,  3115  (R.D.  Pa. Apr.  1,  1971).  Contra, United  States  ex  rel.  Bent v.  Laird,
4  SF.L.  SERv.  L.  RF.  3739  (3d  Cir.  1971)  (hardship  deferment)  ;  Townley  v.  Resor,
323  F.  Supp.  567  (N.D.  Cal.  1970)  (hardship  deferment).
Courts  did  not  often  state  their  reasons  for  limiting  the  requirement  to  the
conscientious  objector  exemption.  But see United  States  v. Andrews,  supra; Dunlap
v. Volatile,  supra.  One  important  reason  might  be  that  conscientious  objector  and
ministerial claims account for  the vast majority  of Selective  Service  cases  that appear
before  the  courts.  Hansen,  supra note  104, at  457  n.19.  An  absence  of  reasons  in
ministerial  claims, however,  would  not  have  as crucial  consequences  as  in  cases  con-
cerning  conscientious  objectors.  Since  the  ministerial  exemption  turns  wholly  on
objective  criteria and  the  good faith  of the registrant is  not at issue,  see text accom-
panying notes  176-77  supra, a board  ruling  on  a ministerial  exemption  has  much  less
leeway  in its  decisionmaking  than  does  a  board  passing  on  a  conscientious  objector
claim.  In  conscientious  objector  cases,  where  the  registrant's  sincerity  is  a  key
issue,  the reason  for  denial  of a  claim  will  be  much  less  frequently  apparent,  since
a  claim  can  be denied  because  of inferences  from  the facts  in  the record  even  when
there is no contradictory  evidence in the record.  See text accompanying notes  176-79
supra.
Other factors  explain  courts'  greater  urgency  in  requiring  reasons  for  conscien-
tious objector  claims than  for deferments  like hardship  and  occupational  ones.  There
is  some  discretion  in  the  local  board  in  granting  hardship  deferments,  and  at  one
time there was discretion in granting  occupational  deferments  as well.  Because boards
had  some  input into  the  standards for  those  classifications,  there  was  less  need  for
a court  to  have  reasons  to see  whether  the  board had  conformed  to a  predetermined
standard  than  there is  in conscientious  objector  cases.  For in conscientious  objector
cases  draft  boards  have  never  had  discretion  whether  or  not  to  grant  claims,  as
distinct  from  having  leeway  in the  factual  determinations  they  make  and  exercising
often  unreviewable  judgments  in  arriving  at  those  factual  conclusions.  Boards  are
supposed  to  follow  a  statute  in  conscientious  objector  cases,  granting  exemptions
only  where  they  find  the  three  statutory  criteria  are  met  and  denying  them  only
when  a criterion  is lacking.  See text accompanying  notes  112-33  supra.
Along  with the greater  frequency  of  conscientious  objector  cases,  other  relevant
factors  accentuated  in  conscientious  objector  claims  may  be  board  hostility  to  the
exemption  and  the  expertise  required  to  understand  both  the terms  of  the standard
and  registrants'  supporting  statements.  See  text  accompanying  notes  134-43  supra.
Though these factors  may make judicial  review  particularly  necessary  in those  cases,
however, they do not undercut the need for judicial review  in  other contexts  as well-
a  need which  the statute  recognizes  by applying  the requirement  generally.
It  was  primarily  the  inability  to  provide  effective  review  that  led  those  courts
that  did  so  to  impose  a  reasons  requirement.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  O'Bryan
450  F.2d  365  (6th  Cir.  1971);  Rosengart  v.  Laird,  449  F.2d  523  (2d  Cir.  1971)
(Lumbard,  J., dissenting)  ; United States  v. Stetter, supra; United  States v. Stephens,
445  F.2d  192,  197  (3d  Cir.  1971)  (Aldisert,  J.,  concurring);  Paszel  v.  Laird,  426
F.2d 1169  (2d  Cir. 1970)  ; United  States v. Broyles, supra;  United States  v. Haughton,916  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
decision  to  be  reviewed ;232  that  when  agencies  need  not  disclose  the
basis  of their  decisions  they  can  exceed  with impunity  the powers  en-
trusted  them;233  and  that  an  agency's  action  "must  be  measured  by
what  [the agency]  did, not by what  it might have  done."  234  The ab-
sence  of  reasons  also  arguably  impinged  upon  the  statutory  right  of
appeal,  for  courts had  observed  that losing parties  who  do  not under-
stand  the  basis  for  rulings  against  them  are  ill-prepared  to  challenge
those  rulings  they  believe  are  erroneous,  let  alone  to  accept  them  as
just.2 3 5  The most plausible  explanation for the long-continued  tolera-
413  F.2d  736 (9th  Cir. 1969)  ; United  States  v.  Reese,  331  F.  Supp.  1088  (N.D.  Ga.
1971);  United  States  v.  Dineen  327  F.  Supp.  646  (D.  Mass.  1971);  cf.  Clay  v.
United  States  403  U.S.  698  (191)  ; United  States  v.  Lemmens,  430  F.2d  619  (7th
Cir.  1970);  tnited  States  ex  rel. Morton  v.  McBee,  310  F.  Supp.  328  (N.D.  Ill.
1970).  Other  commonly given explanations  for  imposing  a reasons  requirement  were
that  a  claimant's  right  to  a  meaningful  appeal  within  the  Selective  Service  System
requires  that  he  know  the  local  board's  basis  for  rejecting  his  claim,  e.g.,  United
States  v. Stetter,  supra; United  States v.  Stephens,  supra (Aldisert,  J., concurring)  ;
United  States  v. Dineen, supra; United  States  v. Lonseth,  300  F.  Supp.  857  (D.  Ore.
1969)  ;  United  States  v.  St.  Clair,  293  F.  Supp.  337  (E.D.N.Y.  1968),  and  that  the
requirement  avoids  arbitrary  or  lawless  behavior  by  local  boards,  e.g.,  United  States
v.  Broyles,  supra; O'Brien  v.  Resor,  423  F.2d  594  (4th  Cir.  1970);  Townley  v.
Resor,  supra.
The scope  of  the requirement the courts  imposed  differed  from the  congressional
requirement not only in its limitation  to  conscientious  objectors  but in other  ways  as
well.  Many  courts  seemed to require  reasons  only when  the  denial  was  on  grounds
of  sincerity,  e.g., United  States  v.  Abbott  425  F.2d  910,  914  n.5  (8th  Cir.  1970);
United  States  v.  Broyles,  supra; United  States  v.  Haughton,  supra; United  States
v.  Washington,  392  F.2d  37,  39  (6th  Cir.  1968).  Many  also  appeared  to  require
reasons  only  when  the  registrant  stated  a  prima  facie  case,  e.g.,  United  States  v.
Weaver,  423  F.2d  1126  (9th  Cir.  1970).  Contra, United  States  v. Stephens,  supra
(Aldisert,  J., concurring)  ; United  States  v. Reese, supra.  Courts imposing a  reasons
requirement  typically did not make clear the extent of the reasons  they were requiring
of the  board.  See text  following  note  243  &  accompanying  notes  244-56  intfra. 232 See  SEC v.  Chenery  Corp.,  318  U.S.  80,  94  (1943)  ("[T]he  orderly  func-
tioning  of  the  process  of  review  requires  that  the  grounds  upon  which  the  admin-
istrative agency  acted be clearly disclosed  and  adequately  sustained.") ;  United  States
v.  Chicago,  M.,  St. P.  & P.R.R.,  294  U.S.  499,  511  (1935)  ("We  must  know  what
a decision means before  the duty becomes  ours to  say whether  it is  right or wrong.")  ;
City  of  Yonkers  v. United  States,  320  U.S.  685,  694-95  (1944)  (Frankfurter,  J.,
dissenting).
233 See,  e.g., Schaffer  Transport.  Co.  v. United  States,  355  U.S.  83,  92  (1957);
Cole  v.  Young,  351  U.S.  536  (1956);  Phelps  Dodge  Corp.  v.  NLRB,  313  U.S.  177
(1941).  Concerning  the  dangers  of  leaving  administrative  agencies  uncontrolled,
Justice Douglas  has reminded  us that "[absolute  discretion, like  corruption, marks the
beginning  of the  end  of  liberty."  New  York  v.  United  States,  342  U.S.  882,  884
(1951)  (dissenting  opinion).
234 SEC v.  Chenery  Corp.,  318 U.S.  80,  93-94  (1943).  See also id.  at 87;  Secre-
tary of  Agriculture v. United  States,  347  U.S. 645,  650-55  (1954)  ;  American  Broad-
casting  Co.  v. FCC,  179  F.2d  437  (D.C.  Cir.  1949);  Saginaw  Broadcasting  Co.  v.
FCC,  96  F.2d  554  (D.C.  Cir.  1938).
235 This reasoning  was  evident  in  In  re Gault,  387 U.S.  1  (1967),  in  which  the
petitioner  contested  a juvenile  court procedure  whereby  prior to the hearing  the juve-
nile's  parents were  told  only of  a general  conclusion  of delinquency.  They  were  not
informed  of the  specific  facts  and  charges  involved  until  the  hearing  itself, and  they
were given  time  to prepare  to meet  those  charges  only if they  denied  the  facts.  The
Supreme  Court  held  the  procedure  constitutionally  defective  for  lack  of  adequate  no-
tice, saying that unless  a party was  informed  of  specific  charges  or  factual  allegations
in  controversy and  of the specific  issues  that  had  to  be  met  to  prevail,  he could  not
prepare adequately for the hearing.  Id.  at 31-34.  Similarly, in  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254  (1970),  the Court held  that "rudimentary  due  process,"  id. at 267, required
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tion of unexplained decisions  in Selective  Service cases  is that the judi-
ciary was persuaded  that practicalities  required  them  to indulge  in the
presumption that boards had correctly interpreted and applied the law.a 6
that  prior to termination  of  public  assistance benefits  a  recipient  be  given  a  hearing
preceded  by "timely and  adequate notice  detailing the reasons  for a proposed  termina-
tion."  Id. at 267-68.  The  statement of reasons  was  necessary,  at least in  a case  in-
volving factual issues, see  id. at 268  n.15,  so that a recipient  could contest the factual
basis of the case against  him and produce  evidence  in rebuttal.  Id. at 266.
Gault and  Goldberg could support  a constitutional  argument  that  a registrant  in
a  draft  board  case  must  be  provided  with  the  grounds  for  a  decision  against  him.
When  the  registrant  does  not  know  the  factual  assumptions  upon  which  the  ruling
against him was  premised  or  is not aware  in what  respect his  claim might be legally
deficient,  he may  not address  the point  that  is  at  issue.  It  is  true  that both  Gault
and  Goldberg concerned  litigants  understanding  issues  at  an  initial  hearing  rather
than at a  stage  of review,  and they  concerned  understanding  the  charge  made  rather
than  a  decision  made, but  these  differences  should  not  be  determinative.  Unless  a
party  is  made  aware  of the  contentions  advanced  against  him,  he  is  unable  to  meet
those  contentions,  whether  at  an  initial hearing  or  on  review.  In  fact  the  dilemma
is  more  serious  in  draft board  cases  and  in  Goldberg than it was  in  Gault.  An ad-
versary  confrontation  was  contemplated  at the  hearing  in  Gault so  the  petitioner  at
that time  would learn the charges  against him.  The absence  of  any adverse  party in
Goldberg and in draft board cases,  however, makes it possible that a person will never
know  the  case against  him  and will never  therefore  be given an  opportunity  to meet
it.
Cases  in the Selective  Service  area  dealing  with the registrant's  right to  see  ad-
verse  evidence  in his file  also lend  some  support to an  argument that  proceedings  on
appeal cannot be fair unless  the board to be reviewed  has indicated  the grounds for its
decision.  In United  States  v.  Nugent,  346  U.S.  1  (1953),  the  registrant  contended
he  was  improperly  denied  access  to  the  report  the  FBI  submitted  after  it  con-
ducted  its  investigation  into  the  sincerity  of  his  conscientious  objector  claim.  The
registrant's  argument  was  that  the  hearing  on  the  subject  of  his  sincerity,  which
the  statute  provided  for,  would  be  meaningless  if  he  was  unable  to  know  the
contents  of the report so that he could refute them.  The  registrant had been  provided,
however,  with  a  resum6  of the  report  fairly  summarizing  the  adverse  evidence  but
omitting the  names  of the persons  interviewed.  The  Court  held it unnecessary  under
the circumstances  to disclose  the report, over  a dissent by  Justice  Frankfurter  claim-
ing that the main purpose  of a hearing-to give the registrant an  opportunity to rebut
adverse  evidence-was  frustrated  when  the  registrant  was  denied  knowledge  of  the
source  of the information.  In the later  case  of  Simmons  v. United  States,  348  U.S.
397  (1955),  it became  clear  that the existence of a "fair  resum6" was  essential  to the
Nugent holding.  The  Court  held  Simmons  was  deprived  of  the  hearing  the  statute
guaranteed him when the FBI failed to furnish him with  a resum6  of the information
its investigation  produced.  The  Court said the fair  resum6 that  was  required  "is  one
which will permit the registrant to defend against the adverse  evidence--to  explain it,
rebut it, or otherwise  detract  from  its  damaging  force.  . . . The  Congress,  in  pro-
viding  for a hearing, did not intend  for it to be conducted  on the  level of  a  game  of
blindman's  buff."  Id. at  405.  Similarly  in Gonzales  v. United  States,  348  U.S.  407
(1955),  decided  the  same  day  as  Simmons,  the  Court  held  that  a  registrant  had  a
right to  a copy  of the Department  of Justice's  recommendation  to  the  appeal board:
"Just as the right to  a hearing means  the right to a meaningful hearing  ... ,  so  the
right to  file  a  statement before  the  Appeal  Board  includes  the  right to  file a  mean-
ingful statement, one based  on all the facts in the file  and made with awareness of the
recommendations  and  arguments  to be countered."  Id. at  415.
These  decisions  do not, of course,  control  the issue  of boards  giving  reasons,  for
in Simmons  and  Gonzales the  decisionmaling boards  could  consider  information  that
the  registrant  was  unable to  confront.  If boards  omit  reasons,  by  contrast,  review-
ing tribunals  and the registrant are equally  ignorant of the  basis for  the  decision  that
is to be  reviewed.  The registrant's  major difficulty  therefore is not in confronting  the
adverse  evidence as much as it is in securing his right to have the local board's decision
reviewed.  Since  the reviewing  tribunal  is  unaware  of the  basis  for  the  initial  deci-
sion, its  action appears  less  like review  than  like  de  novo  decision  with  a  very large
presumption  against  the registrant  (the board's result  being  sustained  if there  is  any
basis  in  fact  that  could support it).
236 See note  205  supra.
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Two  characteristics  of  draft  boards  are  pertinent  in  this  connection:
(1)  draft boards  can lay no claim  to  expertness  in the administration
of the law; and  (2)  the boards  operate under heavy time pressure.
The  point  may  be  restated  in  the  form  of  a  question:  Will  the
reasons  requirement,  now formally  adopted by Congress,  debilitate  mo-
bilization because board  members,  unschooled in  law, will  be unable  to
give reasons for their decisions  adequate  to pass judicial  muster?  To
argue  that boards  of  laymen  cannot  give  sustainable  reasons  because
they  do  not  understand  the  legislative  scheme  under  which  they  are
operating and the rules they apply would prove too much; it would show
that the existing system  of administering the  Selective  Service  laws  is
intolerable.  If,  on the other  hand, the fear  is  that boards  will  be  re-
versed  though their bases of decision are essentially  correct, simply be-
cause  boards do  not use legal niceties  in explaining their decisions,  and
if that fear  is well  founded,  it militates  against a  reasons  requirement.
The solution, however, is not to abandon the requirement  of a rea-
soned decision but to refrain from requiring of boards of laymen a form
of decision  they  are unable  to provide.  Courts should  simply require
boards  to  set out directly  and  in an informal,  unsophisticated  manner
their actual reasons for disposing of cases as they do."'  If the statute's
complications  preclude boards  from giving actual  reasons that comport
with  the  law,  the solution  is  either  to remove  the  complications  from
the statute  so that civilian boards can administer it, or to utilize boards
with the skill to follow it.  It satisfies no policy to operate under  a law
that cannot be correctly interpreted  and applied by the agency to which
it is  entrusted.
237 Under  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1938,  7  U.S.C.  §§ 1281  et  seq.
(1970),  boards  of  laymen  acting  as  "part  time  administrators"  under  a  complex
statute  the terms of  which  are rather  vaguely  defined,  Fulford  v.  Forman,  245 F.2d
145, 151-53  (5th  Cir.  1957),  have  been  required  to  render  reasoned  decisions.  Under
the  Act  a  "County  Committee,"  comprised  of  three  local  farmers  elected  by  the
farmers  in  the county,  sets  the  quota permitted  each  farmer  for  tobacco,  cotton,  rice,
and  peanuts.  The quota  is  reviewable  by  a "Review  Committee,"  an appointed  body
of three  other  local  farmers.  In  Austin  v.  Jackson,  353  F.2d  910  (4th  Cir.  1965),
the  Fourth  Circuit,  over  the  Government's  protest  that  the  Review  Committee  was
not qualified  to  write  explanations  of the  great  number  of decisions  it  was  called  on
to  make,  imposed  on  Review  Committees  the  "duty  to  render  a  reasoned  opinion,"
saying  the  requirement  was  "especially  important  where  the  administrative  tribunal
is  lacking  in  legal  expertise."  Id.  at  911.  See also  Stallard  v. Review  Comm.,  275
F.  Supp.  931  (W.D. Va.  1967).  Despite  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture's  dire  predic-
tions as  to the  effect  the  decision  would  have  on  the administration  of  the  program,
Letter  from  Secretary  Freeman  to  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Civil  Division,  De-
partment  of Justice,  Jan.  1966,  on  file  in  the  Department  of Justice,  five  and  a  half
years after  the  decision the  Department's  Deputy  General  Counsel  reported  that there
had been  only  "five  or  so"  instances  in  which the district  court  had  remanded  to  the
Review  Committee  for  an  elaboration  of  its  reasons,  in  addition  to  "several"  where
the  Department  of Agriculture  had  itself  asked  the  court  to  remand  for  elaboration,
and  that the  system  was  "working well."  Telephone  interview with  Claude  Coffman,
Deputy  General  Counsel  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture,  June  1971.
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Adding  to  board  members'  previous  responsibilities  the  task  of
explaining their  decisions  could  arguably  interfere  with  the  ability  of
the  Selective  Service  System  to  mobilize  manpower  speedily.  The
articulation  of reasons  is obviously  an added  demand,  even if  a simple
disclosure of the board's  rationale is deemed sufficient.  Thus, it might
prove necessary to increase the number of board members or the amount
of time that  current  members  spend  at their job.  If this  proved  im-
practicable,  a  basic  change  in  the  structure  of  the  current  system-a
professionalization  of the draft boards-might prove necessary.  General
Hershey has warned against that course:
The people of the country  will support  a compulsory  system
only to the extent that they have confidence in its fairness  and
they will have confidence in a system only to the extent which
they themselves  operate  it.  The  Selective  Service  System  is,
therefore,  founded  upon  the  grassroots  principle,  in  which
boards made up of citizens in each community determine when
registrants  should  be  made  available  for  military  service.21 8
While  the  idea  of  having  a man's  "friends  and  neighbors"  239  rather
than a distant bureaucrat  determine whether he must serve may, in the
abstract, seem attractive, it is questionable whether  on balance that sys-
tem increases public confidence in the fairness  of the draft.2 4
"  The un-
representative  nature  of  draft boards  detracts from  the  appeal  of  the
"friends  and  neighbors"  concept;  so,  also,  would  the  high price  paid
for their volunteer character  if the result is short shrift to requirements
of basic fairness.2 4 1   Nevertheless, the Selective Service has rested upon
238 L.  HERSHEY,  MEMORANDUM  ON  PRESENT  OPERATIONS  OF THE  SYSTEM  AND
LocAL  DRAFT  BoARDs,  S.  Doc.  No.  82,  89th  Cong.,  2d Sess.  4  (1966).
239
The  civilians  were  neighbors.  They  were,  as it were, indigenous  to the
soil.  The men  were well-known  in  the neighborhood.  They  were often  per-
sonal friends or family friends  of the men  who were  to be sent to  war.  They
had  the  intimate  knowledge  of  family  histories  and  of  individual  histories.
E.  FrrzPATRici,  CONSCRPTION  AND  AMERICA  46-47  (1940),  quoted  in  Decision-
Making, supra note  134, at  104.  The  author  was  a  State  Director  of the  Selective
Service  during  World  War  I.
240 See J.  DAvis  & K. DOLBEARE,  supra note  134,  at 7,  172-90.
241 As against  the  disadvantages,  an  asserted  advantage  of  having  local  men
classify  registrants  is  that they  know  the men  they  draft.  See Hershey,  Review  of
the  Organization  and  Administration  of  the  Selective  Service  System  9694.  This  is
no longer  true, however,  if it ever was  so.  J. DAvis  & K. DOLBE.ARE,  supra note  134,
at 94-99,  197;  MAARSHaALL  CoMMISSioN  REPORT,  supra note  135,  at  20.  If  "friends
and neighbors"  ever  adequately  described  the  local  boards,  the  urbanization  of Amer-
ica's population and  high registrant mobility  have, for the majority of  the  population,
reduced  General  Hershey's  characterization  to little  more than  a bitter  joke.  MA-
SHALL  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra at  20;  J.  DAVIS  &  K.  DOLBEARE,  WHO  GETS
DRAFTED  31  (1967)  ;  G. WAMSLEY,  sipra note  134,  at 112-16.  Wamsley  reports  the
following  comment  by a local  board  clerk  in  an  urban  area  who  was  asked  whether
board members  knew many  of the registrants:
Oh  no.  They're familiar with the district, but  they don't know the  kids that
come  in.  You  know  the  induction  notices  used  to read:  "Your  friends  and
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volunteer,  local  boards  since  1917;  the  System has  made great  claims
for  the  "friends  and  neighbors"  concept ;242  and  Congress  has  con-
sistently  rejected proposals  to change  the structure  of local  boards.243
D.  Interpretation  of  the Requirement
The degree  to which the reasons  requirement  can be  executed  by
boards  as they are presently  constituted  depends  in  large part on  how
one interprets the requirement that a board  "furnish to  [the]  registrant
a brief  written  statement  of the  reasons  for  its  decisions."  It might
be deemed  to direct boards  simply to state the statutory ground  of de-
cision.  Boards  could  comply  with that  directive merely  by  informing
a registrant that his objection was found not to be grounded upon  "re-
ligious training and belief"; that his opposition was found not to extend
to "participation  in war in any form"; that he  was deemed  insincere in
his  expressed  belief;  or any  combination  of these factors.  The  statute
may, however,  require  something  more.  It may  require  reference  to
the evidence  on which the board  relied  in reaching  its finding that the
statutory  criteria were  unsatisfied.  Or it may even  compel  the board
neighbors  have  selected you"--and  it  got  so  it  made  people so  mad that they
dropped  it.  One fellow  came  in here  boiling mad  and  said,  "Who  are  these
friends  and  neighbors?  I  want  to  see  them  right now."
Id. 115.
242
It  would  be  essential  to  avoid  in  any  way  interfering  with  the  present
decentralized  approach  of  the  system  which  has  proved  so successful  in  con-
trast with  the  centralized  ones  of both  the  Federal  and  Confederate  govern-
ments during the  Civil  War.  The  decentralized,  or local board,  or grassroots
operation  of Selective  Service  began  with  the  First World  War  and  demon-
strated  that the Nation  would much  more willingly  support  compulsory  mili-
tary  service operated by their  neighbors  at  home,  than they would  a program
operated  by  a  remote,  impersonal  organization.
Hearings on the Administration &  Operation of  the Selective  Service System Before
the House Armed Services  Comm.,  89th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  9993  (1966)  (statement  of
General  Hershey).
The  military establishment,  the machinery  of  Federal  Government,  even  the
machinery  of state  and  local  governments,  appeared  not  close  enough  or  in-
timate  enough  to deal  with  so vital  and elemental  an  effort.  The  local  board,
a  group  of neighbors  deciding  who  from  the neighborhood  should  be  selected
for armed  service,  became the  foundation  on which  the  System  was built,  and
gave  to  it  its  universality  and  commonness.
SELECTIVE  SERVICE  SYSTEM  ,  ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  SYSTEM
187  (Special  Monograph  No.  3,  1951).
[W]e  are  only seeking  . . . about  1,000,000  out  of  11,500,000,  so there  has
to  be  an  equity  decision.
Somebody  has got  to decide  which  one  of the  11  is to  be taken,  and  I  do
want  to impress  upon all  the  fact  . . . that the  choice  is  being made  by the
neighbors  of  the  man  ....  "
Hearings on  S.  4164 Before  the Senate Comm.  on Military Affairs, 76th  Cong.,  3d
Sess.  384  (1940)  (statement  of  General  (then  Major)  Hershey).
243 E.g., compare  the  MARSHALL  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra note  135,  proposals
at 35-36,  with  the  relatively  minor  changes  in  local  board  structure  adopted  in  the
Military  Selective  Service  Act  of  1967,  §§1-23,  50  U.S.C.  Ap.  §§451-73  (1970),
as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  Ap,.  §§451-73  (Supp.  1972).
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to explain why it found that evidence,  as opposed to other contradictory
evidence, persuasive.  Registrants will benefit from whichever  of these
interpretations is adopted, for each possibility will augment  the review-
ability  of  board  classifications.  The  degree  to  which  the  registrant
benefits  will  vary,  however,  as  will  the  weight  of  the  burden  the
requirement  places  on  the  board.
1.  Simple  Indication of  Statutory  Ground
Board members  should hardly be  overburdened  by a requirement
that  they  simply  identify  the  statutory  basis  of  their  decision.  Pre-
sumably board members have reasons,  even in the absence  of a reasons
requirement,  for denying a claim.  The only new  responsibility would
be to indicate succinctly what that reason is.  To do so would take only
moments.  In each  case,  every  board  member  could  be  furnished  a
checklist with three boxes,  one for  each  statutory ground  of  decision.
The member  could check the one or more grounds that showed his rea-
son for voting to deny in the particular  case.  The  availability of these
checklists  to the registrant and to the reviewing court would  avoid the
anomaly  of  a  court  affirming  the  board's  decision  on  a  ground  upon
which  the board did not rely.  It would  also  apprise  the  registrant of
the ground to which he should  direct his argument on appeal.
This, to be sure, would not invariably narrow the issues.  For ex-
ample, board members  might have different  reasons for denying  a reg-
istrant's  claim.  Of  three  board  members  passing  on  a  conscientious
objector  claim,  one  might find the  registrant  selective,  one might find
him nonreligious, and a third might find him insincere.  As a result the
board would  deny his claim.  The registrant arguing that there was no
basis in fact for his classification would be in a position similar to that of
the  registrant before  a  reasons  requirement  was  imposed  who  had to
show that there was no basis on  any statutory ground  for denying  his
claim.
One might argue that the proper approach is to have the board  give
its reasons for denying a registrant's  claim rather than have each mem-
ber  do  so,  and  that  if a  majority  of  the  members  cannot  agree  upon
grounds  for  denying  the  claim,  the  registrant  prevails.  In  the  ex-
ample given,  since two  out of three board members  found for the reg-
istrant on each statutory ground, he should prevail in his  claim, just as
he would  if a  single person  were  factfinder  and  were  two-thirds  con-
vinced  of the  registrant's  case  on  each  statutory  issue.  It  is  settled,
however,  that  when courts  comprised  of  more than  one judge  decide
a case-civil  or criminal-it  is sufficient  for a verdict  that a  majority
of the panel reaches  the same ultimate conclusion  although the reason-
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ing of  the members  of  the  majority  differs.  Similarly  a jury  must
agree  on the ultimate verdict-guilty  or not guilty  in a criminal  case;
judgment  for  the  plaintiff  or  judgment  for  the  defendant  in  a  civil
case-but  each  jury  member  may  reach  that  decision  on  differing
grounds.244  In  the  light  of these  rules  it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  a
registrant  whose  draft  board  finds  against  him  on  the  ultimate  issue
is entitled  to an  exemption  because  there  is  no  majority  for  any  par-
ticular  ground  of decision  against  him.
Even  though  board  members  might  use  differing  reasoning  to
find  against  a  registrant,  registrants  would  benefit  from  boards'  ex-
pression  of  their  statutory grounds  of decision.  In  most  cases  board
members  would  agree as to one  or more possible  grounds  of  decision,
and  thereby  eliminate  those  grounds  from  the  case.  Even  where  all
possible  grounds  remained,  if  it were  a  close  question  whether  there
was  a  basis  in  fact  on  any  particular  ground  to  support  the  board's
denial  of  an exemption,  awareness  that a  majority  of board  members
favored the registrant  on that ground  might influence the court's  deci-
sion.  Most important, when one of three board members  found against
the registrant on  each statutory  ground, a basis  in fact on one ground
(on  which  two  board members  found for  the registrant)  would  not be
enough to  sustain the classification.  To sustain the  decision  made  by
a majority of the board  there would  have to  be a basis  in fact to sup-
port a decision against the registrant  on  two statutory grounds.
There  is  one situation,  however,  where  despite  boards'  indication
of statutory  grounds  a registrant may  still  have  to  show  that no  evi-
dence  supports any statutory  basis  of decision:  if a  majority  of board
members  finds  that  the  registrant  has  failed  to  satisfy  any  statutory
requirement  for exemption-that on the basis  of his  statement he  does
not satisfy the religious training  and belief requirement  and  is a  selec-
tive objector, and that he is insincere  as well.  Similarly, the registrant
will  benefit  less from the  statement  of grounds  when a  majority gives
two grounds than when it states only one.  Unscrupulous  board  mem-
bers  might  increase  the likelihood  of having their  decisions  upheld  by
automatically  indicating all  statutory grounds when they found against
a  conscientious  objector  claim.  Yet a rule  that board  members  could
indicate  only one ground of decision would be  artificial  and unrealistic.
244 A  problem  similar  to  that  of the draft  board  whose  members  differ  in  their
reasoning  could arise  with a  jury  in  a  special  verdict situation.  A  jury  might,  for
example,  find for the defendant  on every  finding submitted  to  it but its  verdict  on the
ultimate conclusion  might be  against  him because  jurors  found against  him  on differ-
ing  grounds.  If  the  apparent  inconsistency  between  the  findings  and  the  general
verdict  is  so  explainable,  the  general  verdict  should  stand.  Otherwise  the  submis-
sion  of the  special  verdict  would  change  the  outcome  of  such  a  case.  The  general
rule  is  that both verdicts  should  stand  if possibly  consistent.  See, e.g.,  Kirkendoll  v.
Neustrom,  379  F.2d  694  (10th  Cir.  1967).
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Certainly in some cases  board members  can in perfectly  good faith de-
termine that an applicant fails  to  satisfy the  statutory  criteria  in more
than one respect.
No  remedy  for this  situation  is  apparent.  It  was  noted  earlier
that when the Department  of Justice made recommendations  to  appeal
boards  in  conscientious  objector  cases  and  recommended  against  a
registrant on more than one ground, a classification was reversed  if the
Department had erred in one of its assessments.2 45  The principle should
not carry over to a statement of reasons by draft boards.  The rationale
for the rule as to the Department  of Justice-a rule which applied  only
when the appeal board did not indicate the reasons for its decision-was
that it was  impossible to know on which ground  or grounds the appeal
board had rested.  It might have rested solely on the ground on which
the Department  gave erroneous  advice.  When a draft board,  by  con-
trast, finds  against  a  registrant  on  three  statutory  grounds  and  is  in
error as to  only two  of them,  it has  still found  against  the  registrant
on  a legitimate and  sufficient  basis.
2.  Identification  of Evidence Relied  Upon
While  registrants  are aided  by  a  rule requiring  that they  be  in-
formed  of the statutory  ground  of board decisions,  they  would  benefit
more if board members  were required  as well to  indicate  the  evidence
in the  registrant's  file  on  which  they  rely  in  denying  his  exemption.
A registrant appealing the classification  his local  board has  given him
would be much  better able to meet the issue by  supplementing  his  file
before the appeal board if hewere aware of the evidentiary  basis of the
board's  decision.  Without  disclosure  of  the  evidence  relied  on,  he
might be unaware  that certain  evidence  was significant  to the disposi-
tion  of  his claim.  Aware  of its  importance,  he could  present  to  the
appeal board any additional  information  showing that the evidence  the
local board relied on was untrue or that the inference  drawn from the
evidence was unwarranted.  Additionally, he might show that the evi-
dence  cited  did not constitute  a proper  basis  in fact.
If the appeal  board rejects  a registrant's  claim,  he  cannot  contest
his  classification  in  court  by  supplementing  his  Selective  Service  file.
Nonetheless, the registrant would benefit from the focusing of the issue
that knowledge  of the evidentiary basis for the board's  decision would
bring.  The  reviewing  court,  in  order  to  uphold  the  decision  of  the
appeal board,  would have to  find that the  evidence the board relied  on
provides  a basis  in fact for the denial.  It would  not suffice  that there
was  other  evidence  in the  record  that  could  constitute  a basis  in fact
245 See  notes  199-200  supra  & accompanying  text.
1972]924  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.120:870
if board  members had  rejected the relevance,  reliability,  or persuasive-
ness  of  that  evidence.  Courts  would  thus  be  applying  their  narrow
scope  of review  to the decision actually  made.  If board  members  dif-
fered in the evidence they relied on in rejecting a registrant's claim, the
grounds  of decision  of  a majority  of  the voting members  would  have
to constitute a legal  basis for  the rejection.
A requirement  that boards  give the evidentiary  basis for their de-
cisions thus would protect against upholding legally erroneous decisions
on  the hypothesis  that the board  relied  upon  evidence  it  actually  dis-
credited.  It would  also bring to light legal errors by the board.  One
mistake it might either  reveal  or correct is board reliance  on evidence
outside the file.  For example, the regulations  forbid a board to reject
a claim because of statements at the personal appearance  unless it tran-
scribes the statements  and places  them in the file.  Without a require-
ment that the board  cite the  evidence  relied  upon,  a  court would  have
no means of learning that the actual basis of decision  was evidence that
the board  had  failed  to  incorporate  in  the  record.  The  board  might
be sustained on the basis of  other evidence  which had  not in fact per-
suaded it to rule against the registrant. 24
Boards  may  also  rely  on  evidence  that  is factually  insufficient  to
support their result.  When  all  the  evidence  supports  the claim that a
registrant became a conscientious  objector at age eighteen, the fact that
he worked  in a munitions plant at age sixteen is not a basis  in fact for
a  decision  that his conscientious  objector  claim is  insincere.  A more
common  situation  is  for a board  to  rely on  a  factor  that  courts  have
said is legally  insufficient  to  support denial  of a  claim.  For  example,
a board that relies  solely on lateness  in filing to show insincerity would
have  its  classification  overturned.  Interesting  legal  questions  would
arise if a board gave the fact that a registrant was not a churchgoer as
one  of  several  grounds  supporting  its finding  that his  opposition was
not the product of "religious  training and belief"; or if a board pointed
out that a registrant  had  said he would kill  in  self-defense  as one  rea-
son for its  ruling that the registrant was  a selective  objector.  Courts
have ruled that a person  need  not be a  churchgoer,  or even  a member
of an organized  church, to qualify for exemption.  Nor  need  a person
renounce the use of force in self-defense.  It is unclear, however, whether
these  facts  are  regarded  as  immaterial  or  whether  they  are  merely
246 If, after  the  reasons  requirement,  boards  are  required  to  reveal  the  evidence
for  their  rulings,  a  board  that  simply  cited  "inconsistent  statements  at  the  personal
appearance"  as  the basis for its denial  on grounds  of insincerity would  have its  classi-
fication  overturned because the  supporting  evidence did not appear in the  file.  A board
could  avoid this  result by  complying  with  the  rule that it  include  in the  file  all  evi-
dence  upon which it relies; it would  spell  out what the registrant's  inconsistent  state-
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deemed legally insufficient  when unaccompanied  by other  evidence  ad-
verse  to  the  registrant. 2 47
To require boards  to specify  the evidence  on which they have re-
lied would doubtless impose a greater burden than a simple requirement
that they state the statutory ground.  The burden should not, however,
be  overwhelming.  Presumably  board  members  are  aware  of the  evi-
dence that persuades  them  even  in the absence  of such a requirement.
If they are not, the requirement may  serve  an added beneficial  purpose
of increasing  the  care  with  which they  make their  decisions.  Simple
expedients  could be adopted for identifying the evidence that influenced
the  board.  A  board could,  for example,  mark  with  red  pencil  those
portions  of the file  which were  the  evidentiary basis  of  decision.  (If
board  members  differed  in  their  evidentiary  basis,  each  could  use  a
different  color  pencil  or each  could submit  a marked  copy  of the  file.
A board  could adapt  to  the situation  where there  was  more than  one
statutory  ground,  each  with a  separate  evidentiary  basis,  in a similar
manner.)  Even in the most complex situation, adding to the decisional
process  the  burden  of  marking  the evidentiary  material  significant  to
it should not add more than a few minutes.
3.  Statement  of  Rationale
Only if boards must give more than their statutory and evidentiary
bases  of decision  and  explain  as  well  their rationale-why  they  con-
sider the evidence on which they rely to be persuasive-would  they be
obliged to write  opinions.  Arguably the phraseology of the new statu-
tory  requirement-the  board  "shall,  upon  request,  furnish  to  [the]
registrant a  brief written statement  of the reasons  for  its decisions"-
suggests  that  this  is  in  fact  the  requirement.248  If  so,  as  discussed
earlier,249 the reviewing  court should  be content  with  an informal  and
unrefined  statement  of the board's  reasoning.  It should  demand  only
247 That these  facts are legally  insufficient to  provide  a basis in fact for  denial  of
conscientious  objector  status  is  clear,  see  text  accompanying  notes  6-7  supra,  and
since  "any  evidence"  can  serve  as  a  basis in  fact,  this  would  suggest  that  they  are
no  evidence  at all.  Courts  have  not  said,  however,  that  these  facts  are  immaterial
but simply that they are "consistent  with  conscientious  objector status,"  United  States
v. Haughton,  413  F.2d  736,  742  (9th  Cir.  1969)  (willingness  to  use force  in certain
circumstances  not a proper basis for  denial),  or that they do  "not necessarily  negative
a  conscientious  objection,"  Shepherd  v. United  States,  217  F.2d  942,  945  (9th  Cir.
1954)  (use  of force).  See  United  States  v. Harris,  1  SEL.  SERv.  L. REP.  3360  (D.
Ore.  1968)  (defendant's  refusal to  be  baptized  as Jehovah's  Witness  and  thereby  be-
come  true  member  of the  faith  not basis  in  fact  for  denial  of  I-0 claim).
248 The  regulations  require  the  board  to  "record  its  reasons"  for  rejecting  a
claim in his  file and  to inform  the registrant  of those  reasons  when he is  notified  of
his  classification.  32  C.F.R.  § 1623.4(c)  (1972).
249 Text  accompanying  note  237  supra.
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enough to satisfy itself that the board has not misunderstood the critical
considerations.  Boards might tend  to be more careful in the processes
of decisionmaking  if they  had to  spell  out, however  succinctly  and  in-
formally,  their  reasoning  processes.2 5 °   Moreover  the requirement,  so
construed,  would expose  some  errors that  would  not be  evident  from
a mere citation of the statutory ground and of the evidence  relied upon.
The need for statements  of boards'  reasoning is reduced, however,
in  decisions that  are  not  to  be  reviewed  further  within  the  Selective
Service  System  because  of the rule  that courts  must  uphold a  board's
decision whenever  it is supported by  a basis in fact.25'  In some cases,
boards'  explanations  might  disclose  a  legal  error,  or  an  explanation
might  be  necessary  before  the  court  could  understand  why  the  cited
evidence lends  any support  to the decision.  Generally,  however,  since
courts are not concerned  with the persuasiveness  of the evidence  cited
in the light of any conflicting  evidence,  and since the registrant to pre-
vail  must  show that no  evidence  in the  file  supports his  classification,
an identification  of the statutory  ground  of decision  and  the  evidence
on which the board relied will allow the court fully to perform its func-
tions.  The same would not be true before an appeal board or the Presi-
dential board, because their task is to determine the registrant's  classi-
fication  on the basis  of  all available  evidence.2 52   Boards'  explanations
of their  adjudications  are more  likely to  augment  the accuracy  of the
decisionmaking  process at this stage by enabling  the registrant and the
appellate board to explore the validity  of the earlier determination.  In
cases where it is clear that a registrant can obtain further  review within
the  Selective  Service  System,  therefore,  a  board  ruling  against  him
might be required to state its rationale.  Unless the basis-in-fact  stand-
250 Judge  Frank  once  said  that  the most  important  purpose  of  the  findings  re-
quirement  in  trial courts  was  "that  of  evoking  care  on the part of  the trial judge  in
ascertaining  the facts ....  Often a  strong impression  that, on  the  basis  of  the  evi-
dence,  the facts  are  thus-and-so  gives  way  when  it  comes  to  expressing  that impres-
sion on paper."  United  States v. Forness,  125  F.2d  928,  942  (2d  Cir.),  cert. denied,
316 U.S.  694  (1942).  Contra, Sunderland, Findings of  Fact and  Conclusions of Law
in Cases Where Juries Are Waived, 4  U. CHi.  L.  REv.  218, 228-29  (1937).
251 The  standard  of  review  in  the Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  cases  requidng
Review  Committees  to  give  their  reasoning,  by  contrast,  was  a  substantial  evidence
standard.  See, e.g.,  Jones  v.  Hughes,  400  F.2d  585  (8th  Cir.  1968).  See  note 237
supra.
252 If the appeal  boards'  classifications  were truly  de novo  and  earlier  determina-
tions  were not  at all  influential,  reasons  for  the earlier  determinations  would  not  be
necessary  to  their  functions.  Despite  cases  saying  appeal  boards'  determinations  are
de  novo,  however,  it  is  clear  that  earlier  rulings  are  of  at  least  some  influence.  If
they  were not,  demeanor  could  not  have  been  of  any  influence  prior  to  the  recent
amendments,  unless  it  was  fully  described  in  the  record,  for  appeal  boards  did  not
grant  personal  appearances.  Yet  pre-1971  cases  seemed  to  indicate  that  simply  an
adverse notation  as to  demeanor  in  the record  would  be a sufficient  basis  for a  court
to  sustain  an  appeal  board's  classification.  Witmer  v.  United  States,  348  U.S.  375,
382  (1955)  (analyzing  facts  in  record  only  after  finding  no  indication  of  "shifty  or
evasive"  demeanor);  United  States  v.  Corliss,  280  F.2d  808,  814-16  (2d  Cir.  1960).PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR  CASES
ard is abandoned,  a statement of the grounds and  evidence relied  upon
might suffice in cases where only judicial  review  seems  likely.253
E.  Evaluation of the Reasons Requirement
Whichever  interpretation  of  the  reasons  requirement  prevails,  it
will serve  in some measure  to  increase the  effectiveness  of judicial  re-
view.  It should also stimulate boards to exercise greater  care  in mak-
ing their determinations.  If an interpretation  requiring  specification  of
either the boards'  evidentiary  basis or  their full  reasoning  is adopted,
the  requirement  could  also  go  far  towards  controlling  any  tendency
boards might have to pick a ground  of decision  arbitrarily,  that is,  to
choose it not because  it reflects their actual reasoning processes  but be-
cause  it will withstand judicial  scrutiny.
Either of these two  interpretations would limit the extent to which
a board could undermine the purposes of a reasons requirement by citing
all possible  reasons.  As previously  noted,  a board  operating  under  a
requirement  that  it  simply  state  its  statutory  grounds  could  list  all
statutory  bases  for finding  against  a claimant.  Under  a  rule  that  a
board must indicate  the evidence  on which it  relies,  however,  it would
be more difficult for a board to  impede effective review  by this tactic.25 " 4
Likewise, a requirement that the board state its reasoning would inhibit
any tendency in this  direction.2 55
If  one  of the  more  demanding  interpretations  of the  reasons  re-
quirement  is adopted,  there will also  be less  likelihood  of improper  re-
liance  on  demeanor  evidence.  The  vexing  question  whether  a  board
should  be empowered  to reject  a registrant's  story on  the basis of  de-
253 The rules  as  to which  cases  go  to the Presidential  board  make it  impossible
for an  appeal board  to  ascertain with certainty  all  cases  where  further  review  within
the  system  will  be had.  See text accompanying  notes  67-68  supra.  If  the  suggested
approach  were adopted,  local  boards  should  give  full  reasoning  in  all  cases,  and  the
Presidential  board  would  never  be  required  to  give  full  reasoning.  Appeal  boards
would  have  to  do  so,  at least  in  cases  where  the  appeal  board  was  not  unanimous.
If appeal boards gave full reasoning only in such  cases,  there would be some  instances
-those  where  the  State or  National Directors  appealed-where  the  appeal board  had
not given  full  reasoning  but where  there  would  be  further  review  within  the  Selec-
tive  Service  System.
254 A  board  could  do  so  only  by  indicating  every  piece  of  evidence  that  could
possibly  support  its  decision  as  an  independent  basis  of  decision.  The  tactic  would
backfire, however,  if the  board neglected  to  state  that  the  grounds  were  independent
of each  other.  Moreover,  if a  board  indicated  a  great  deal  of  evidence  in  the  file,
including  evidence  that  could  not  possibly  support  its  decision,  the  bad  faith  of  the
board would  be  apparent,  and  a  court  should  rule  that  the  board  had  not  complied
with  the  requirement.
255 If a board required to  spell out its reasoning could  state all possible  reasons as
independent  bases of decision,  the registrant  could  be deprived  of all  benefits  the  rea-
sons  requirement  provides.  As  a practical  matter,  however,  the board  would  usually
be unable  to eliminate the  benefits  of the requirement  in  this way.  It might decrease
the  helpfulness  of the  requirement  by maximizing  the number  of independent  reasons
it  gives, but  as  long  as  it  does  not  cover  all  possibilities,  it  will  not  eliminate  the
utility  of  the requirement.
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meanor alone was adverted to earlier.  If demeanor is deemed sufficient,
boards  at the  least  should  have  to  describe  fully  what  it  was  in  the
registrant's  demeanor  that  influenced  the  board.  A bare  declaration
that  the  registrant  seemed  "shifty"  or gave  an  "appearance  of  unre-
liability"  would not insulate  the administrative  decision  from reversal.
Requiring  in this  fashion a fuller description  of  demeanor  should  cut
down  on  any  tendency  boards  may  have  to  make  adverse  demeanor
findings  automatically  as the easiest way to  deny a claim.
The  requirement  might  also  contribute  to  the  reviewability  of
demeanor  evidence.  The usual rule of review-that  a board's  decision
will be sustained  if any evidence supports it-still admits of an  inquiry
whether  in the particular  case  demeanor provides  "any  evidence"  sup-
porting rejection of the registrant's  claim.  The registrant's  demeanor
is obviously  not always sufficient  to serve  as  an independent  basis for
decision against the registrant, even if there is a rule that demeanor  can
serve  as the sole basis in fact.  A requirement  that the board must de-
scribe fully the registrant's  demeanor  (or, additionally,  give its reasons
for  considering the demeanor influential)  would  make it possible  for  a
court to make a more informed  judgment whether  in a particular  case
the demeanor  evidence  does  constitute  a basis  in fact for  disbelieving
the  registrant.256
IV. REMAINING  PROBLEMS
Despite the  improvement  the  reasons  requirement  represents,  the
administration  of  the  Selective  Service  System  remains  seriously
flawed.  The virtue of that requirement  is that it will bring more  into
the open what boards are doing and thus make it more  probable  in any
given  case  that the ultimate  decision  is  in  accord  with  the  prevailing
rules.  To the extent that past  difficulties  in accurately  discerning  who
is  a  conscientious  objector  lay  in  the  rules  themselves,  however,  the
2 56 The  reasons  requirement  could  cut  down  on  board  misuse  of  demeanor  in
another  way as  well: the  requirement  will  clarify just how  strong  the  demeanor  evi-
dence  against  a  registrant is.  A  court  might  require  a  particularly  strong  showing
of demeanor  evidence  to support rejection  of  a registrant's  claim  in  cases  where  the
file shows a very strong  case for the registrant on the paper  record, or where it shows
obvious  sources  of  relevant  information  that the  board  has  failed  to  pursue.  Under
the  basis-in-fact  test, however,  it  would  seem  improper  for  a  court  in  this  way  to
balance  the  strength  of  the  registrant's  case  against  the  strength  of  the  demeanor
evidence.  The  sole  inquiry  that  test  allows  the  court  to  make  is  whether  demeanor
serves  as  any  basis  in fact  for  the  board's  decision;  theoretically  that  determination
should  be  made  without  regard  to  other  evidence  in  the  registrant's  file.  Moreover,
it is  conceivable  that  the board's  description  of  demeanor  will  show  it  to  be  a basis
for  disbelieving  only some  of a registrant's  evidence but  not enough to defeat  a prima
facie case.  The registrant then  would  have satisfied  his burden  of proof unless  there
were  other  unfavorable  evidence  in  the  record,  or  unless  the  registrant's  insincerity
as  to  some  evidence  can  be  affirmative  evidence  against  him,  allowing  disbelief  of
other  of  his  evidence.  Cf.  Dyer v.  MacDougall,  201  F.2d  265  (2d  Cir.  1952).
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reasons requirement has little ameliorative  effect.  Other reforms  could
improve  the situation.  Thus, lengthier personal  appearances  with full
procedural rights  could be guaranteed registrants;  the power  of boards
to  deny a classification  because  of demeanor  could  be limited  to situa-
tions where no more concrete evidence  is available;  exaggerated  defer-
ence  to boards'  factual findings  could be avoided by frank adoption  of a
broader  standard of review than the basis-in-fact  test;  means  might be
sought to make the factfinding body more representative  of the popula-
tion.  One of the most  significant  ways  to  reform  the decisionmaking
system  would  be to  provide  for meaningful  investigation  of conscien-
tious objector  claims.  This  could  be  done by  reinstituting  a  Depart-
ment of Justice investigation  of the kind that existed until mid-1967.57
Alternatively,  draft boards themselves  might  be required  thoroughly to
investigate before  any deference  could  be  given  to their  factual  deter-
minations.  This  approach  might  well  require  professionalizing  draft
boards so that members  would have adequate time to spend at the job.
Even  if the full  range  of reforms  were provided,  however,  prob-
lems of unreliable  conscientious  objector  determinations  would  remain.
There would be cases where investigation would not help  because there
simply is  nothing to  confirm or refute  a registrant's  own  statement  in
support  of his  claim.  Moreover,  present criteria for conscientious  ob-
jector  status-whether  a  registrant's  belief  is  sincerely  held  and  "oc-
cupies a place  in the  life  of  its possessor  parallel  to  that filled  by  the
orthodox  belief  in  God  of  one  who  clearly  qualifies  for  the  exemp-
tion" 2 ---are too elusive to admit of reliable  application.2 59   Impartial
and full consideration of claims based  on all available evidence  will not,
therefore,  provide assurance  that the conscientious  objector  exemption
is being correctly  and uniformly applied.
In  all conscientious  objector  cases  there  are  inherent  difficulties.
The determination  depends on the registrant's state of mind in relation
to a subject which  is peculiarly personal  and which involves a complex
of  emotional,  psychological,  and  ideological  factors.  Moreover,  the
incentive  to dissemble  or falsify is  extreme.  In instances  where  it is
available,  the factfinder  can  take  some  comfort  in  circumstantial  evi-
dence casting light on the honesty of the registrant's  self-serving  state-
257 The  inability to keep  up  with the  caseload  that apparently  led to  abolition  of
the procedure could  be avoided by appropriating  funds to hire sufficient staff  to  handle
the  caseload.  See text accompanying  notes  159-60  supra.
258 United  States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,  166  (1965).
259In United  States  v. Nugent,  346  U.S.  1, 10  (1953),  though  decided at  a  time
when  the  exemption was  interpreted as limited  to  the traditionally religious  and when
the Department of Justice investigatory procedure  was in effect, the  Court nevertheless
recognized  that  "[i]t  is  always  difficult  to  devise  procedures  which  will  be  adequate
to  do  justice  in  cases  where  the  sincerity  of  another's  religious  convictions  is  the
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ment  of his  beliefs.  The  man  who  can  show  membership  in a tradi-
tionally pacifist sect, for example, has convincing circumstantial evidence
of his  opposition  to participation  in war.  Even for  him, however,  the
evidence  is not conclusive;  he might have joined  simply  to strengthen
his conscientious  objector  claim.  If he joined  the sect at an early  age
and if his participation in religious  activities has been  regular and full,
the credibility  of his claim  increases.2 60  Even so,  it is possible  that he
is a farsighted  dissembler.
A registrant who  is religious  in a traditional  sense but who  is not
a member of a peace church has a more difficult task.  Such a registrant
must rely on circumstantial  evidence to convince the board not only that
the teachings  of his church  are central to his life,  but also  that he has
in  good  faith  reached  the  conclusion  that  those  teachings  forbid  his
engagement  in war.
Most  troublesome  for  the  factfinder,  however,  are  the  cases  in
which  the  applicant  for  conscientious  objector  status  has  no  church
affiliation.  The  claims  of  some  persons  without  traditional  religious
affiliations  may be clearly provable or disprovable.  Generally, however,
they are the least susceptible  of accurate  determination.  An unaffiliated
registrant  may  be  totally  sincere,  yet  have  no  objective  evidence  to
corroborate his assertion that he believes  it would be wrong for him to
participate  in war.2"1
The  registrant  who  can  do  no  more  than  describe  his  inward
beliefs  is in a dilemma:  his  claim may  not be believed  simply because
it is easily fabricated and impossible to prove or disprove 62  The draft
board  shares  the problem:  if it were  to  reject  all  such  claims  on  the
ground  that  the  registrant  had  never  performed  an  overt  act  that
showed,  even  circumstantially,  that his  claim  was  legitimate,  it  could
well reject the claim of a registrant who was, under Seeger and  Welsh,
entitled  to  a conscientious  objector  exemption.  If,  on the other hand,
260 See note  261 infra.
261 In  fact,  studies  show  that  draft  boards  are  most  likely  to  grant  claims  by
members  of  pacifist churches,  that persons  affiliated  with other  churches  are the next
most  favored  group,  and  that  persons  not  affiliated  with  any  church  have  the  most
difficult time  having  their  claims sustained.  Rabin, supra note  36,  at  657-58;  Reisner,
supra note  7,  at  531-35.  But  cf.  Clay  v.  United  States,  403  U.S.  698,  700  (1971)
("[T]he  Selective  Service  System  must  be  concerned  with  the  registrant  as  an
individual, not  with  its  own  interpretation  of the  dogma  of the  religious  sect, if  any,
to  which he may  belong.")  Registrants  are  also  aided  by  affirming  their  belief  in  a
Supreme  Being.  Reisner,  supra at  531.  Interestingly  enough,  the  Reisner  study
indicates  that  while  church  affiliation  (and  particularly  affiliation  with  traditional
peace  churches)  is  often controlling, the length  of time of affiliation and the  regularity
of  church  attendance  as reported  by the registrant  to  the  draft  board  seem  unimpor-
tant.  Id. 538.
262 Compare  this  situation to  the  dilemma  of  conscientious  objectors  when  there
is no procedure for investigating  conscientious  objector claims;  see text accompanying
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it invariably accepted such claims in the absence of evidence to impeach
them, disingenuous  registrants would receive conscientious  objector  ex-
emptions  to  which  they  are  not  entitled.  By  hypothesis,  there  is
nothing to  which the  draft board can  look that will  reliably  guide  its
determination.
To be sure,  not all  nonaffiliated  objectors will  lack objective  evi-
dence  relevant  to  their  sincerity.  Some  will  have  manifested  their
beliefs through action or by making  statements  indicating opposition to
war.  It  is  likely, however,  that  their  lack of  religious  affiliation  will
make it more difficult for them  than it would be for  a  church  member
to show that those actions or statements reflect a belief that substantively
qualifies.  Opposition to war  qualifies  one for the exemption  only if it
is  (1)  directed to  all wars  and  (2)  founded  upon  moral  or  religious
principle  and not just pragmatic  considerations.  The fact of religious
affiliation obviously will assist materially in convincing a board that the
basis for opposition is moral or religious.  When traditional religion is
the foundation of a belief it may also be more easily deemed  to extend
beyond a particular war to war in general.  Nonaffiliated  objectors who
can point to antiwar  actions or statements  as  evidence  of their opposi-
tion to war  may still run a heavy risk that those actions or statements
will be dismissed as merely political  or as  directed toward  a particular
war.
263
Objective evidence  is helpful not only in proving that a registrant
is sincere in his belief that he should not participate  in war; it may also
tend  to  show  that  the belief  is  held  with  the  requisite  depth-that  it
"occupies  a place  in  the life  of  its possessor  parallel  to  that  filled  by
the  orthodox  belief  in  God  of  one  who  clearly  qualifies  for  the  ex-
emption."  Here  again,  objectors  lacking  traditional  religious  affilia-
tions may be disadvantaged:  264  the kind of evidence they have,  antiwar
statements  or  activities,  for  example,  may  be  quite  consistent  with  a
merely political  belief or one directed only at a particular  war.  Again,
the presence  of some  objective  evidence  may  be insufficient  to provide
the  board with  a firm  basis  for  distinguishing  the  valid  claims  from
263 Although  a  man  clearly  could  consistently  oppose  the  Vietnam  conflict  and
also  be entitled  to conscientious  objector  status,  Professor  Reisner  reports  that when
a  file shows  opposition  to  the  Vietnam  war  a  registrants  chance  of  receiving  a con-
scientious  objector  classification  from an  appeal board  substantially  lessens.  Reisner,
sipra note 7,  at 530.  On the  basis  of a  limited  sample  he also  reports that "[o]pposi-
tion to  the Vietnam  War was  only  slightly  less  decisive  as  a negative  factor in  the
cases  that  underwent  Justice  Department  review."  Id.  541.
264 That  traditionally  religious  objectors  will  be  at  an  advantage  with  respect
to  the  depth  requirement  is  clear  since  the very  function  of  the  depth  requirement
is  to  define  religion-to  determine  whether  a man's  opposition  to  war  is  the  product
of "religious  training and  belief"  in the  statutory sense.  See text accompanying  notes
117-25  supra &  notes  123,  125.
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those that are  contrived  or  are legally  inadequate  under  the  statutory
standard.
Whether  a particular  registrant holds his  belief with the requisite
depth  may  indeed  be  an even  more elusive  issue  than the  question  of
sincerity.  One who has  a sincere  belief that he should not participate
in war may himself  be uncertain whether his belief "occupies  a place  in
[his]  life  .. .parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption."  265  If the possessor of a belief
in all honesty is unable to determine whether his belief meets the statu-
tory criteria, it is clearly beyond the competence  of an outside factfinder
to make that determination with accuracy.  The board  may well resort
to  deciding  the  issue  of  depth  according  to  categories  of  registrants,
rather than assessing the particularized  beliefs  of individual registrants.
Theoretically,  a  traditionally  religious  man might  also  be  found
disqualified from conscientious objector status because of lack of depth.
He might  have a sincere  belief that  stemmed from  religious  affiliation
that it was wrong for him to participate  in war, yet the belief might not
be sufficiently  important to him or central to his  existence to  meet the
law's  requirement.  In  practice,  however,  draft  boards  faced  with
claimants  having  traditional  religious  affiliations  and  objecting  with
apparent sincerity to participation in war in any form are apt to presume
that the beliefs are held with the requisite  depth-to presume it simply
because  of the impossibility  of actually  determining  whether the  depth
criterion  is  satisfied.
Even  if investigation  of  conscientious  objector  claims  were  pro-
vided, therefore,  determinations  of conscientious  objector  status would
continue  to  be  unreliable.266   In  many  cases-most  frequently,  but
certainly not exclusively, cases involving nonaffiliated  registrants-there
would  still  be  no  adequate  factual  basis  for  deciding  whether  a reg-
istrant  satisfied  all of  the  statutory  criteria.  Whether  the  lack  of an
adequate  factual  basis  for  decision  would  ultimately  redound  to  the
benefit of the registrant is uncertain.  It would not if there were enough
in the  record  to provide  a basis  in fact for a decision against  him  on
any  ground.  In that  situation,  the board  could  indulge  its  suspicion
of  the  registrant,  or  its  hostility  to  him,  by  simply  seizing  on  that
ground.  Similarly  the  registrant  would  not  benefit  from  the  lack  of
adequate  evidence  if the board  could  hold against him  by findings  on
demeanor  and  have  its  decision  upheld.  If, on  the  other  hand,  de-
265 Uncertainty  might arise  either from  a registrant's  failure  to understand what
degree  of  depth is  required-that  is, what  is  "the place  . . . filled  by  the orthodox
belief  in  God of  [a  registrant]  who  clearly  qualifies--or  from a  registrant's inability
to ascertain  the exact  degree  of his  own  depth  of belief.
266 Investigation  would,  however,  improve  the  situation.  See  note  169  supra.
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meanor  alone  were  deemed  a legally  insufficient  basis  for  denial,  and
if a registrant is  sufficiently resourceful to present a claim believable  on
its face and  of such a nature that investigation yields  no  evidence  con-
trary to it, the situation is the same as when claims are not investigated:
any person who is able to state a claim that is legally sufficient to justify
conscientious  objector  status  and  who  has  the  temerity  to  fight  an
adverse Selective Service determination in court should eventually have
his  conscientious objector claim  sustained whether his claim be truthful
or not.
Unless  required by necessity,  we  should be  reluctant  to  employ  a
standard  for  conscientious  objection  that  is  likely  in  any  substantial
percentage  of  cases  to  lead  to  unreliable  results.  An  erroneous  dis-
position  of  a  conscientious  objector  claim  entails  harsh  consequences.
The unfairness to a registrant sentenced to prison because  of erroneous
classification  is  obvious.  There  is  also  a cost  to  the  nation in  pros-
ecuting  and  imprisoning  a  man  who  could  perform  some  beneficial
service that does  not conflict  with his conscience.  On the  other hand,
the attainment of conscientious objector status by men who are insincere
in their  claims  is  grossly  unfair:  the  direct  result  of  their  erroneous
classification  is that other  men must  take their  place.
V. A PROPOSAL  FOR  CHANGE
The public has lost  confidence  in the  administration  of the draft.
In  1941,  at  a  time  (pre-Pearl  Harbor)  when  the  public  was  very
divided  over  the  wisdom  of  having  a  conscription  system,  a  Gallup
Poll showed nevertheless that ninety-three percent of the public believed
that the draft had "been handled fairly,"  and only seven percent thought
otherwise 6' 7  By 1966, however,  only forty-three percent felt that "the
way  [the  draft]  works  is  fair,"  though  "[t]he  vast  majority  of
Americans favor[ed]  drafting young  men for military service."  268  A
presidential commission that in 1967 made recommendations  concerning
the Selective  Service  System also came to the conclusion that the draft
is unevenly administered.2 69  Subsequent to the 1967 amendments, testi-
267 G. WAmsLEY, supra note 134, at 1.
268Id.  2.  For  a  summary  of  complaints  leveled  against  the draft  in  the  mid-
1960's,  together  with  the  Selective  Service  System's  rebuttal,  see  Hearings on  the
Administration &  Operation of the Selective Service System Before  the House Comm.
on; Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9985-96  (1966).
2 69 MARS HALL  CozmnmnssioN  REPORT,  supra note  135.  The  Commission  was  ap-
pointed in  1966  by  President  Johnson.  See  Exec.  Order  No.  11,289,  31  Fed.  Reg.
9265-66  (1966).  It  was  headed by  Burke Marshall,  a former  Deputy  Attorney Gen-
eral  of  the United  States,  and it came  to  be known  as  "the  Marshall  Commission."
Most  of  the  recommendations  the  Marshall  Commission  made  concerning  the
administrative  restructuring  of  the  system  were  not  adopted.  The  congressional
debate  on  reform  of  the  nation's  draft  laws,  which  culminated  in  the  Military
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mony  before  congressional  committees  suggested  that  widespread  in-
equities still existed. °  One  source of dissatisfaction has been the lack
of centralization  and the extent of discretionary  decisidnmaking,  which
have combined to produce  a lack of uniformity.7  Another  is that the
system of exemptions and deferments  makes it more likely that socially
and  economically  disadvantaged  persons  who  are  qualified  for  service
will be drafted, than will members  of more privileged groups. 2  Pro-
cedural  changes in the way the draft is to operate have been  one means
adopted by lawmakers to increase the fairness of the system  .2
"  Another
Selective  Service  Act  of  1967,  50  U.S.C.  A''.  §§451-73  (1970),  as  amended,  50
U.S.C.A.  APP.  §§451-71a  (Supp.  1972),  can  be  found  in Hearings on  the  Admin-
istration &  Operation of  the Selective Service  System  Before  the House  Comm.  on
Armed Services, 89th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  (1966)  ; Hearings on S. 1432 Before  the Senate
Comm. on Armed  Services, 90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1967)  ; Hearings on Extension of
the  Universal Military Training & Service Act  Before  the House Comm.  on Armed
Services, 90th  Cong.,  1st Sess.  (1967)  ;  S.  R  Pa.  No. 209,  90th Cong.,  1st Sess.  (1967)  ;
H.R.  REP.  No.  346,  90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1967);  H.R.  REP.  No.  267,  90th  Cong.,
1st Sess.  (1967)  ;  CIVILIAN  ADVISORY  PANEL  ON  MILITARY  MANPOWER  PROCUREMENT,
90TH  CONG.,  1ST  SESs.,  REPORT  TO  THE  HOUSE  Comm.  ON  ARMED  SERVICES,  (Comm.
Print  1967)  (the  "Clark  Report,"  authored  by  a  panel  chaired  by  General  Mark
Clark, was  appointed  by  the Armed  Services  Committee  to  give  Congress  a  basis  for
examining the draft independent of the Marshall  Commission).
270 Hearings on  S. Res. 39 Before  the  Subcoinm.  on Administrative Practice &
Procedure of  the  Senate Comm.  on  the  Judiciary, 91st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  58-78,  378
(1969)  ; Hearings on  Selective Service  & Military Compensation Before  the  Senate
Comm.  on  Armed  Services, 92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  120  (statement  of  Senator  Ken-
nedy),  339  (statement  of  Mr.  Caplan)  (1971);  Hearings on  Administration  &
Operation of  the Draft Law Before the Special Subcomm.  on  the Draft of  the House
Comm.  on Armed  Services, 91st  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  12,809  (1970)  (statement  of  Repre-
sentative Harrington).
271 See, e.g.,  Hearings on  S.  Res.  39  Before  the  Subcomm.  on  Administrative
Practice & Procedure of  the Senate  Comm.  on  the  Judiciary, 91st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.
378  (1969)  (pronouncement  on  Selective  Service  System  adopted  by  the  United
Church  of Christ);  Hearings on Selective Service  & Military Compensation Before
the Senate Comm. on Armed  Services, 92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  120  (statement  of Senator
Kennedy),  339-42  (statement  of Mr.  Caplan),  400  (statement  of  Lutheran  Church)
(1971);  MARSHALL  CoMMISSION  REPORT,  supra note  135,  at  17-29,  41-42;  J.  DAVIs
& K. DoInARE,  supra note 134, at 198-99, 207.
272 Hearings on  Selective  Service  & Military  Compensation Before  the  Senate
Comm.  on Armed  Services, 92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  388  (1971)  (statement  of William
Keeney) ;  Hearings on Administration &  Operation of  the Draft Before  the  Special
Subcomm.  on  the Draft of  the  House Armed Services  Comm.,  91st  Cong.,  2d  Sess.
12,809  (1970)  (statement  of  Representative  Harrington);  MARSHALL  COMMISSION
REPORT,  supra note  135,  at 9-10,  21-26;  J. DAvis  & K.  DOLBEARE,  supra note  134,  at
15-17,  129-52.
273 Although the  1971  amendments  enacted  some  of the  procedural  changes  often
called for-statement  of reasons  for  rejecting  registrants'  claims,  presence  of  quorum
of local  board  at  personal  appearance,  right  to appear  before  classification,  and  the
right  to  present  witnesses-many  of  the  perceived  procedural  shortcomings  have  not
been  remedied.  Among  these  are  the  nonrepresentative  character  of  the  Selective
Service  boards,  the  absence  of  a  right  to  counsel  at  local  board  proceedings,  the
absence  of  a  right to  a  transcript of  local  board  proceedings,  Hearings on  Selective
Service  &  Military  Compensation Before  the  Senate  Conm.  on  Armed  Services,
92d Cong.,  1st  Sess.  425-26  (1971)  (statement  of  Mr.  Neier),  and  the  lack  of  local
board awareness  regarding  the state  of the law.  Hearings  on  S. Res. 39 Before  the
Subcomm.  on Administrative Practice & Procedure of  the  Senate  Comm.  on  the
Judiciary,  91st  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 66  (1969).
[Vo1.120:870PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR  CASES
has  been  to create  a truly random  system  of  selection-as  the  lottery
commenced  in  1970  is  designed  to  be 274-among  all  those  equally
vulnerable  to service  and to  cut  back  deferments  and  exemptions that
create privileged groups of persons  able to minimize their vulnerability.
In contrast to the notion that General Hershey made popular-that the
Selective Service System should, through the use of deferments,  channel
manpower  into  activities  it  considers  in the  national  interest 275-the
current conception  is of a system where deferments and exemptions  are
minimized,  the largest possible number  of men  is eligible  to serve, and
the choice  of who actually  shall  serve is  dictated  by chance. 6
As  a result  the fatherhood,  occupational,  and  student  deferments
have been substantially  cut back  in recent years. 2 7  The conscientious
objector  exemption,  however,  has  remained  substantially  unchanged,
though it is at least equally susceptible to inequity in its administration.
It may be that advantaged  persons are more likely  to be conscientious
objectors  than  are  the  disadvantaged-at  least  objectors  of  the  not-
traditionally-religious  variety recognized in Welsh and Seeger.  At any
rate, the sophistication  and the ability to hire counsel put one at a great
advantage in formulating a sustainable conscientious objector  claim and
274 The path  for  a random  selection process  was  cleared  by  repeal  of  § 5 (a)  (2)
of the Military Selective  Service Act of  1967  which preserved  the "oldest first" induc-
tion  system.  Act of Nov. 26,  1969,  Pub. L. No.  91-124,  § 2, 83  Stat. 220.  Two days
later, President Nixon, pursuant to his rulemaking power, adopted a system of random
selection.  Proclamation  No.  3945,  34  Fed.  Reg. 19,017  (1969),  50  U.S.C.  App.  § 455
(1970).
275 Hearings  on  the Administration &  Operation of  the Selective Service System
Before the House Comm.  on Armed  Services, 89th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  9620,  9623  (1966)
(testimony of General H-ershey)  :
I  do  not believe  we  are so  rich  in human  resources  that we  can afford
deliberately  to  ignore  opportunities  we  have  to  channel  people  into  training
and  the  application  of  training.  There  are  enough  factors  over  which  we
have  no  control  which  interferes  with  the  development  of  the  potential  of
our  citizens,  and  with  the best utilization  of  that potential  when it is  devel-
oped.  By  deferment  we  can  influence  people  to train  themselves  and  to  use
the skills they acquire in work critical to  the Nation,  in civilian or in military
life.
See also  1965  Din.  SEL.  SERV.  ANN.  REP.  18;  SECrvE  SERVICE  AND  CHRONOLOGY
30  (1965).
276 See, e.g.,  Hearings on  S.  Res.  39  Before  the  Subcomm.  on  Administrative
Practice & Procedure  of  the Senate Comm. on  the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,  1st  Sess.  986
(1969)  (article  by  Senator  Kennedy  in  EVENT,  June  1969).
27750  U.S.C.A. App.  §456(h)  (Supp.  1972),  amending 50  U.S.C. App.  §456(h)
(1970).  Compare Exec.  Order  No.  11,360, 32  Fed.  Reg. 9787,  9791  (1967),  with 32
C.F.R.  § 1622.25  (1972)  (student  deferments).  Compare Exec.  Order  No.  11,360,
32 Fed.  Reg. 9787,  9791  (1967)  (III-A  deferment  to any male  with  child or  children
and bona  fide  family  relationship),  with 32  C.F.R.  § 1622.30  (1972).  Compare Exec.
Order  No.  11,527, 35  Fed.  Reg. 6571  (1970),  with 32  C.F.R.  § 1622.22  (1972)  (occu-
pational  deferments).
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in having it ultimately sustained.  The conscientious  objector exemption
may,  then,  be  criticized  on  the  ground  that  the  privileged  have  the
easiest  access  to it-a  criticism  also  leveled  at  the  occupational  and
student deferments.  In addition, its administration  is unfair because the
inherent difficulties of determining who is a conscientious objector make
that classification  much more susceptible  to false claims than any others.
The problem of inequitable  administration would of course be eased
if  objective  criteria  were  used-if, for  example,  one  were  to  make
membership  in particular  peace  churches  the  sole test  of  conscientious
objection."'  The  intractable  difficulty  is  in  arriving  at  objectively
provable  criteria  that  include  all  to  whom  we  wish  to  extend  the ex-
emption  without  allowing  the  exemption  to  be  claimed  too  broadly.
Alternatively, the problem of proof in conscientious  objector cases could
be  met by minimizing  the  attractiveness  of  the  conscientious  objector
exemption,279  thereby decreasing the incentive to make false claims  and
making  more credible those that are made.  Our present  system,  with
respect  to I-0 objectors,  is an uneasy  compromise:  we  do burden  the
objector  in return for his avoidance  of military service by making him
perform  alternative  service.  The burden  is  largely  purposeless,  how-
ever, because it is not sufficiently great to remove the incentive for false
278 The Draft Act of  1917 followed  this approach,  at least  on paper.  It  required,
as a prerequisite to  conscientious  objector status,  membership  in a church  whose  doc-
trine  forbade participation  in war.  Selective  Draft Act of  1917, ch.  15,  § 4, 40  Stat. 76,
78.  During that period, the exemption did not permit conscientious objectors  to remain
civilians.  Draftees were deemed  members  of the military from the date  of issuance  of
their  induction  order.  See  M.  SIBLEY  & P. JACOB,  CoNscRn'ToN  OF  CONSCIENCE  12
(1952).
What  conscientious  objector  exemption  there  was,  however,  was  not in practice
always limited to members  of peace churches.  Local  board treatment  of the exemption
varied, since the War Department  did not prepare a  list of  recognized  peace churches.
I  SELECTIVE  SERVICE  SYSTEM,  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTION  52  (Special  Monograph No.
11,  1950).  But every person  who  claimed upon induction  that he was  a conscientious
objector, whether  or not  he was  a member of  a peace  church  and whether  or not he
had been  certified  as a  conscientious  objector by his draft  board, was  segregated  from
the other  soldiers  in military camp.  See U.S.  SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  STATEMENT  COX-
CEINING  THE  TREATMENT  OF  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTORS  IN  THE  Ai  my  17  (1919)
[hereinafter  cited as  STATEMENT];  M. SIBLEY  & P. JACOB,  .mipra  at  13.
Seven months  after  the  enactment  of  the  Draft Act, the  Secretary of War  legiti-
mated the practice of treating  all objectors  alike by issuing  an order  that not only all
religious  objectors but  also  those with  "personal  scruples against  war"  should  be  con-
sidered  conscientious  objectors.  STATEMENT,  mtpra at 39.  That  order was  not publi-
cized  out of a fear  that knowledge  of it would encourage  persons  to make false  claims
of  conscientious  objection, id. 17,  but in March  of  1918  the  President  confirmed  that
broadening of the category of conscientious  objectors in  an executive  order.  Id. 39-40.
279 Another  approach might be  to keep  the public  from  knowing  how  advantage-
ously  conscientious  objectors  are  treated  in comparison  to  other  persons.  This  was
tried  at times  during World War I.  See, e.g.,  note 278  supra.  The isolation  of the
Civilian  Public  Service  Camps  where  objectors  were placed  during  World War II is
also partially  explainable  on this ground.  See M.  SIBLEY  & P. JAcOB,  supra note  278,
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I-0  claims; 280  the  I-0  objector  (but  not  the  I-A-O  objector28)  is
much better treated than the ordinary soldier." 2
280 To the extent that the burden  constitutes work that contributes to the national
interest,  it can  be explained  on  that ground.  In large  part, however, it is  explicable
only as a concession to public opinion,  which might be outraged if those  refusing mili-
tary service were not made to perform any service at all.
The government  has rationalized  the  various  kinds  of alternate  service  it has  pro-
vided for  in the course  of our history  on  the ground  that they  both  respect  the  con-
scientious  objector's  beliefs  and  make  him  contribute  in  some  way  to  the  national
interest  The alternate  service  provisions may be found at Universal  Military Train-
ing  and  Service  Act,  ch.  144,  § 1(q),  65  Stat.  86  (1951),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.
APP.  § 456(j)  (Supp.  1972);  Selective  Training  and  Service  Act  of  1940,  ch.  720
§ 5(g),  54 Stat.  889;  Selective  Draft Act  of  1917,  ch.  15,  § 4, 40  Stat.  78.  See  also
MILLER,  STORIES  FROM  BEaHeERN  LIFE  137-38  (1942),  quoted in  1 SELECTIVE  SERVICE
SYSTEM,  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTION  42-43  (Special  Monograph  No.  11,  1950).  In
fact,  however, it is unlikely  that the  contribution  conscientious  objectors'  service  has
made has  equalled the costs and  effort expended  in imposing the requirement  on them.
During  World War  I  only  about  1200  men  were  furloughed  to farms,  STATEMENT,
supra note  278,  at 25;  Stone,  The  Conscientious Objector,  21  COLUM.  U.Q.  253,  271
(1919)  (1300  men),  but a great deal of  energy at very high  levels went into  the prob-
lem of how to deal with those objectors.  See generally STATEMENT,  SUpra.  Moreover,
a Board of Inquiry consisting of three prominent persons including Harlan Fiske  Stone,
then Dean of Columbia Law  School and  later Chief Justice of the United  States, spent
approximately  a  year  interviewing  persons  claiming  eligibility  and  passing  on  the
merits of their claims.  M.  SIBLEY  & P. JACOB,  supra note 278, at 14.  The 151  Civilian
Public  Service Camps  that existed to provide  alternate  service  for  fewer  than  12,000
conscientious  objectors during  World  War II  often  filled  their  day  with  makework.
In terms  of  costs it is most unlikely  that the  expense  of  setting them  up and  admin-
istering  them was  met by  work performed.  Id. 89,  209,  224-36.  But see id. 124-51.
Much effort  is expended  under the current system as well in assigning persons  to  jobs
that qualify  for alternate service.
In addition to a lack of returns for the efforts expended, there are other indications
that a primary reason for the alternate service  scheme is to place  some burden  on the
1-0  registrant.  See  generally Silard,  Invalid Disruption Riles for  CO  Alternative
Service,  3  COLUM.  SURVEY  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS  LAw  136  (1971).  Several  Selective
Service  rules  for  dealing with  1-O's  are  explainable  only  on  this  rationale.  Local
Board  Mem. No. 64, SEL.  SEav. L. REP. 2183  (1962,  amended  1968)  (rescinded,  5 SEL.
SEav. L.  REP.  8  (1972)),  for example,  provided that  the registrant's  work  should  be
performed  outside of the  community  where  he resides and  that the position the  regis-
trant  receives  "should  constitute  a  disruption  of the  registrant's  normal  way  of  life
somewhat  comparable to the disruption of a registrant who is inducted into the Armed
Forces.'  See Local Board  Mem.  No. 98, SEL.  SERV.  L. REP. 2200:7  (1969)  (rescinded,
5 SEL.  SERV. L. REP. 8  (1972)).  For the current  rules, see  note 11 supra.  Moreover,
the alternate service requirement was abolished in the 1948  draft law,  Selective  Service
Act of  1948,  ch.  625,  § 6(j),  62  Stat.  612-13,  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  APP.  § 456(j)
(Supp.  1972),  and was  revived  in  1951  because  of a  hostile  public  reaction  to  total
exemption.  See  D.  JOHNSON,  THE  CHALLENGE  TO  AMERICAN  FREEDOMS  17  (1963)
(illustrating the government's desire to avoid public hostility to overly permissive  treat-
ment in formulating World War I legislation)  ; M. SIBLEY  & P. JACOB,  supra at 239-40
(for an instance of congressional  reaction at the  end of World War II to what it  con-
sidered undue favoring  of conscientious  objectors).
281 See note 284 infra.
282 The  1-0  objector  has  no  greater  likelihood  of  having  to  perform  alternate
service than the I-A registrant has  of having to serve.  His term of service is no longer
than that of the ordinary  soldier, and  he fulfills it not in the military but  in a civilian
occupation  that typically involves  no unusual  danger.  He participates  in  choosing his
job, and he is  treated  on equal terms with civilian  employees.  See text accompanying
notes  10-14 spra & note  11.
The burden  imposed  on  1-0  objectors  as  a group,  while  it may have  served  the
function  of placating the  public,  has never  been  sufficient  to  remove the  incentive  for
false 1-0 claims.  The World War II experience with  Civilian Public  Service  Camps
probably placed on the objector the heaviest burden this nation has ever imposed.  For
some  persons  the hardship  of  that service  was  equal  to  military  service.  Objectors'938  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.120:870
In keeping with the objective of decreasing  the incentive  for false
conscientious objector claims, it is proposed that conscientious  objectors
not be exempted from entering  the military.  Persons who  are drafted
who  have  conscientious  scruples  against  killing  other  persons  should,
however,  be  relieved  from  all  obligation  to  kill.  Objectors  to killing
should  be  self-selecting;  that  is,  persons  should  be  admitted  to  this
category at their election and without any criteria concerning  source of
opposition,  reason for  opposition,  depth  of opposition,  and  so  forth.2 3
likelihood  of service  and period  of  service was  comparable  to  that of the nonobjector,
and the  danger involved in his work was  less.  Conscientious  objectors,  however,  were
given  no  compensation  for  their  services.  Persons  in  need  of  funds,  either  for  them-
selves  or for their dependents,  and who could not find an organization to finance  them,
consequently  found  alternate  service  less  appealing  than  military  service  would  have
been,  and some,  because  of this factor, abandoned  their  scruples  and  entered  the  mili-
tary.  See M.  SIBLEY  & P.  JACOB,  supra  note  278,  at 89-90,  112, 216-24.  For persons
who  could  bear the financial  burden, however,  alternate  service remained  more attrac-
tive than military service.  The incentive  for false claims  remained, therefore,  for those
who could afford  alternate  service.
283 The proposed scheme appears in many ways to duplicate that utilized in World
War  I once it is remembered  that the statutory limitation  during that period  to mem-
bers  of pacifist  churches  was not  in fact  observed.  See note  278  supra.  Even  during
World  War  I,  however,  though  personal  scruples  against  fighting  were  recognized,
there  were  substantive  limitations  on  the  exemption.  The  sincerity  of a  man's  con-
scientious  objection  had  to  be established,  see Stone, supra note  280,  at  258,  263,  and
political  or  selective  objection  to  war  was  never  recognized,  STATEMENT,  supra
note  278,  at  32  (public  statement  issued  by  Secretary  of War)  ;  W.  KELLOGG,  THE
C  NSCIrbTIOUS  OBjEcToR 29-30  (1919)  ;  Stone, supra at 267.
Not only was the scope of  who would qualify for the exemption  different in World
War I than in the proposed  scheme,  but also  the  scope of duties  that the  conscientious
objector had to perform differed.  Under  the proposal,  objectors  would  be under  obli-
gation  to  perform  military  duties  not  related  in some  direct  manner  to  killing.  The
World War I  statute  also  provided that no  person  should  be  exempt  from  service  in
any capacity that the President should  declare to be noncombatant.  Selective Draft Act
of  1917, ch. 15,  § 4, 40 Stat. 78.  In practice, however, objectors could  acquire a broader
exemption.  Between May 1917,  when the  Draft Act was enacted,  and March  1918,  the
President  did  not  define  noncombatant  service.  During that  period  all  conscientious
objectors  were  members  of the military  and  were  segregated  in  the military  camps.
See  note 278  supra.  Some  tried  to  minimize  their  identification  with  the  military
establishment beyond  what noncombatant  service  would  seem to  allow, see  G. HERsn-
BERGER,  WAR,  PEACE,  AND  NONRESISTANCE  128  (1944),  and the government  did not take
a hard line with regard to  such objectors.  In  September  1917, for example,  the  Secre-
tary  of War  issued  an  order  that  Mennonites  not be  forced  over  their  objections  to
wear military uniforms.  STATEMENT,  supra at  17.  (This is not to  say, of  course, that
official  policy was  invariably adhered  to  in  the  camps.  See M.  SIBLEY  & P.  JACOB,
supra note  278, at  15.)  When  the President  finally defined  noncombatant  service,  he
limited it to service within the military in the  medical,  quartermaster,  and engineering
corps.  He  also  provided,  however,  that  those  who  would  not  accept  noncombatant
service  should  continue  to  be  segregated  and  should  not  be  subjected  to  "punitive
hardship" because  of their conscientious  beliefs.  Those persons  were  subject to court-
martial  if  their  sincerity  was  questioned;  if they were  sullen  and  defiant  in attitude;
or  if they were active  in propaganda.  Otherwise, their  beliefs  were respected  as  long
as they kept themselves  and  their  surroundings  clean and engaged  in regular  exercise.
STATEMENT,  supra at  18-19.
A few  months  later  the War  Department  adopted  a policy  for  disposing  of the
segregated  objectors:  persons  sincerely  objecting  to  noncombatant  service  could  ful-
fill their military obligation by being furloughed to  a farm  selected  by  the government.
Any pay  they received at the  job in  excess  of that of  a private  in the military  had to
be turned  over to  the  civilian branch  of the  Red  Cross.  STATEMENT,  supra at  19-23;
Stone, supra at 258.  Only  those  who  would  accept  neither  a  furlough  nor  noncom-
batant  service  were  to be  court-martialed.PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTOR  CASES
To avoid the problem  of the military not having available  enough per-
sons  willing  to  engage  in  combatant  service,  conscientious  objector
service would have to be made equally onerous.  If with either type  of
duty there  were  an  equal  chance  of  serving  in  combat  areas  284  and
conscientious  objector service were not in other  respects  more pleasur-
able than combatant  service, it would seem that a  sufficient  number  of
persons would still be available for combat.  If events proved otherwise,
the conditions  of  conscientious  objector  and  combatant  service  would
have to be adjusted so that there would be a sufficient  number  of com-
batants.2 5   One of many ways that this might be done  is to make  the
term of service  for  combatants  shorter than that for those  with objec-
tions to fighting.  Another  is  to adjust differences  in pay  or in fringe
benefits;  that has the disadvantage,  however,  of its  effectiveness  as  an
In  practice,  then, the conscientious  objector's  options  during  World  War  I  were
much more similar  to  the  system today  than appears  from  the  face of the  1917 Draft
Act.  And  World War  I  is  the  only period  when this  country has required  conscien-
tious  objectors  even  formally  to  become  members  of the  military.  During the  Civil
War any  person  subject  to  the Draft  Law  could  satisfy  his  obligation  by  providing
a  substitute or paying  $300  into the War  Department  to procure  a  substitute.  Draft
Act of 1864, ch.  13,  §§ 4, 5, 13  Stat. 6-7.  Special  consideration  was  given to religious
objectors  who could,  if they accepted  induction, be assigned  to hospitals  or to  the care
of freedmen  and,  if instead  they paid  $300,  could have it applied  to the benefit  of  sick
and  wounded  soldiers.  Id. § 17,  at 9.  The  only  other  period  of  conscription by  our
national  government is  from  1940 to the present.  At no time  during  that  period  has
any  form  of military  service  been  forced  on  those  conscientious  objectors  who  were
recognized  and whose  conscientious objections  extended to it.  From  1940  to  1946  such
objectors  were  assigned  to  Civilian  Public  Service  Camps.  Selective  Training  and
Service  Act  of  1940,  ch.  720,  § 5(g),  54  Stat.  889,  as  amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.
§ 456(j)  (Supp.  1972);  Exec.  Order  No.  8675,  6  Fed.  Reg.  831-32  (1941).  Under
the  1948 Draft Act no service at all  was required  of those  objectors.  Selective  Serv-
ice  Act  of  1948,  ch.  625,  § 6(j),  62  Stat.  612-13,  as  amended,  50  U.S.C.A.  App.
§ 456(j)  (Supp.  1972).  In  1951,  the current  alternative  service  provision  was  estab-
lished-involving  individual  assignments  to  civilian  jobs  rather  than  public  service
camps.  Universal  Military  Training  and  Service  Act,  ch.  144,  § 1(q),  65  Stat.  86
(1951),  as amended, 50  U.S.C.A.  App.  §456(j)  (Supp.  1972).
284 In fact, under  the current  system a man with  a I-A-O  classification  is  likely
to be assigned  as a medic and is more likely to serve in  a combat  zone and be exposed
to  dangerous  duties  than  is  a I-A  soldier.  A.  TATUM  & J.  TucHIaNsKY,  GUIDE  TO
THE  DRAFT  208  (1969).  That  situation  would  probably  change  under  the  proposed
system,  however,  because  of  a large  increase  in  the number  of  noncombatant  classi-
fications.  The  greater  danger  of  I-A-0  status  today,  and  the  consequent  apparent
sincerity  of an  applicant  for that  status,  may be  partially  responsible  for the  (pres-
ently illegal)  practice of some  draft  boards  of automatically  granting applications  for
I-A-O  as opposed  to 1-0 status.  See Rabin,  supra note  36, at 669.  See also id. 651-
52,  670-72.  Another  likely  cause  under  the  quota  system  was that  I-A-O's  counted
towards a draft  board's  quota, though  I-O's  did  not.  Note  140 supra. 285 While  such  adjustments  may  seem  awkward  and  impracticable,  they  are
necessary  even under a scheme  like the existing one in a total or  near-total  mobiliza-
tion  situation.  Such  a calculus  was  made, for  one  example,  during  World  War  I.
At that time,  the  scope  of the  conscientious  objector  exemption  was  determined  only
after a preliminary  survey  of the number  of objectors  who  would  be  involved.  The
administration  concluded  that because  the objectors  were not  numerous  "a very  gen-
erous  and considerate  mode  of treatment"  would  be possible.  D.  BEAVER,  NEWTOx  D.
BAI:ER  AND  THE  AMERIcA  WAR  EFFORT:  1917-1919,  at  232  (1966).  It  sought  to
eliminate  the  problem  of the generosity  of the  exemption  attracting  false  claims  first
by  limiting the  exemption  to members  of peace  churches, see Hearings  on  the Selec-
tive Service Act Before the Hotse Comm. on  Military Affairs, 65th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.
9  (1917),  and  later by  keeping  secret  the generosity  with  which  the objectors  were
treated,  see note  278  supra.
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incentive varying with the wealth of the particular draftee.2"6  (Adjust-
ments could be made either  by classification-so  that the desirability  of
a particular  classification  in terms  of  the  danger,  discomfort,  and/or
rewards involved would be the relevant criterion--or they could be made
according to the particular  assignment  that an individual received-in
which case  all persons  who in fact served  in a war  zone,  for example,
doing work of equal danger would be treated the same way whether they
were classified as combatants  or noncombatants.)
The best approach would equalize the burden on conscientious  ob-
jectors  with that on other persons  and also have  the advantage  of not
forcing to enter the military many of those objectors with conscientious
scruples  against  entering:  Congress  could  retain  alternate  service  for
those  opting for  it if,  at the  same  time,  it increased  the  likelihood  of
service for those who  chose to perform it in a civilian capacity.  Under
such  a system  persons who  registered  for  alternate  service  might,  for
example, have to serve automatically, regardless  of whether their lottery
numbers  would make  them  liable  to  induction  if  they were  willing  to
enter  the  military.  Some conscientious  objectors  to  military  service,
however,  would  still  have  to  enter.  A  system  of  automatic  alternate
service could  operate only for  those persons  expressing their desire for
such service prior to the determination  of their lottery number.  There
would have to be a subsidiary system for persons becoming objectors or
registering  their  objection  only  after their  lottery  position  showed  a
likelihood  that  they  would  be  vulnerable  to  military  service.  Such
persons  would  have to  enter  the  miliary  but would  be  able to  elect  a
noncombatant  status  that  was  equalized,  to  avoid  false  claims,  with
combatant service.257
Under any of these versions of a self-selection proposal  some per-
sons  who have deep-seated  religious  beliefs  that it  is wrong for them
to enter the military will be forced  either to violate their consciences  or
be liable to imprisonment; and, under  any but the last version,  a great
many persons  may be subject to  that dilemma.  That  is  the most ap-
parent  objection  to  adopting  a  self-selection  system.28  This  Article
2S6 See note 282 supra & note 288  infra.
287  Compare  this  to  the  situation  of  the  person  whose  objection  is  late  in
crystallizing under the present  system,  see notes  304-05  infra & accompanying  text.
28
8 Another  objection  that might be  raised,  and  that was  raised when  the  House
bill  prior  to  the  recent  statutory  amendment  provided  for  a  third  year  of  alternate
service for  I-0  objectors,  H.R.  REtP.  No. 433,  92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  21-22  (1971),  is
that conscientious  objectors  are discriminated  against,  in  violation  of the  first amend-
ment free  exercise  clause  and  of  the  fifth  amendment  due process  clause,  when  they
are made  to serve  for  a  longer  time than  other  draftees.  A  similar  objection  could
be voiced  if objectors  were paid  less,  or  if they were  made  more likely  to  serve.
The objection is  not fatal  to the  proposal.  If  there  is a  self-selection  system  for
noncombatant  service  and  if  persons  not  compelled  by  conscience  choose  noncom-
batant  rather  than  combatant  service,  it  must  be  because  that  service,  though  more
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vill not discuss the question, thoroughly explored elsewhere,5 9  whether
the first  amendment's  guarantee  of  free  exercise  of  religion  requires
an exemption from military service for  conscientious objectors.  While
a colorable argument can be made that an exemption is required, 9'  lan-
guage  in Supreme  Court opinions  has  consistently  expressed  the view
that the exemption  is an act of legislative  grace and that conscientious
objectors  could  constitutionally  be  subjected  to  the  same  military
service as other citizens.291   Moreover, the Supreme  Court has recently
onerous  than  combatant  service  in  some  respects,  is  altogether  not  less  desirable.
Even if there were not a self-selection  system,  one  would have  to ask, in  determining
whether  the types of service  were equal,  whether  those  not  conscientiously  compelled
to  take  noncombatant  service  might  be  equally  content  with  it.  Simply  showing  a
longer  period  of  service would  thus  not  show  a  discrimination  against  the  conscien-
tious objector.
There might  be  created,  however, such  a  disparity  in  the  periods  of  service  that
the conscientious  objector could show discrimination  against him.  If in a self-selection
system  the only  persons  choosing  to become  noncombatants  were  those  compelled  by
conscience  not  to  kill, it would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  conditions  of  noncombatant
service  in the aggregate  were substantially  more burdensome  than those  of combatant
service.  The fact  that persons compelled  by conscience  continued  to  sign up  for  non-
combatant  service would  not  show equality  because  those  persons  by  definition  would
not be exercising  a choice.
Even  if  conscientious  objectors  in  that  situation  could  show  they  were  being
treated  more harshly than  other persons who  serve, they would  also  have to  cross  the
hurdle  of  showing  that  the  harsher  service  was  unconstitutional.  For  the  govern-
ment  would  doubtless  argue  that since  it could  constitutionally  require  conscientious
objectors  to  enter  the  military  as  combatants,  see  text  accompanying  notes  289-93
infra, it can  constitutionally  instead put  each  objector  to  a  choice  betveen  entering
as  a combatant  and  performing  a harsher form  of service.  Whether  the  government
would  prevail  in  that  argument  should  depend  upon  whether  the  requirement  of
harsher  service  is  to  some  extent  necessitated  by  the  grant  of  the  privilege  not  to
serve  as  a  combatant  (assuming  that  this  is  a  privilege  and  not  a  right).  See
French,  Unconstitutional Conditions: An  Analysis, 50  GEo.  L..  234  (1961).
The  only  instance  from  history  where  a  case  of  discrimination  might  plausibly
be made  is in the  World War II  failure  to  compensate  1-O's serving in Civilian  Pub-
lic  Service  Camps.  See note  281  supra.  Failure  to pay conscientious  objectors  is  a
poor means  of equalizing  their  burden with nonobjectors  because the  degree  of equal-
ization  varies with the circumstances  of the individual.  To the rich objector, alternate
service  might still  seem  vastly  superior  to  military  service,  whereas  to the poor  man
alternate  service  might  be  an  utter  impossibility.  The  discrimination  therefore  is
limited  to  the  poor  conscientious  objector;  it  is  not  against  I-O's  in  general.
289 See,  e.g.,  R.  DRINAN,  RELIGION,  THE  COURTS,  AND  PUBLIC  POLICY  15-20
(1963);  W. KATz,  RELIGION  AND  AxsmlcA,  CONSTrrUTIONS  20-21  (1964);  P.  KIm-
LAND,  RELIGION  AND  THE LAW  37-49  (1962)  (discussing  cases)  ; Brodie  & Souther-
land,  Conscience, the  Constitution, and  the  Supreme Court:  The  Riddle  of  United
States  v.  Seeger,  1966  Wis.  L.  REv.  306,  319-27;  Conklin,  Conscientious Objector
Provisions: A  View  in the Light of  Torcasco  v. Watkins,  51  GEo.  LJ. 252  (1963)  ;
Donnici,  Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A  Study  of  the  Cur-
rent  Conscientious Objector Exemption  From Military Service,  13  J.  PUB.  L.  16
(1964)  ; Mansfield,  Conscientious Objection--1964 Term, 1965  RELIGION  & PUB.  OaDE
3,  59-81;  Note, 34 U. CHL  L. REv. 79  (1966).
290 See, e.g., Brodie  & Southerland, supra note 289, at 319-27;  Freeman,  Exemp-
tions from  Civil Responsibilities, 20  OHIo  ST.  L.J.  437,  444-53  (1959).  Hochstadt,
The  Right to  Exemption From Military Service  of  a Conscientious Objector to  a
Particular War, 3  HARv.  Civ. RIGHTs-Cv.  Lmn.  L.  REv.  1, 37-50  (1968);  Macgill,
Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA.  L. REv.
1355,  1389-93  (1968).
291 See United  States  v. Macintosh,  283  U.S.  605,  623-24  (1931),  overruled  on
other grounds, Girouard v. United  States,  328  U.S.  61  (1946)  ; Hamilton  v.  Regents,
293  U.S.  245,  266-68  (1934)  (Cardozo,  J.,  concurring)  ;  Selective  Draft  Law  Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 389-90  (1918).  Cf. In re Summers,  325  U.S.  561,  572-73  (1945).
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held that under  congressional  legislation  at least two  kinds of religious
objectors must enter the military,292  and it has found no constitutional
problem with the legislation  even where  the religious  objector  was not
exempt  from the  obligation of  killing. 293
It  seems  likely,  then,  that  the  constitutionality  of  the  proposal
would be  sustained.  The question still to be faced  is whether it is wise
to  impose  the  obligation  of  entering  the  military  on  the  convinced
conscientious  objector.  The primary case  in favor  of doing  so  is that
only by that means can a system of conscription relieve  all those deeply
opposed to killing other persons  from a legal obligation to  do  so.  Our
current  scheme  is to  allow  conscientious  objector status  to a few  and,
if  their  conscientious  scruples  extend  that  far,  to  relieve  them  fully
from military duty.  Though the scheme may appear more humane than
one obliging conscientious  objectors to enter the military, it is not more
humane when  one considers the price paid for allowing total  exemption
to the few.  In the first place,  a system  of selection  is made  necessary
and,  as  discussed  above,  that  system  is  peculiarly  and  inevitably  un-
reliable.  Members of established peace churches and persons well repre-
sented  by  counsel  are  particularly  favored  in  the  selection  scheme.
There  can  be no  doubt that valid  claims  are  denied  with  considerable
frequency.  Those unfortunate  enough to have  their claims denied  are
subject to full military duty, including the duty to kill.  But serious as
they are, the inaccuracies  of the selection  process are not the only area
of concern.  The current test for conscientious objection as well as being
difficult of application  is also irrational in its limitations.  Under present
rules,  some persons  with  conceded  religious  opposition  to entering the
military  are  nevertheless  put  to  a  choice  between  entering  and
imprisonment.
292 Gillette  v.  United  States,  401  U.S.  437  (1971)  (the  selective  conscientious
objector)  ; Ehlert  v.  United  States,  402  U.S.  99  (1971)  (the  person  whose  conscien-
tious objection  does  not crystallize  until  after  the mailing of  his notice  to report  for
induction).  The  cases  are discussed  at text  accompanying notes  294-306  infra.  It  is
worth  noting at  this point,  however, that  while  the Court  in  Gillette confined  to  se-
lective  objectors  its  holding  that requiring  service  did not  violate  the  free  exercise
clause,  the  Court  in  Ehlert gave  some  indication  that  it  thought  it  constitutionally
permissible  to  require  all  conscientious  objectors  to  perform  noncombatant  service.
The  Court  said  that  "[t]he  only  unconditional  right  conferred  by  statute  upon  con-
scientious  objectors  is  exemption  from  combatant training  and  service,"  402  U.S.  at
102  (emphasis  in  original),  and  that  the  right to  alternate  service  "arises  only  if  a
registrant's  'claim  is  sustained  by  the  local  board.'"  Id. at  103  (quoting  from  the
Selective  Service  statute).  Cf.  Clark  v.  Gabriel,  393  U.S. 256,  258  (1968).  While
the  statement  is  nonsense-since  it  would  indicate  that  the  denial  of  a  I-0  classi-
fication  by a  board  is  unreviewable,  which  plainly  is  not  the law-the  fact  that  the
Court  said  this was  statutory policy and indicated  no  doubts as  to  its constitutionality
is  some  evidence  of the  view  it would  take were the  constitutionality  of such  a pro-
vision  actually  before  it.
293Although  persons  like  the  objector  in  Ehlert have  an  opportunity  to  have
their  conscientious  objector  claim  sustained  before  they  are  assigned  to  combatant
duty, see text accompanying  note  306  infra, selective  objectors,  like  those involved  in
Gillette, can  be  put to a  choice  between  combatant  service  and imprisonment.PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR  CASES
In  Gillette v.  United States,9 '  the  Supreme  Court  held that  the
Selective  Service statute does not grant a conscientious objector  exemp-
tion to persons whose opposition is to participation  in a particular  war
rather than war in general and that the exemption, as limited, is consti-
tutionally permissible.  The  Court  did  not rest its  decision  that  Con-
gress  could  constitutionally  differentiate  in  its  treatment  of  selective
objectors and general  objectors  on the ground that selective  objectors'
opposition to participation in war is necessarily less profound or that it
is  necessarily political  and  not  religious.  On the  contrary, the  Court
assumed that the objections of the petitioners  in the cases before it were
sincere  and religious in nature.
2 9 5   One of the petitioners,  Gillette,  was
a humanist.  The  other,  Negre,  was  traditionally  religious;  he was  a
devout  Roman  Catholic.  The  Catholic  Church  is  not  pacifist  but
maintains  that there  are  just and  unjust wars.  While the  institution
has not taken a position on the justice of the Vietnam conflict, it imposes
on  each  member  the  duty  of  reaching  his  own  conclusion  whether  a
particular  conflict  is  just  and  refraining  from  participating  in  those
conflicts that are unjust.  For a Catholic to participate  in a conflict he
has concluded  is  unjust violates his religion in the same  way it would
for a Quaker to be forced to participate  in any war.296
The  Court held  that nevertheless  it did  not violate  the  establish-
ment clause  for the  Selective  Service  statute to  cause  disparate  treat-
ment  of  Quakers  and  Catholics.  In  the  Court's  view, the  aim  of  the
statute was not to favor one  religion  over  another,  and though  it had
that effect, it was justified by a neutral, secular purpose. 29T  That pur-
pose principally was  the government's  interest  in having a  "fair, even-
handed, and uniform"  selection process.29  It  was thought that  recog-
nizing selective objection would  interfere  with this  goal because  of the
difficulties  of  distinguishing  the  religious  selective  objector  from  one
294401  U.S.  437  (1971).
295 Id. at  440-41,  447,  458.
296 See id. at 441.  With regard  to  the  Roman  Catholic  "just war"  doctrine,  ,see
generally J. RYAN,  MODERN  WAR  AND  BASIc  ETHIcs  (1933);  G.  VANN,  MORALITY
AND  WAR  (1939).
29T The Court  held  also  that for  the  same  reason  the limitation  to  universal  ob-
jectors  does not violate  the  due process  clause  of the fifth amendment  as an  arbitrary
and  capricious  enactment.  401  U.S. at  449  n.14.  On  the  same  ground  it rejected  a
claim  that the  statute violated  the  free  exercise  clause  by  requiring  religious  selec-
tive objectors  to serve in violation of their religion:  a valid  and  secular  governmental
purpose  justified  the burden  placed  upon  the  selective  objector's  exercise  of  his  re-
ligion.  Id.
2
98 Id. at 455.  The Court mentioned  other  secular  purposes  for  the  exemption  as
well-e.g.,  the  recognition  that  conscientious  objectors  were  unlikely  to  be  effective
soldiers and  the unwillingness  to  put conscientious  objectors to a  choice  between  their
conscience  and  imprisonment-Id.  at 452-53;  but  those  purposes  apply  equally  to  the
sincere  selective  objector.
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whose  dissent was  merely political.  If selective  objection were  recog-
nized,  the  Court  reasoned
[t]here  is a danger that  as between  two  would-be  objectors,
both having  the same complaint  against  a war,  that objector
would  succeed  who  is  more  articulate,  better  educated,  or
better  counseled.  There  is  even a danger  of unintended  re-
ligious  discrimination-a  danger  that  a  claim's  chances  of
success  would  be  greater  the  more  familiar  or  salient  the
claim's  connection with conventional  religiosity could be made
to  appear.
2 9 9
Finally the Court thought
[I] t is not unreasonable to  suppose that some persons who are
not prepared  to assert  a  conscientious  objection,  and  instead
accept  the  hardships  and  risks  of  military  service,  may  well
agree at all points with the objector, yet conclude,  as a matter
of conscience,  that they  are personally  bound by  the decision
of the democratic process.  The fear  . . . is that exemption
of  objectors  to particular  wars would  weaken the  resolve  of
those  who  otherwise  would  feel  themselves  bound  to  serve
despite  personal  cost,  uneasiness  at the prospect  of  violence,
or even  serious  moral  reservations  or policy objections  con-
cerning the  particular  conflict.
. . . [R] eal dangers  . . . might  arise if an exemption
were made  available that  in its nature  could  not be adminis-
tered  fairly  and  uniformly  over  the  run  of  relevant  fact
situations.  Should it be thought that those who go to war are
chosen unfairly or capriciously, then a mood of bitterness and
cynicism  might  corrode  the  spirit  of  public  service  and  the
values  of willing performance  of a citizen's  duties that are the
very heart  of free government 00
While  these considerations  may be true for  selective  conscientious
objection,  they  are  also  true  of  the  conscientious  objector  exemption
when  selective  conscientious  objection  is  not  recognized.  The  Court
did not take the view in  Seeger that to  recognize  persons  as  conscien-
tious  objectors  who  are  not  religious  in  the  traditional  sense  would
seriously impair the fairness with which the Act is administered because
it would become very difficult to distinguish the legitimate conscientious
objector  from the  spurious  claimant,3 '  although the  argument  was  as
2 991d.  at  457.
3001d.  at 459-60.
301 See Brief for the United  States at 38,  80-82, United States  v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163  (1964).
Similar reasoning  caused the  Secretary  of  War  to  reject  the  efforts  of  some  to
have World War  I legislation  include nonreligious  as well as religious  objectors.  See
D.  JoHNsoN,  mipra note 280,  at  15-17.  He  said  that extending  the exemption  beyond
recognized peace  churches would open the way for "self-serving declaration[s]."  Hear-
ings on the Selective Service Act Before the House Comm.  on Military Affairs, 65th
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valid there as in Gillette.1 02   The persons denied conscientious  objector
exemption in Gillette seem to have objections to entering the military  3 0'
and participating  in war that  are,  in some  cases  at least,  as  strong  as
Cong.,  1st  Sess.  9  (1917).  And  Senator  Phelan  arguing  against  extending  the  ex-
emption  beyond  members  of  peace  churches,  stated:  "If  we  respect  an  organization
. . . that has for a long time, not in contemplation  of this war or any other war, con-
scientiously  declared  its  principles,  it  would  be  well  for  us  to  do  it  without  opening
the  doors  to  every  slacker  who,  without  any  sincere  and  long-established  convictions
might  declare  also  his  so-called  'conscientious  scruples'  in  order  to  avoid  service."
55  CONG.  Rc. 1399  (1917).
302 In fact, it  is unlikely  that administrative  problems  concerning the  draft would
appreciably  increase  if  selective  objection  were  recognized.  It  is  difficult  to  believe
that  the  Gillette holding  will  deter  many  persons  who  are  legally  counselled  from
seeking  conscientious  objector  status, for  the  line  between  a selective  and  a universal
objector is  not easily defined or proved.  The holding  instead has made prerequisite  to
conscientious  objector  status  one more  administrative  finding  where  the  well-advised
and the willing-to-fabricate  will be advantaged  over the ignorant  and the  honest.
The  objective  evidence  (if  there  is  any)  of  many  registrants  objecting  only  to
particular  wars  is unlikely  to  show whether  the  registrant's  opposition  is  particular-
ized  or  general.  Those  registrants,  then,  who  are  willing  to  dissimulate  can  claim
universal  rather  than  selective  opposition.  In  most  cases  where  objective  evidence
precludes  the fabrication,  the evidence  would  also  show  the registrant  disqualified  be-
cause  his opposition  is  political  rather  than  "religious"  in  the statutory  sense.
The  problem of isolating  the  selective  objector  is not limited  to  instances  of out-
right falsehood.  Many  selective  objectors  could  in  good  faith  characterize  their  ob-
jections  as  universal,  if  they were  aware  of  the  possibility.  When  two  wars  are  in
progress and  a man feels  willing to  fight  in one but not  the other,  it is  clear that his
objection  is  selective.  Whenever  he  objects  to  all  present  wars,  however,  his  selec-
tivity is much less clear.  Gillette leaves  room for  an argument that a man should not
consider  himself  disqualified  because  he thinks  he  might be willing  to  fight in  some
future  conflict:  "Unwillingness  to  deny  the  possibility  of  a change  of mind,  in  some
hypothetical  future  circumstances,  may  be  no  more  than  humble  good  sense,  casting
no  doubt  on  the claimant's  present  sincerity  of belief."  401  U.S.  at  448.  The  Court
said  "there  is  an obvious  difference  between  present  sincere  objection  to  all  war,  and
present  opposition  to  participation  in  a particular  conflict  only,"  id., but  if  one pres-
ently objects  to all  present wars  the  line is  much less  clear.  Similarly  draft  manuals
counsel  that one may claim universal  objection  though  he might have  been  willing  to
fight  in  past  wars,  see,  e.g.,  A.  TATum  &  J.  TucHInSlY,  supra note  284,  at  190
(1969);  CENTRAL  Co  mrrT-E  FOR  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTORS,  HANDBOOK  FOR  CON-
SCIENTIOUS  OBJEcToRS  44-45  (10th  ed.  1970),  and  the  case  of  Sicurella  v.  United
States,  348  U.S.  385  (1955),  can be read  to  support  this  conclusion.  Clearly the  de-
gree of  certainty a man has  as to  whether he  would or  would not have fought  in  an-
other  war is one factor  in deciding whether  he is a universal objector.  But with  such
uncertain  tests  of what  constitutes  selective  objection  it  is difficult  to believe  the  Su-
preme  Court's Gillette holding contributed  to  a "fair, evenhanded,  and uniform"  selec-
tion process.
303 It  might  be  unnecessary,  if  the  current  scheme  did  recognize  selective  ob-
jection, for  selective objectors  to receive  I-0 status  rather  than  entering  the military
and  then declining  to  support or  participate  in  the particular  conflict  to which  they
object.  Since  currently  the objector  cannot  be  sure  that he  will  not  be  used  in  the
conflict  to which  he objects if he enters the military, it is reasonable  for him to object
to  entering  at all.  The  alternatives  would  be either  to  violate  his  conscientious  be-
liefs,  or to  enter  and obey orders only until he was  asked  to participate  in the  conflict
to which  he objects.  At that time  he would  face  court-martial  for  refusing  to  obey
orders  and  be  subject  to  the  military justice  system.  His  selective  objection  would
not be a defense,  just as it  is not  in the  civilian  system where  he would  face prosecu-
tion if  he refused  to enter  the military at all.  United  States v.  Noyd,  18  U.S.C.M.A.
483,  40  C.M.R.  195  (1969).  See  Dep't of Defense  Directive  No.  1300.6,  § VB1,  SEL.
SERv.  L.  REP.  2326  (Aug.  20,  1971).  For  another  bar  to  the  objector  raising  his
defense  before  the military  tribunal,  see  id. § VB2.  See  also  Negre  v. Larsen,  418
F.2d  908  (9th  Cir.  1969),  aff'd  sub  nomr. Gillette  v.  United  States,  401  U.S.  437
(1971).
1972]946  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
the objections of universal  pacifists;  yet they must be willing to kill  or
else  face  imprisonment.
There  is another  instance as well in which the Supreme  Court has
recently  held that  persons  conscientiously  opposed  to  participation  in
war  must  enter  the  military.  In Ehlert v.  United States, the  Court
decided  that  one  whose  conscientious  objection  crystallizes  after  the
mailing  of  his notice  to  report  for  induction  may  not  raise  his  con-
scientious  objector  status  before  the  Selective  Service  board  or  in
defense of a criminal prosecution for  refusing to submit to induction.3 04
The only way he will be able to raise his conscientious  objector claim  is
by entering  the miliary and seeking  release  as a  conscientious  objector
under  military procedures. 05
304 Although  the  regulations  require  reopening  of  the  registrant's  classification
with  its  consequent  rights  to  personal  appearances  and  appeal  whenever  the  regis-
trant  presents  a  new  prima  facie  claim  of  conscientious  objection,  see  notes  33-35
supra & accompanying  text, the rule  differs  for claims made  initially after  the mailing
of  the  induction  notice.  The  local  board  cannot  reopen  those  claims  unless  it  "first
specifically  finds there has  been a change  in the registrant's  status  resulting from cir-
cumstances  over  which  the registrant  had  no control."  37 Fed. Reg. 5123  (1972)  (to
be  codified  at  32  C.F.R.  § 1625.2).  In Ehlert, the  Supreme  Court  was  to  decide  a
conflict  among  the  circuits  as  to whether  a registrant  becoming  a  conscientious  ob-
jector after  the mailing of his notice  to  report for  induction  (a)  necessarily  was,  (b)
might  or  might not  be,  or  (c)  could  not  be  a  circumstance  beyond  the  registrant's
control  (a)  requiring,  (b)  permitting, or  (c)  not allowing  the board to  reopen.  The
issue  was  of  some  moment  for,  while  a  claim  maturing  at that  late  date  might  be
sincere  and  otherwise  entitled  to  recognition,  the tool  for  delay  that  ability  to  force
reopening  always  gives  the  registrant,  see note  34  supra, might  be  particularly  sus-
ceptible  to  misuse  and  particularly  destructive  of  orderly  induction  procedures  if  it
were available  after  the  mailing  of a  notice  to  report.
The  Court's  opinion  does  not make absolutely  clear  which  of  the three  holdings
as  to  the  application  of  the regulation  it adopted.  Mr. Justice  Stewart's  opinion for
the  Court  begins  with  the statement:  "The  question in this  case  is  whether  a  Selec-
tive  Service  local board  must reopen  the  classification  of a registrant"  for  a  postin-
duction  notice  claim,  402  U.S.  at  100  (emphasis  added),  whereas  the  body  of  the
opinion  speaks  as though  the issue  is whether  the board  is permitted to  reopen.  See,
e.g., the  closing  sentence,  which  states:  "[W]e  hold that the  Court of Appeals  did not
misconstrue  the  Selective  Service  regulation  in  holding  that  it barred presentation to
the  local board  of a  claim  that allegedly  arose between  mailing  of a  notice  of  induc-
tion and the scheduled  induction date."  Id. at 107-08  (emphasis  added).  The  Court's
reasoning  best  accords  with  the  second  quoted  sentence  and  with  the  view  that  the
Court  has  concluded  that  a  board  may  not  reopen  such  a  claim.  It  accepted  the
government's  interpretation  of the  regulatory  language  that  the  "circumstances"  be-
yond a registrant's  control  had to be  "objectively  identifiable"  and  "extraneous"--such
as injury to  the  registrant  which  made  him  eligible  for a  physical  deferment.  Id. at
104-05.
It  might  still  be  argued  by  a  late-crystallizing  conscientious  objector  whose
change of heart  was  prompted by  such  an  "objectively  identifiable"  circumstance  that
he falls  within the  group  whose  late  claim  can  be  heard,  but  late  conscientious  ob-
jector  claims as a  general  class  will  not  qualify for  late  reopening.  The  Senate,  ap-
parently not content  with the holding of Ehlert, sought a provision  in the  1971  amend-
ments  prohibiting  induction  of  conscientious  objectors  whose  claims arise  after receipt
of an induction notice.  The  House  conferees,  however,  were adamant in  their opposi-
tion  to  this  proposal.  The  Senate  receded  "with  the  understanding  that  in  unusual
cases,  local boards would  have the  discretionary  authority  of  extending  to  such regis-
trants  a  hearing  on  their  late  claim  if  the  circumstances  so  warranted."  H.R.  REP.
No.  433,  92d  Cong.,  1st Sess.  22  (1971).
305 The  result  in  Ehlert was  dependent  on  the  Court's  conclusion  that  it  did
"not leave  a  'no man's  land'  time  period  in  which  a  claim  then  arising  could  not  be
presented  in  any  forum."  402  U.S.  at  102.  The  registrant  whose  claim  was  late  in
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The plight of the conscientious  objector  whose objection  was late
in crystallizing is obviously less severe than that of the selective objector
in that he need  enter the military only for purposes  of seeking release.
During the time he is seeking release he is not to be assigned to  duties
in conflict with his conscience, 3 06  and he will be faced with the prospect
of total military  service  only  if his  claim  of conscientious  objection  is
denied.  Nevertheless  it is an instance  where a person whose conscience
and/or religion forbids  him to enter the military  at all-not merely to
refrain from combat-is forced either  to face  imprisonment  or to enter
the military in violation of his conscience.
Under  the  proposed  self-selection  system,  selective  conscientious
objectors,  late  objectors,  and  others  who, for  one  reason  or  another,
would not presently qualify for alternate  or noncombatant  service could
be relieved from the duty of killing other human beings  if they  elected
to  perform,  instead,  whatever  noncombatant  service  was  available  to
objectors.  (Under the increased-likelihood-of-service  variant, preserv-
ing alternate  service,  some  of these  persons  could  also  qualify  for  al-
ternate service, but those who filed their claim after their lottery number
was  determined  would  be  required  to  enter  the  military.)  A  basic
supposition underlying this proposal  is that the most compelling reason
for  a person to  seek  exemption  from  military  service  is  that  he has
conscientious  scruples against taking human life and that it is therefore
arising  could present  it  to  military  authorities  after  induction.  If a  man  does  not
enter  the military,  however,  either  because  his  principles  forbid it or  because  he  is
ignorant  that  entry  is  the  only  avenue  for further  pursuit  of  his  claim,  he  has  no
forum  and  no  defense  to  criminal  prosecution.  The  result  is  harsh  for  such  a
registrant,  once  one  admits,  as  the Court  does,  id. at  104,  that  the  registrant's  con-
scientious  objection  may  be  sincere.
The result could  have  been  avoided  without giving  the registrant  power  to  cause
any  great  delay  in  his  induction.  The  Court  could  have  held  that  a  draft  board
should  pass,  on  a case-by-case  basis,  on  whether  there  has  been  a change  in  status
resulting from  circumstances  beyond  the  registrant's  control,  see note 304  supra, and
that  a proper  component  in  this inquiry  is  whether  the  registrant  is  sincere  in  his
claim.  The  decision  on  whether  the  registrant  qualifies  for  reopening  then  would
incorporate  a decision  on the merits.  If  the registrant  were found  insincere,  his  case
would not  be reopened  and  he would not gain  rights  to  personal  appearances  and  an
appeal.  He  would,  however,  have  had  an  opportunity  to  convince  his  local  board.
More important,  if he then  refused  induction,  he could  raise  any  local  board  error  in
denying  his  conscientious  objector  claim  as  a  defense  to  his  criminal  prosecution.
The  Second  Circuit  prior  to  the  Ehlert  decision  adopted  such  a  solution.  See
Paszel v. Laird,  426  F.2d  1169  (2d  Cir.  1970).
A  simpler method of preserving  a criminal  defense  for  the registrant who  refuses
induction,  and  a  method  that  involves  no  delay  whatsoever  in  the  induction  pro-
cedures,  would  be  to  allow  a  registrant  whose  objection  crystallized  late,  once  he
has refused  induction and  is  to be  criminally prosecuted,  to  have  a hearing  before his
local  board  on  whether  he  did  become  a  sincere  conscientious  objector  and  to  have
the  board's  conclusion  reviewable  by  a  court,  according  to  the  usual  basis-in-fact
standard  of  review,  in  defense  to the  criminal  prosecution.  If  registrants  with  late
conscientious  objector  claims  do,  however,  lose  all  forums  by  refusing  induction,
there  should  at least be  some  assurance  that when  faced  with the  choice  whether  to
submit  they be  meaningfully  advised  of the  consequences  of  the  decision.
306 Dep't  of  Defense  Directive  No.  1300.6,  §VIH,  SzL.  SERV.  L.  REP.  2330
(Aug. 20,  1971).
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more  important  for  society  to  grant  that  exemption  to  all  persons
sincerely  seeking it than it is to respect  the beliefs  of persons  who  feel
it is wrong for them to enter the military at all.3" 7  To force a person to
do  an  act  that  is  forbidden  by  his  religion  may  possibly  be  a  more
serious  impingement  on his  freedom  than  to forbid  him  to  do  an  act
that his  religion  requires.3 ° 8  More  important,  when  the  required  act
is  one  that  society  itself  regards  as  abhorrent  in most  circumstances,
there  is particularly persuasive  reason for honoring the individual's  de-
cision that he cannot in good conscience  comply.
A person  may,  of  course,  believe  that  it  is  wrong  to  enter  the
military just as strongly as  others believe  that it is  wrong to  kill, and
society's  toleration  of  diverse  religious  philosophies  should  not  gen-
erally  depend  upon  whether  a  religion's  views  are  understandable  or
acceptable to  society  as a whole.3 09   Nevertheless  it does  seem  proper,
or at least permissible, for society, when it is exempting a group from a
generally-imposed  obligation,  to make a judgment  that an  aversion  to
killing is of a different order in the scale of values  than an aversion to
doing other things-for example, entering  the military, wearing  a uni-
form, bearing  arms  310  and  to give  recognition  to that objection  while
refusing to recognize other objections that it views as less compelling.3 11
307 Indeed,  it is  either  expressly  stated  or  implicitly  assumed  by  those  who  con-
tend  that  the  conscientious  objector  exemption  is  constitutionally  required  that  the
source of the requirement  is the fact that in the military one may be forced  to kill,  an
act normally  vigorously  frowned  upon by  society.
308 This  argument  is  made  in  Stone,  supra note  280,  at 268;  Clark,  Guidelines
for the Free Exercise Clause, 83  HAxv.  L.  REv.  327,  345-46  (1969);  Macgill,  supra
note 290,  at  1390-91  (1968).
309 Cf.  United  States  v.  Seeger,  380  U.S.  163,  184-85:
The  validity  of  what  [an  applicant  for  conscientious  objector  status]
believes  cannot  be  questioned.  . . . [Such  an  inquiry  is]  foreclosed  to
Government.  As  M,.  JusTIcE  DouGLAs  stated  in  United States v.  Ballard,
322  U.S.  78,  86  (1944):  "Men  may  believe  what  they  cannot  prove.
They  may  not  be  put  to  the  proof  of  their  religious  doctrines  or  beliefs.
Religious  experiences  which  are  as  real  as  life  to  some  may  be  incompre-
hensible  to  others."  Local  boards  and  courts  in  this  sense  are  not  free  to
reject  beliefs  because  they  consider  them  "incomprehensible."  Their  task
is  to  decide  whether  the  beliefs  professed  by  a registrant  are  sincerely  held
and whether  they are, in his own  scheme  of things,  religious.
310 A case  can  be  made  that those  who  limit  themselves  to  alternate  service  are
more  principled  than  those  willing  to  engage  in  noncombatant  service  because  they
refuse  not only  to  participate  directly  in  killing but  also  to  be  any part of  a system
that  has  that  as  its  aim.  The  rationale,  however,  would  carry  over  to  non-
payment  of  any  taxes  to  support  the  war,  and  perhaps  even  to  nonpayment  of  any
taxes  to  a  government  that  engages  in  war.  Moreover,  in  anything  short of  a total
mobilization  situation,  a  conscientious  objector  who  declines  to  serve  at  all  in  the
armed  forces  does  not thereby  reduce  the  number  of  persons  who  will  serve  or the
number  of  lives  that  will  be  taken.  He  simply  withdraws  himself  from  the  system
so that another person must take his  place.  If one  focuses on  those facts, the  I-A-O's
role  appears  at  least  as principled  as  the  I-O's.
311 Conscientious  opposition to  governmental  obligations  other  than  military  ones
by  the  same  token  is  not  by  any  means  generally  honored.  See,  e.g.,  Cantwell  v.
Connecticut,  310 U.S.  296,  303-04  (1940)  ; Jacobson  v. Massachusetts,  197  U.S.  11,  29
(1905);  cf.  Cleveland  v.  United  States,  329  U.S.  14,  20  (1946).PROOF IN  CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR  CASES
Even  under  the  current  scheme  of  conscientious  objection  where  we
have satisfied  groups  like the  Quakers  by allowing them  the option  of
alternative  service,  we  make  discriminating  judgments  about  the  im-
portance  of various  religious  objections  concerning  war  and we honor
some  more than  we do  others.  Jehovah's  Witnesses  have long  taken
the position that performing  alternative service,  as well  as entering the
military, is in violation of their conscientious beliefs."'  Their religious
objection has not been recognized,  and they have been put to the choice
of violating their convictions  in this  respect or facing imprisonment. 3
Others  have found  it  contrary  to  their  conscience  to  register  for  the
draft, 314  or  to pay  taxes  to  support  the war,315  but  Congress  has  not
honored their  objections  even when  they are  as  sincere  and  as  deeply
felt as  interests  that  are  respected.  The  precise  line  which  has  been
drawn  in the  past  was  influenced  by  political  forces, 3 16  and  doubtless
such  forces  shall  continue  to  shape the  policy for  the  future.  But  if
principle  were  to govern,  it would  seem that the  interests  now  recog-
nized  as  sufficient  to  justify  the  grant  of  permission  to  perform
alternative  service  in  lieu  of noncombatant  service-that  it  violates  a
man's  conscience  to be any  part of a  system that  attains its  objectives
by  destroying  human  beings;  that  the  conscientious  objector  cannot
wear  a  uniform  because  he  believes  it  indicates  approval  of  military
312 See Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses:  Conscientious Objectors, 28  S.  CAL.  L. REv.
123,  130  (1955).  The  religion's  official  doctrine  is  that  each  individual  Witness
should  interpret  for  himself  what  implications  Witness  doctrine  has  for  his  action.
M.  SIBLEY  & P. JACOB,  supra note 278,  at 35.  In  practice,  however,  it  is  expected
that  a  Jehovah's  Witness  will  not  accept  alternate  service.  Id.
313 During  the  1940's  and  the  1950's  from  80  to  90%  of  all  conscientious  ob-
jectors involved in criminal  prosecutions  were Jehovah's  Witnesses.  See Smith & Bell,
supra note  147, at  711,  714.
314 Cf.  McGee v. United States,  402  U.S.  479  (1971).
31r See,  e.g.,  Joan  Baez'  refusal  to  pay  income  taxes,  reported  in  N.Y.  Times,
Apr. 16,  1965,  at  35,  col.  2.  The government ultimately,  but without  her  cooperation,
recovered the money due from her.  N.Y.  Times, Mar. 6,  1966,  at 72,  cols. 1-2.  Com-
pare  the  Dunkards'  religiously-based  refusal  during  the  Indian  Wars  either  to
render military  service or  to pay a  commutation  fee,  and the  government's  subsequent
extraction  of  the  fee,  described  in  1  SELECTIVE  SERVICE  SYSTEM,  CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION  32  (Special  Monograph  No.  11,  1950).
316 During the period  when  the World War  I  exemption  was  being  formulated,
the  Quakers,  the  Mennonites,  and  the  American  Union  Against  Militarism  (a
precursor  of  the  American  Civil  Liberties  Union)  were  active  in  working  for  an
exemption.  The  provision  that  finally  emerged  was  influenced  by  the fact  that  the
peace  churches'  principal  concern  was  an  exemption  for  themselves,  see,  e.g.,
G.  HERSHBERGER,  supra note  283,  at  114-19,  and  the American  Union  Against  Mili-
tarism's  attempts  to  win  recognition  for  all  religious  objectors  was  undermined  by
their  efforts  on behalf  of political  objectors  as well.  See D. JOHNSON,  supra note 280,
at  14-18.  The  political  maneuvers  leading  up  to  the  World  War  II  conscientious
objector  provisions  are described  in M.  SIBLEY  & P. JACOB,  supra note 278,  at 45-52.
During  that  period  the  peace  churches  and  the  ACLU  did  originally  push  for  an
exemption  for  absolutists  and  for  nonreligious  objectors  as  well  as  for  the  cat-
egories  ultimately  exempted,  but  they  failed  in  that  endeavor.  See  NATIONAL
SERVICE  BOARD  FOR  RELIGIOUS  OBJECTORS,  CONGRESS  LOOKS  AT  THE  CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR  (1943).
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objectives; that it is wrong to minister to an injured military man since
that  will  enable  him  to  resume  his  destructive  duties  sooner "!-are
more akin  to  the  interest  in  not paying  war  taxes,  or  the  Jehovah's
Witness' objection to performing even alternative  service,  than they are
to  the  conscientious  objector's  conceived  duty  not to  kill. 31
The virtues of the present proposal are that it would recognize  the
most compelling interest in avoiding combatant  service and that it could
operate  far  less  capriciously  than  the present  system  of  selecting  ob-
jectors  and  granting  them  privileged  status,  by  granting  exemption
from  combatant  service  to  all who  profess  conscientious  objection  to
taking life and  by requiring them  to perform noncombatant  service  of
comparable  risks  and  burdens.
317 These  are  the  arguments  that  the  manuals  for  draft  registrants  most  com-
monly  suggest  using  in  support  of  the  position  that  a  man's  conscientious  objection
will  not permit  him  to serve  in  a  noncombatant  capacity.  See,  e.g.,  CENTRAL  Com-
MITTEE  FOR  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTORS,  HANDBOOK  FOR  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTORS
41  (10th  ed.  1970).
31s Along with their lobbying,  see  note 316 supra, another  probable  reason  for
recognition of the interests of groups  like the Quakers is  their  respectability.  See  1
SELECTIVE  SERVICE  SYSTEM,  CONSCIENTIOUS  OBJECTION  42  (Special  Monograph
No.  11,  1950);  United  States  v.  Schwimmer,  279 U.S.  644,  655  (1929)  (Holmes,  J.,
dissenting).  Adopting  a  system  that  would  require  us  to  imprison  a  substantial.
number  of  Quakers  might not  sit  well  with  the  American  people.  Yet imprisoning
Jehovah's  Witnesses  for  observing  their  religious  beliefs  creates  little  stir.  The
proposed  system  would  put  Quakers  and  Jehovah's  Witnesses  alike,  together  with
nonreligious  persons  holding  the  same  beliefs,  to  a  choice  between  observing  their
beliefs and  facing  imprisonment  or  performing  noncombatant  service.  The  imprison-
ment  of  many  persons  presently  allowed  to  perform  alternate  service  might  well
result.  On  the  other  hand,  once  the  unavailability  of  the  alternate  service  route
became  established,  a  number  of  persons  from  peace  churches  whose  members  now
regularly  receive  a 1-0  exemption  might  well  enter  the military.  The  World War  I
experience  provides  some  basis  for  this  prediction.  While  some  persons  followed
their  faith  in  refusing  noncombatant  service  even  when  it  was  not  clear  that  such
a  refusal  would  go  unpunished,  see note  283  supra, a great  many  persons  chose  to
serve  in  a  combatant  capacity  contrary  to  the  tenets  of  their  faith.  The  segregation
of  conscientious  objectors  in  the military  camps  led  more than  80%o  of the more  than
20,000  persons  inducted  who  had  received  certificates  from  their  draft  boards  that
they  were  entitled  to  noncombatant  status  as  members  of  peace  churches  to
abandon  their  exemption  from  noncombatant  service.  STATEMENT,  supra  note  278,
at  16.  Similarly,  the  World  War  II  objectors  who  renounced  the  Civilian  Public
Service  Camps  because  they  needed  to  be  compensated  for  their  work,  while  fewer
in  number, illustrate  the  obvious  proposition  that not  all  objectors  are beyond  being
influenced  by  the legal provisions  as  to  whether  they  must enter  the  military  and  by
the  rewards  or  penalties  attached  thereto.